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Analysis of competition in European open access long-distance 
passenger rail markets, by Lisa Irene Feuerstein  
This thesis explores factors influencing open access competition in long-
distance passenger rail transport in Europe. It fills a gap in the existing literature 
by providing expert opinions on open access competition, by identifying and 
rating factors influencing competition positively or negatively as well as their 
correlation and shift over time, and by comparing practical examples of 
influencing factors in two cases. To answer the research questions, a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology was applied: a Delphi 
study helped to construct a theoretical framework, the case study filled the 
framework with practical examples. To structure and frame the analysis and to 
reveal the cause-and-effect relationships, a PESTLE analysis was used. It 
clustered the identified factors into political, economic, social, technical, legal 
and environmental influence. This structured research approach reveals the 
following findings: open access competition is a tool to revitalise the passenger 
rail market, it is beneficial for customers by increasing quality and often 
decreasing prices, and it can improve the efficiency of incumbent operators. 
However, only a slight increase in competition is expected within the next 10 
years. A total of 34 influencing factors were identified, of which political/legal 
and economic factors have the greatest influence. The findings show that the 
strength and type of factors vary between the different EU member states. An 
overall shift of factors can be observed over the last decade. It is also revealed 
that all factors closely relate to one another and are part of a network. Within 
this identified network, the right combination of influencing factors needs to be 
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present to make open access competition possible. Finally, this thesis shows 
that the introduction of a competitive market proved to be difficult, especially 
due to the slow introduction of the necessary legal framework and the high 
economic risks and long-term investments. However, open access competition 
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1.  Chapter 1: Introduction 
Almost 200 years ago in the age of industrialisation, the railway was a major 
force for social change all over Europe. Originally meant to transport goods 
such as coal, wood and steel, a market for personal mobility and railway travel 
developed quickly and the passenger figures increased exponentially. People 
could travel faster, more comfortably and consequently more often – cities and 
countries grew closer together and the railway added a new dimension of 
mobility for the entire population. Urban growth was taking place in interaction 
with human migration, industrial development and the extension of the rail 
network (Baron 2015). This marked the beginning of the golden age of 
passenger rail transport with its often prestigious lines. 
Yet, ever since the 1970s, rail’s share of passenger transport in Europe has 
declined from 10% to a stable 6% in the 2000s (Di Pietrantonio & Pelkmans 
2004, EC 2017g). The benefits of market growth in recent decades fell to other 
modes of transport such as private car travel, air or coach transport, while rail 
struggled to keep old and win new customers. The reasons for this development 
are diverse and were often initiated by political decisions. Over decades, 
politicians favoured air and road transport regarding investment in new 
infrastructure, tax regulation and so forth. The passenger rail industry itself was 
insufficiently dynamic and failed to adapt to changing customer wishes and new 
standards in the mobility market (Niedhart 2009). 
To break this trend and once again strengthen, modernise and revitalise rail 
transport in Europe, a new political and legal framework was established by the 
European Union (“EU”). New regulations and directives were introduced from 
1991 onwards to perform this task (Holvad 2009). This was a starting point for 




major changes in European passenger rail transport and resulted in gradual 
transformation which is still in progress. The old state monopolies were broken 
up step by step and new competitors started operation (Warnecke & Götz 
2012), on which this thesis focuses.  
Despite the changes which took place in recent years, European rail transport 
finds itself at a crossroads (EC 2011): new challenges such as the 
implementation of a pan-European train control system, or the adaptation to the 
growing opportunities due to digitalisation present themselves. Old challenges 
such as the high fixed-costs structure and the relatively slow liberalisation of the 
market remain. Several studies show that the existing law in the books is on the 
one hand not yet fully implemented and on the other hand is often transferred 
differently into national law (Laperrouza & Finger 2009, Everis 2010, Kirchner 
2011). This results in a fragmentation of the European rail market and naturally 
creates a difficult market environment for EU-wide competition.  
Since competition was introduced at varying speeds in different sections of the 
European rail market, it developed diverging forms. This thesis focuses on the 
specific type of open access competition in long-distance passenger rail, 
considering only day trains running on EU territory. Open access arrangements 
in the various countries are a condition for this type of competition, since EU 
regulation currently only manifests open access for international services 
through Directive 2007/58/EC. These open access arrangements are already 
implemented in national regulation in several EU countries, e.g. Germany, 
Sweden, the Czech Republic, Italy and Austria (Beckers et al. 2009, Holvad 
2009, Tomes et al. 2016). From December 2020 onwards, the open access 
competition provisions will be expanded to domestic passenger transport 
through Directive 2016/2370/EC. 
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However, despite the favourable political and legal conditions in some 
countries, open access competition still remains scarce even in these markets. 
This leads to the assumption that other factors besides the political and legal 
ones influence the likelihood of competition in the market. In this thesis, factors 
influencing competition are defined as circumstances or aspects that have an 
impact on or consequences for competition and encourage it in a positive or 
hinder/weaken it in a negative way. The factors can be different in type, 
therefore a PESTLE analysis is used: it groups the factors into political/legal, 
economic, social, technical, or environmental clusters. Influencing factors may 
include entry barriers that prevent competition, legal changes that enable 
competition, underlying determinants of the industry, preferences of the 
customers, etc.  
This assumption is further strengthened by a closer investigation of the different 
forms of existing open access competition, which reveals that competition 
between the new entrants and the state incumbents takes different forms: in 
Italy, the competitor Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori (“NTV”) established a high 
quality, high-speed concept with massive investments in rolling stock and aimed 
for a high market share from the first day of operation. In Germany, the 
competitor Locomore entered the market with conventional, second-hand rolling 
stock on only one route and later complemented the coach-network of its new 
owner, FlixBus. This also indicates that economic, social and technological 
factors influence competition in the market and shape it differently. This 
background leads to some important questions: 
• Which factors influence open access competition in long-distance 
passenger rail transport in Europe positively or negatively and thus 
promote or hinder competition? 




• Bearing in mind the different forms of competition: does the strength of 
individual influencing factors vary between countries and what is the 
reason for that?  
• How do the influencing factors interact and is there a correlation between 
influencing factors?  
• Can a shift of influencing factors be observed over time?  
By answering the above questions, this thesis contributes to the knowledge of 
market liberalisation, the gradual transformation process and the introduction of 
competition in the European long-distance passenger rail. It complements the 
mainly theoretical knowledge with findings from the existing competition. It aims 
to help decision makers and market players to understand and act in a 
competitive market and reach the goal of revitalisation of the passenger railway 
industry. In this way, it intends to help make rail more competitive and also 
reveal beneficial cooperation.  
1.1.  Research objectives 
In line with the important questions posed in the above section, the objective of 
this thesis is to identify positive and negative factors influencing this type of 
competition, their strength, their interplay, their shift over time and variations 
between countries. Since the market environment is complex and multi-layered, 
a PESTLE framework is applied (see 4.2.3.). It structures the process of 
collecting and clustering of factors into political/legal, economic, social, technical 
and environmental influences. Also, it guides the revealing of interrelations 
between factors as well as clusters. Finally, it allows the presentation of a 
holistic picture. This helps to deepen the understanding of the fragmented 
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European market and to answer the question, if open access competition is 
possible. 
More specifically, the research objectives are:  
1. to identify positive and negative factors influencing open access 
competition in long-distance passenger rail; 
2. to assess the strength of influencing factors;  
3. to explore the possible mutual correlation of influencing factors; 
4. to explore the possible shift of influencing factors over time; 
5. to analyse the differences in strength/type/correlation and shift of 
influencing factors between countries;  
6. to assess if a competitive market can be introduced into long-distance 
passenger rail and, if this is the case, how it can be achieved best.   
Objective 1 needs to be addressed first since all other objectives build on this 
step. After the fulfilment of objective 1, objective 2-4 can be initiated and worked 
on in parallel. Objective 5 needs to be addressed afterwards, since it requires a 
closer investigation of the outcome of objectives 1-4 and adds another 
dimension. However, the chosen philosophical background (4.1.) implies that 
the truth is pragmatic and experimental. This means that continual questioning 
and considering different perspectives is necessary throughout the whole study 
and that all objectives need to be reassessed in a dynamic process when new 
information appears. Objective 6 is the last objective to be addressed; it builds 
on the fulfilment of objectives 1-5.  
 
 




1.2. Motivation   
“Transport is an important area of academic study and one which is problem 
rich, stimulating a great deal of debate in areas which impact on everday lives” 
(Cowie & Ison 2018, p. 1).  
In times of liberalisation and increasingly faster innovation and change, the topic 
of this thesis is very relevant to the passenger rail industry as well as regulators 
and decision makers. Various examples from different backgrounds show that 
static and entrenched structures in industries, which have been stable over 
decades, can change fundamentally within a few years, leaving the companies 
involved with the choice between giving up or starting a reorientation. One 
prominent example for this is the telecommunications industry, which, like the 
railway industry, is considered a network industry (see section 2.1.). The 
European telecommunications market was protected over decades and 
characterised by powerful monopolies which dominated the market. After 
liberalisation in 1998, new players emerged quickly, leading to fierce 
competition. Consequently the rules of the game changed fundamentally: 
incumbents and new entrants were forced to reconsider their strategy and 
scope of business to survive and be successful (Fladung 2004).  
Long-term oriented industries with incremental change, like the railway industry, 
are particularly endangered by such developments, since they are slower to 
adapt to changes. It is therefore necessary to research this field to provide 
insights in the market development for policy makers, incumbents, and new 
competitors. It is certain that the railway sector faces fundamental changes, 
especially in passenger rail: the EU plans further liberalisation, the passenger 
mobility market is changing and new possibilities enabled by the internet and 
other technological innovations occur, e.g. driverless cars and trains. 
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However, rapid liberalisation, which could be observed in the 
telecommunications industry, has not yet occurred in the railway industry. The 
liberalisation of the railway market started three decades ago and is still an 
ongoing process, in some countries successful, in others less so. The 
widespread and extensive discussion around the Fourth Railway Package (see 
section 2.1.2. for a detailed definition) recently shows how many strong and 
differing opinions on passenger rail liberalisation exist and that further research 
on its nature is necessary. And open access competition, one of the most 
concise indicators of a liberalised market, is a particularly suitable field for 
further research.  
Finally, this thesis is also motivated by a lack of relevant literature on real life 
open access competition in the market. Current case studies and in-depth 
observations can provide rich, detailed insights in open access competition in 
Europe, but this has only been done by few researchers (e.g. Kirchner 2011, 
Warnecke 2014, Tomes et al. 2016, EC 2016b), with some of the research 
being outdated due to the recent market entry of new competitors. After the first 
bigger wave of new competitors starting in 2011, the present day is of special 
interest for researchers since it reveals much about open access competition in 
the market and its influencing factors. The coming years will show if the concept 
is successful and fulfils its purpose. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is structured as follows: chapter 1 will introduce the reader to the 
topic. Chapter 2 will give an overview of the network industry, the railway 
industry and the rail liberalisation process in Europe. An overview of six 
countries, where the Railway Reforms resulted in open access competition, 




introduces the reader to the cases which are analysed more closely later on in 
the thesis. In chapter 3, the literature review shows how the research topic can 
be set in the framework of existing literature and which issues have already 
been discussed there and which gaps exist. Chapter 4 illustrates the research 
methodology: it explains the aim and objectives of the thesis as well as its 
philosophical background. It also introduces the reader to the theoretical 
framework of Delphi studies, case study research and the PESTLE framework. 
Chapter 5 points out how the Delphi study was conducted, starting by outlining 
the Delphi process. Each stage of Delphi is reported individually, showing the 
development of findings through all stages. Chapter 6 introduces the case study 
framework and incorporates the investigation of the German and the Italian 
case. Chapter 7 gives a holistic examination of influencing factors and a 
weighting of the factors. Finally, chapter 8 draws a conclusion, giving a review 
of the core findings, recommendations for politicians and railway companies, 
and suggestions for further research.  
The following picture gives a graphical overview of the structure of the thesis, 
showing that Delphi study and case study play a central role and are closely 
interlinked:  



















2.  Chapter 2: Market and legal environment 
2.1. Background and definitions 
The following section gives an overview of the main economic and legal setting 
of this thesis. It starts by introducing competition in the network and the railway 
industry, including some relevant definitions. The section then discusses the 
liberalisation process of the European railway industry, including a detailed 
overview of the four Railway Packages.  
2.1.1.  Competition in the network and railway industry 
In the last three decades, network industries all over the world have undergone 
broad changes and have been subject to liberalisation, privatisation and 
profound reforms. The EU is no exception to this trend and ever since the 
Single European Act of 1987 and the single market programme, reforms have 
taken place in different network industries, such as the railway industry 
(Bickenbach 2000, Knieps 2006). To achieve efficiency and equity goals, 
competition is now seen as a more powerful tool than monopoly in network 
industries (Bickenbach 2000). As a special type of industry, network industries 
are characterised by a high degree of complexity and interdependency. A clear 
definition of networks and network industries is of importance for this thesis to 
understand the aspects underlying the railway industry. Therefore, the following 
section defines the core parameters and gives a general overview of the 
industry.  
A network is characterised as a number of links between connection points, 
where the links serve as transmission routes. Networks are complex systems, 
whereas individual parts cannot be examined in isolation due to various 
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interlinked elements (Knieps 2007). They consist of three elements: nodes, links 
and mesh. Nodes are the points where different links are concentrated and form 
a crossing. Links are the ties and connections between these nodes, being the 
fundamental unit of the network. The mesh gives a network its shape and 
dimension, it is the overall structure or pattern of a network (van Loon 2006). 
The crucial feature of networks is the complementarity between the nodes and 
links: the delivery of a service in a network industry always requires the use of 
more than one network component (Economides 2006). Networks form the 
basis of many important industries, e.g. in electricity, postal services and as well 
rail transport.  
The railway industry is a network industry with high importance and a long 
history in Europe. It traditionally plays an important role for most member states. 
Railways connect cities, regions and countries, ensure the transportation of 
goods, connect people and play an important strategic role in wars. Therefore, 
rail is seen as an “integrated socio-technical system” (Finger & Messulam 2015, 
p. 19). The railway industry is an integrative mechanism that overcomes 
geographical barriers, helps to develop underdeveloped zones, and can provide 
minimum transport services for the population (Campos & Cantos 1999). In the 
EU’s transportation strategy, rail plays an important role (EC 2011). The railway 
sector contributes strongly to the EU’s economy, as the estimated gross value 
added of the entire supply chain of rail services in the EU is around 140 billion 
EUR, while employing more than 2 million people. The EU’s railway sector has 
an estimated cost volume of over 100 billion EUR, of which passenger and 
freight rail revenues cover 60%, while 30% are covered by public subsidy and 
10% by other sources of income (Steer Davies Gleave 2015). 




This shows that the railway industry, like many other network industries, is of 
high economic importance for countries. It is therefore subject to extensive 
regulation. The railway industry fulfils all defined features that characterise 
network industries (Bergman et al. 1998, Lapuerta & Moselle 1999, Economides 
2006, Knieps 2006, 2007, Casullo 2016):  
Making the product or service available to the customer crucially relies upon 
an underlying network, which is the track network, stations, signalling, etc.  
This physical network produces high sunken costs which have mostly been 
incurred already and cannot be fully recovered, like the track network.  
The underlying track network is considered a “natural monopoly”, 
competition in provision of this network would result in an expensive and 
very inefficient duplication of facilities. Baumol defines a natural monopoly 
as an “industry in which multifirm production is costlier than production by a 
monopoly” and/or “to which entrants are not “naturally” attracted, and are 
incapable of survival even in the absence of “predatory” measures by the 
monopolist” (1977, p. 810).  
Network externalities exist, which occur when actors in the market impact 
each other, even if they do not pay for the impacts (Fladung 2004). Network 
externalities can be of a positive or negative nature: positive network 
externalities occur e.g. when more stations are included into the track 
network and more customers profit from the network. They are also called 
network effects. Negative network externalities occur e.g. when many 
different companies use the track network at the same time and cause 
congestions. 
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When analysing the cost situation within network industries, economies of 
scale, scope and density play a fundamental role. Economies of scale exist 
when the increase of input leads to an over-proportional increase in output, 
resulting in a reduction in unit costs. E.g. the more trains run on an existing 
network, the lower the costs will be for each train. Economies of scope exist 
when two outputs can be produced at lower average cost for each output by 
on single company than by several companies. This can occur e.g. when 
overheads or IT-systems can be used by both passenger and freight rail 
providers within one company and the costs are shared. Economies of 
density exist when dense urban environments lead to higher efficiency: e.g. 
when the tracks are better utilised, the increased usage results in more 
services, which then leads to more trains on the network. This results in a 
decrease of unit cost which are divided over a higher output up to a certain 
optimum point (see also section 3.2.).  
The services of the industry are potentially competitive, which applies for 
both passenger and freight rail services.  
The industries have often been dominated by big state-owned monopolies. 
Today, big state-owned rail incumbents still play a dominant role in Europe. 
As in all network industries, in the railway industry one can differentiate between 
network infrastructure and network provider. Even though both components are 
complementary, they can be sub-classified on four levels. All levels can be built 
or serviced independently of one another (Knieps 2007):  
Level 1: network service provider (e.g. railway undertakings like DB 
Fernverkehr) 
Level 2: infrastructure manager (e.g. DB Netz)  




Level 3: network infrastructure (e.g. tracks/signalling)  
Level 4: public resources (e.g. sites/land)  
The separability of the four components in network industries generally enables 
competition. This is also the case in the railway industry: for many decades, 
vertically integrated railway companies were regarded as natural monopolies, 
due to their presupposed economies of scale. Today, only the rail infrastructure 
is considered a natural monopoly and changes in regulation over the last three 
decades show that competition in the railway industry is possible (Campos & 
Cantos 1999, Alexandersson 2009). This is practicable due to the separability of 
the management and ownership of the network infrastructure and land on one 
side and the operation of services on the other (Knieps 2007). The following 
illustration by Beckers et al. (2009) gives an overview of rail’s value chain and 
the resulting separability: 
 
Illustration 2: Rail’s value chain, adapted from Beckers et al. (2009) 
Infrastructure in this context means “essential facilities”, those parts of a 
network which enable the services and are too costly to be dublicated by other 
operators, like track, stations, signalling, and maintenance facilities (Seabright 
2003). The infrastructure is managed by an infrastructure manager (“IM”). IMs 
can be defined as “either the owners of railway infrastructure or companies that 
have been awarded concession contracts. They are responsible for the safety 
and maintenance of railway installations, as well as for making any necessary 
renovation and capacity expansion investments. Most importantly, they are 
PhD Thesis Lisa Feuerstein 
31 
 
responsible for making their infrastructure available to the different train 
operating companies” (Finger & Messulam 2015, p. 7).  
Train operating companies, rail service operations or undertakings (“RU”) are in 
direct contact with customers as they provide the transportation service. RUs 
can combine their own inputs with inputs bought from other players (Finger & 
Messulam 2015). They can be divided into freight and passenger transport, 
where freight transport delivers cargo and goods. Passenger rail can be divided 
into regional and long-distance passenger rail, where regional transportation is 
mostly short-distance trips with a high stopping pattern and a relatively short 
travel time and high degree of commuters. Regional passenger rail is generally 
operated on behalf of public authorities and subsidised (Beckers et al. 2009). 
Long-distance passenger rail transport is defined as regularly scheduled 
Intercity or Eurocity trains (e.g. ICE, IC, EC, RJ, SC, TGV) which transport 
passengers with a one-way trip length of at least 50 km by having a relatively 
limited stopping pattern. Most long-distance services provide additional features 
like different service classes, on-board catering, entertainment, etc. (Beckers et 
al. 2009). Long-distance passenger rail can also include night trains, providing 
special sleeping cars and travelling overnight, as well as charter and event 
trains that only run on special occasions (Kirchner 2011).  
Having discussed the theoretical basics of the network and railway industry, it 
becomes clear that competition in such an industry is not achieved easily and 
constitutes a relatively new phenomenon. Competition in general can be 
described as the aspiration of two or more persons/groups/entities to reach a 
goal where the higher level of target achievement of one player leads to a lower 
level of target achievement of the other player (Schmidt 2005). Competition as a 
tool in economics ensures that private interest and social welfare match each 




other. Consequently, competition is not an end in itself, but a means to 
economic welfare (Neumann 2000). Competition is thus a dynamic process, 
defined by action and reaction of the market actors, even the announcement of 
competition can trigger dynamic competition (Schmidt 2005). A precondition for 
competition is the absence of legal entry barriers (Knieps 2015). Competition 
policy is one of the oldest elements of EU regulation, it is already included in the 
EEC Treaty of 1957. From the EU’s point of view, competition is a means to 
increase and preserve welfare. The welfare of consumers is at the centre of 
activities. This political orientation can be related to the “Chicago School” 
(Busch 2010).  
In the railway industry, competition takes different forms, some of them more 
frequent than others. Since this thesis focuses on long-distance passenger rail, 
it investigates a special, demarcated part of competition: intramodal open 
access competition of day trains in the EU. Intramodal competition thereby 
means competition between two or more RUs, for this thesis two or more long-
distance passenger RUs (Bergantino et al. 2015). Intermodal competition on the 
other hand refers to competition with other transport modes, here long-distance 
coaches, flights and motorised private transport (Seabright 2003). Two different 
types of intramodal competition exist: competition for the market and 
competition in the market. Competition for the market means the situation when 
two or more RUs compete to obtain access to the market. In this case, the 
network is split in regions and operators bid for monopoly rights or franchises to 
operate services for a limited time (Cox et al. 2002, Holvad 2009). As in other 
network industries, this type of competition is most frequent in the railway 
industry. It is most common in regional passenger rail and also used in British 
long-distance passenger rail. In some countries, however, regions or whole 
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networks are directly awarded to RUs, without bidding processes, as with Dutch 
long-distance passenger rail (Economides 2006, Beckers et al. 2009). When 
two or more RUs compete on the tracks, not for the tracks, competition in the 
market or on-track-competition exists. Competition takes place in the market on 
the same routes for the same customers at the same time. The RUs run the 
services on those lines under their commercial responsibility and do not hold 
public service contracts or franchises, e.g. in German long-distance passenger 
rail and in freight rail (Holvad 2009, Warnecke & Götz 2012). A pre-condition for 
competition in the market is open access arrangements in the country (Holvad 
2009). Currently, EU regulations only manifests open access for international 
services through Directive 2007/58/EC, however, some countries have already 
implemented open access in their national regulation (e.g. Germany, Sweden, 
the Czech Republic, Italy, Austria, Great Britian) (Beckers et al. 2009, Tomes et 
al. 2016).  
The above section shows that competition in the railway industry is possible. 
However, close observation and continual monitoring is needed and lead to a 
fundamental tension in competition policy: on the one hand, liberalisation of a 
market promotes competition by disciplining inefficient firms and ensuring 
consumer benefits. On the other hand, over-regulation itself can lead to 
inefficiency of the system and may result in an expropriation of the previous 
network investments. Consequently, network industries embody diverse 
challenges for competition law and policy-making in terms of liberalising the 
market and maximising the benefits while controlling the abuse of monopolistic 
positions (Lapuerta & Moselle 1999, Knieps 2007). The following section 
provides examples for the complexity of competition in the railway industry: 




On the political and legal side, the underlying premises of competition is that all 
competitors have access to the network on equal terms. However, most railway 
companies were and are traditionally state-owned and vertically integrated. 
Such companies, being both IM and RU, pose a danger for competition. 
Discrimination is possible and easily carried out, e.g. by complication of network 
access, setting of high prices, non-provision of sufficient capacity, cross 
subsidisation, and denial of necessary information. On the one hand, separation 
between infrastructure and operations is therefore considered as highly 
beneficial for effective competition (Bickenbach 2000, Knieps 2006, 2007, 
Brandt 2008). On the other hand, the railway industry is characterised by strong 
coordination which is needed between IM and RU, especially since various 
facilities are necessary to provide transportation on rail. This is one reason why 
some economists and politicians dread vertical separation. Railway systems are 
seen as a complex interplay between the various players – not only IM and 
RUs, but also the RUs among each other (Seabright 2003, Finger & Rosa 
2012).  
Further, the lack of customised regulation also influences competition: many 
interdependencies exist between the different factors in the network industries 
and some of the goals of liberalisation have conflicting aims, which often results 
in a weighing off. Since the railway industry supplies the population with public 
transport, not only profit maximisation, but also welfare maximisation must be 
considered. Full liberalisation or privatisation can lead to a reduction in safety 
level or the abandonment of unprofitable lines, which remain of importance for 
the population (Alexandersson 2009). Further, some public control is necessary 
for military and industrial causes. This is why the majority of European railways 
are still publicly owned and highly regulated. Consequently, regulatory steps are 
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often taken carefully, which can slow down or hinder a transformation to a fully 
competitive industry. The railway sector is therefore considered to be rather 
slow in innovation and it generally changes mostly incrementally (Friedlaender 
et al. 1992, Campos & Cantos 1999, Beria et al. 2012).  
From an economic perspective, the railway industry also provides challenges: 
like most network industries, the railway industry is a very capital-intensive 
sector with high initial costs. Mostly, these high ex ante investments are tied for 
long periods of time or are sunken costs in case of rail infrastructure. Often, a 
lack of investment into infrastructure can be observed, which is the case in state 
ownership and also in private ownership, as the example of the rail 
infrastructure in Great Britain shows. Besides the building of infrastructure, the 
maintenance is equally costly. The covering of the total infrastructure costs by 
infrastructure fees is mostly unrealisable. Therefore other pricing approaches 
are necessary, influencing the financial gap that needs to be compensated for 
by governments. In EU regulation, the concept of marginal-cost pricing is 
incorporated as a basis for infrastructure pricing. Marginal costs thereby 
reference to costs caused by one additional train using the rail infrastructure 
(Campos & Cantos 1999, Messulam & Finger 2015).  
Another example for high initial costs in passenger rail is the ownership of 
rolling stock: when no leasing market is established, the ownership of rolling 
stock is essential and characterised by high ex ante investments, a long 
purchase time (3-4 years) and a long amortisation time (up to 15-20 years). 
These factors result in long product lifecycles with slow incremental change and 
often discourage entrants and investors who are unwilling to take the risks 
(Seabright 2003). Besides the high initial costs, especially the passenger 
railway industry is also characterised by a high operating cost structure. 




Operating costs include e.g. infrastructure fees, diesel fuel or electrical energy, 
leasing of rolling stock, maintenance of rolling stock, on-board staff, commercial 
costs and overhead (Finger & Messulam 2015, Sanchez-Borras 2015). 
After considering the cost side, the demand side also provides challenges: while 
transport in general can be defined as the service of displacing an object from 
point A to point B, beginning and ending at given dates, it shows a high 
differentiation (Seabright 2003). Irrespective of the service on sale, transport 
demand is essentially a derived demand, satisfying the need for accessibility. 
This means that the demand for transport services is inseparable from people’s 
need to reach destinations, goods, services, or activities and often, transport 
demand is unequally distributed throughout the day (Seabright 2003, Litman 
2017, Cowie & Ison 2018). Seabright states that “railways are not like any other 
industry, not even any other network industry”, which means rail transport is 
also different from transport in general (2003, p. 76). Railways can provide 
railway services and railway infrastructure at the same time within one 
company. Further the “back haul problem” has an enhanced role in rail 
transport: demand in both directions of a line is often unbalanced, leading to a 
relatively low overall load factor of trains and asymmetric costs (Rietveld & 
Roson 2002). Finally, the existence of strong incumbents that already serve a 
high degree of the demand are characteristic for the railway industry, especially 
in long-distance passenger rail. Their dominance often leaves little room for 
broad market entry of competitors and allows them to achieve surplus profits 
over an extended period. The “invisible hand” of perfect competition has no 
impact in network industries, since it does not incorporate the existence of 
economies of scale. In this case governments must differentiate between 
common market power and market power due to characteristics of network 
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industries and create appropriate regulation to control it (Economides 2006, 
Knieps 2007). Further, network effects also influence competition: the wider a 
network of rail passenger connections, the better for the customers, since they 
can reach a higher number of destinations. An existing company with such a 
network therefore has positive network effects and an increased demand and 
consequently a competitive advantage over a new entrant. 
Having in mind that the railway industry is characterised by a general necessity 
for suitable regulation and control, generally low profitability and financial loss 
due to a high cost structure, a financial gap exists which needs to be closed. 
Besides average instead of marginal cost pricing or perfect price discrimination, 
subsidies are a common tool to close this existing gap. However, this necessity 
of subsidies also influences competition in the network and railway industry: it is 
one reason why competition for the market is more frequent than competition in 
the market (Economides 2006).  
Bearing all this in mind, it is worth mentioning that the political and economic 
concepts of the network and railway industry have been relatively stable in the 
last ten years, showing a similar and steady development all over Europe. 
Some recent considerations of politicians and parties seem to move in another 
direction: in 2017, the British Labour Party considered rail privatisation as 
harmful to passengers’ interests and is working on a concept to return Britain’s 
rail services, along with mail and energy companies, to public ownership 
(Asthana & Steward 2017). The recent coalition agreement of the new German 
Government emphasises the public responsibility of rail and the improvement of 
quality and number of connections, while no privatisation, further unbundling or 
strict enhancement of competition is planned (CDU 2018). These trends need to 




be observed closely in the next years, since they will have major consequences 
for open access competition.  
2.1.2. Railway Reforms and liberalisation   
In the White Paper on Transport from 2001, the European Commission (“EC”) 
considers transport a key factor in modern economies. However, by the end of 
the twentieth century, rail transport in Europe was in a bad shape: national 
railways were heavily subsidised and considered inefficient, the market share 
was mostly stable or decreasing over the years and rail transport was 
characterised by low levels of customer satisfaction (Friebel et al. 2010, Holvad 
2017). “[T]here is a permanent contradiction between society, which demands 
even more mobility, and public opinion, which is becoming increasingly 
intolerant of chronic delays and poor quality of some transport services. […] The 
transport system needs to be optimised to meet the demand of enlargement 
and sustainable development” (EC 2001, p. 6). This general discontent led to 
several reforms which were bundled in the “Railway Packages”, causing a 
liberalisation of the European railway market. Liberalisation thereby means 
opening an industry to competition or the implementing of a regulatory 
framework which has the effect of intensified competition, to increasing 
efficiency and innovation (Bougna & Crozet 2016, Financial Times 2017). As 
part of liberalisation, deregulation is described as the process when sector-
specific exceptional rules lose their importance in the market and the general 
economic law will be applied (Knieps 2007). The process of deregulation in 
network industries can be divided into three phases (Bergman et al. 1998, p. 7): 
Phase 1 “monopoly”: “[s]ervices are supplied by one firm and regulation is 
concerned with the prevention of monopoly abuse in retail markets”. 
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Phase 2 “monopoly and competition”: “[c]ompetition is gradually introduced into 
some or all markets and regulation focuses on: monopoly abuse in both retail 
and interconnect markets by dominant incumbents; emerging competition 
issues; and public service obligations”. 
Phase 3 “competition”: “[h]ere competition is extensive and increasingly 
effective in some or all markets. Some light-handed regulation is needed, as in 
other competitive markets, to ensure fair trading practices and the maintenance 
of public service objectives”. 
The greatest intensity of regulation is needed in phase 2, especially regarding 
interconnection and when the infrastructure is operated and owned by vertically 
integrated incumbents. However, over time the effectiveness of competition 
increases and the requirement of regulation diminishes (Bergman et al. 1997). 
The EU’s regulatory framework also followed this path: for several decades, 
regulation in the network industry was perceived as an important tool to protect 
common interests. Big state-owned monopolies existed, and competition was 
not possible. Today, over-regulation is perceived as a means to hinder 
innovation and progress, often protecting inefficient incumbents (Alexandersson 
2009). By introducing the Railway Reforms, the EC pursued the goal of building 
a single, efficient and competitive market for rail throughout Europe, which 
satisfies the customers and allows a shift of other transport modes to rail (Nash 
2008, Holvad 2009, Kirchner 2011). This requires a clear reduction of costs and 
a continuous improvement of service quality. The markets need to be opened, 
an active promotion of competition and a consequent tackling of barriers to 
market entry is necessary. To ensure the required level playing field for all rail 




companies, compliance with technical standards and market access conditions 
across Europe is necessary (Kirchner 2011, De Francesco & Castro 2017).  
One important starting point of the Railway Reforms were the successful 
reforms in Sweden, where a vertical separation between infrastructure and 
operators took place in 1988 (Alexandersson & Rigas 2013). This led to a 
rethinking of European rail policy and finally resulted in the Directive 
91/440/EEC in 1991, starting the separation of infrastructure and operations 
and therefore opening the rail network for operators. The market opening was 
done in small, gradual steps, with a high degree of heterogeneity in the member 
states, since each directive and regulation was implemented in national law in a 
different legal framework (Alexandersson & Rigas 2013). Originally, European 
railway regulation was conceived as economic regulation, however, over time 
economic, social and technical regulation increasingly grew together and the 
boundaries became blurred (Finger & Messulam 2015).  
The First Railway Package is known as the infrastructure package, it was 
launched in 1988 and finally adopted in 2001. As well as the opening-up of the 
international rail freight market, it promoted accessibility of infrastructure for all 
RUs and by setting rules for the management, accounting and monitoring of IM, 
it reduced discrimination. In 2010, the package was recast to fill existing gaps, 
merge and modify directives for simplification, and add new rules (Holvad 2009, 
Kirchner 2011, EC 2017a). The Second Railway Package was launched in 2002 
and adopted in 2004, and is mostly known for the full opening of the freight 
market. It established the foundation of the European Union Agency for 
Railways (“ERA”) and further enhanced technical interoperability and safety 
standards (EC 2017b). The Third Railway Package was launched in 2004 and 
adopted in 2007, best known for the opening of the international passenger rail 
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market by 2010, including cabotage. This allowed all licenced RUs to operate 
cross-border open access competition, but several exceptions were stated. The 
package further regulates passenger rights and certification and licencing of 
train drivers and crews (Holvad 2009, EC 2017c). The Fourth Railway Package 
was launched in 2013 and adopted in 2016, after a period of lengthy and 
difficult discussion. The original proposal included the market opening of 
domestic passenger rail transport, a far-reaching obligation for competitive 
tendering of Public Service Obligation (“PSO”) contracts, a new role of ERA and 
a further advancement of separation between infrastructure and operations. It 
was separated into two pillars, the market pillar and the technical pillar. The 
technical pillar was adopted in April 2016, improving and speeding up the 
process of rolling stock authorisation and licencing, further enhancing 
interoperability and improvement and harmonisation of railway safety. The 
market pillar has been adopted in December 2016, introducing stricter rules for 
PSO and opening the market for domestic open access competition from 2021 
onwards (European Parliamentary Research Service 2016, EC 2018). 
The following table gives an overview of the significant directives and 








or repeal of 
 29/07/1991 91/440/EEC “Development of the Community’s railway” incl. 
- management independence of railway 
operations 
- separation of accounts for infrastructure and 
operations management  
- opening the rail network for operators  
- improvement of financial situation  
 
 19/06/1995 95/18/EC “Licencing of railway undertakings” incl.  
- procedures for licencing railway operators 
- licence is valid on the Community’s territory   
 
 19/06/1995 95/19/EC “Allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and 
the charging of infrastructure fees” incl. 
- establishment of allocation body in all member 
states to guarantee non-discriminatory access  
- non-discriminatory charging of infrastructure 
fees based on a marginal cost basis  
 




 23/07/1996 96/48/EC “Interoperability for trans-European high-speed 
rail” incl.  
- preparation/adoption of Technical Specification 





26/02/2001 2001/12/EC - opening-up of the international rail freight 
market for competition 
- independent organisational entities for RUs/ IMs 
- separation of accounts for passenger and 
freight operations as well as public service and 
other passenger service operations 
91/440/ECC 
26/02/2001 2001/13/EC - extending the licencing principle to all RUs with 
EU-wide acceptance  
- setting of framework for licence obtaining  
95/18/EC 
19/03/2001 2001/14/EC “Allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and 
the levying of charges for the use of railway 
infrastructure and safety certification” incl. 
- IMs must publish network statements 
- IMs must provide network capacity analysis  
- creation of independent regulatory body for 
monitoring and arbitration 
95/19/EC 
19/03/2001 2001/16/EC “Interoperability for trans-European conventional 






29/04/2004 881/2004/EC “Establishing a European Railway Agency”, incl.  
- describing form, functions and responsibilities 
 
29/04/2004 2004/49/EC “Safety on the Community’s railways” incl.  
- common approach/mutual recognition principles 
regarding safety regulatory issues 
- creation of safety authority in all member states 
95/18/EC 
2001/14/EC 
29/04/2004 2004/50/EC - speeding up of interoperability of the 




29/04/2004 2004/51/EC  - complete opening of the rail freight network in 






23/10/2007 2007/58/EC - opening-up the European market to 
international passenger rail services by 




23/10/2007 2007/59/EC “Certification of train drivers operating 
locomotives and trains on the railway system in 
the Community” incl. 





23/10/2007 1371/2007/EC “Rail passengers’ rights and obligations” incl.  
- liability of RUs 
- minimum requirement for passenger information 
 
 23/10/2007 1370/2007/EC “Public passenger transport services by rail and 
by road” incl. 
- requirements for providing PSO 
- encouragement of use of competitive tendering 
1191/69/EEC 
1107/70/EEC 
17/06/2008 2008/57/EC “Interoperability of the rail system within the 




16/12/2008 2008/110/EC - updated version of the safety directive 2004/49/EC 





21/11/2012 2012/34/EC - independence and competence of regulatory 
bodies 
- access to necessary facilities 




 07/04/2016 2016/545/EC “Regulation on procedures and criteria 
concerning framework agreements for the 
allocation of rail infrastructure capacity” incl.  
- increase transparency of path allocation and 
existing agreements 
- framework agreements should not specify on a 
particular train path, being flexible in time  
 
2012/34/EC 






11/05/2016 2016/796/EC “European Union Agency for Railways” incl.  
- explanation of ERA’s role and functions 
- centralisation of homologation1, licencing and 
safety regulation (one-stop shop) 
881/2004/EC 
11/05/2016 2016/797/EC “Interoperability of the rail system within the EU” 
incl.  
- further advancement of interoperability 
- determining of ERA as European Rail Traffic 
Management System-authority  
2008/57/EC 
11/05/2016 2016/798/EC “Railway Safety” incl. 
- guidelines to ensure development and 
improvement of safety 
- harmonisation of regulatory structure 
2004/49/EC 
14/12/2016 2016/2338/EC “Award of public service contracts for domestic 
passenger transport services by rail” incl. 
- new and adapted requirements for PSO 
- stricter regulation of direct awarding of contracts 
1370/2007 
14/12/2016 2016/2370/EC “Opening of the market of domestic passenger 
transport services by rail and the governance of 
the railway infrastructure”, incl. 
- opening-up the European market to domestic 
passenger rail services in form of open access by 
12/2020, but with several exceptions (e.g. PSO 
on the line) 
2012/34/EC 
14/12/2016 2016/2337/EC “Regulation on the normalisation of the accounts 
of RUs”,  
- repealing Directive 1192/69/EEC 
1192/69/EEC 
Table 1: Overview of the Railway Packages, adapted from Holvad 2009, Kirchner 2011, Holvad 2017, 
sources: EC regulations & directives  
Regarding open access competition, Directives 91/44/EEC and 95/19/EC were 
of high importance, since they formed the basis for non-discriminatory network 
access and infrastructure fees. Especially for high-speed rail, Directive 
96/48/EC triggered the process of technical harmonisation by introducing TSI 
standards that refer to new subsystems which were significantly updated.  
All member states are obliged to transfer the directives into national law, but a 
certain leeway is given which leads to different states of national liberalisation 
(Kirchner 2011). Up to now, all member states have implemented the First 
Railway Package, however, some with a time lag. In 2010, the EC referred 13 
member states (among those were Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and 
Italy) to the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), mostly due to a lack of indepen-
dence of essential functions and regulatory bodies and insufficient infrastructure 
 
1 Homologation in this context means the process of certifying rolling stock to indicate that it meets defined    
   specifications and standards like safety and technical requirements. It is also known as vehicle 
authorisation.  




charging. The ECJ decided that a holding structure, existing in Germany and 
Austria, can provide independence of IM and is therefore allowed, contradicting 
the EC’s long-term preference for total vertical separation (European Parliamen-
tary Research Service 2016). Greece, Luxembourg and Romania were sued by 
the EC for not transposing the Recast into national law (EC 2016a). This 
example shows that regulatory measures against anti-competitive practice can 
take years before they are properly enforced (Knieps 2015). In the framework of 
the Second Railway Package, all necessary institutions have been set up by the 
member states. The ERA was established in 2004 and has operated from 2006 
onwards (European Parliamentary Research Service 2016).  
However, despite the implementation into national law, full and consistent 
liberalisation has not been achieved. A full level playing field for incumbents and 
new competitors does not yet exist (Bergantino 2015). The market remains 
fragmented and many steps still lie ahead, especially for open access 
competition. “[L]iberalisation will certainly be a rocky road for many railways and 
countries” in the next years, as Alexandersson & Rigas state (2013, p. 97). 
Regarding Bergman et al.’s (1998) three phases of deregulation, the European 
passenger rail industry currently finds itself in the second phase of coexistence 
of both monopoly and competition. Some competition is already introduced; 
however, regulation is still needed to guarantee fair competition for all market 
participants, especially with the existence of vertically integrated incumbents. To 
understand the effect of the Railway Reforms and the initiated liberalisation on 
long-distance passenger rail, the following section will give an overview of how 
individual markets developed in the light of the above.  
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2.2.  Six examples of rail liberalisation 
As described above, competition is still a rare phenomenon and the market is 
fragmented in type and degree of liberalisation (Laperrouza & Finger 2009, 
Kirchner 2011). The European regulation has been implemented differently in 
national law and open access competition is not yet permitted on an EU-wide 
basis. Five countries are of particular importance for an analysis of open access 
competition, since competitors entered the markets in competition to the 
incumbent operators: in Germany, the Czech Republic, Italy, Sweden and 
Austria, open access competition currently takes place, taking different forms. 
The 6th example of competition in Great Britain (“GB”) gives another valuable 
insight, since it differs in structure from the other countries and has undergone 
drastic changes in the past. To provide a background for the analysis part of the 
thesis, this section gives a brief overview of how competition developed in these 
six countries under investigation. 
In 2011, the latest version of Kirchner’s Rail Liberalisation Index was published, 
which compares the status of the relative degree of market opening in the 
European rail market (incl. Switzerland and Norway). The study provides a 
benchmark of the legal framework and the de facto barriers to market access, 
distinguishing between freight and passenger transportation. The “LIB-index” 
rates the countries on a scale between 0 and 1000, thereby consisting of two 
sub-indices: on the one hand the LEX-sub-index (law in the books) which 
investigates the power of the regulatory body and the underlying laws. On the 
other hand, the ACCESS-sub-index (law in action) which examines the 
informational, administrative and operational barriers. Kirchner divides the 
countries analysed into three groups regarding their degree of market opening: 
the “advanced” countries with the best conditions for possible market entrants, 




the countries “on schedule” and the “delayed” countries, where different parts of 
the market remain closed or not accessible for new entrants (see illustration 3). 
In this framework, Sweden (855 points), GB (852 points) and Germany (814 
points) are considered as countries with advanced liberalisation, Austria (761), 
Italy (705) and the Czech Republic (705) are countries where liberalisation is on 
schedule:  
 
Illustration 3: Rail Liberalisation Index (Kirchner 2011, p. 69)  
However, Kirchner’s analysis only investigates passenger transport in total and 
does not distinguish between long-distance and regional transport. Also, many 
changes in the market occurred after the completion of the latest study in 2011. 
For example, open access competition was introduced in the Czech Republic, 
Austria and Italy, as further explained below.  
2.2.1.     Germany 
Germany is the most populous European country with 82.8 million inhabitants, it 
is characterised by its dense population, strong economic status, and relatively 
high purchasing power (Eurostat 2019a). Railways have a long history in 
Germany and the operated network at 33,400 km is one of the largest and 
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densest in Europe (Schwilling & Bunge 2014, DB 2018a). The modal split of 
passenger rail is 8.6% (Eurostat 2019b). The average yearly amount of rail 
passenger kilometres per inhabitant is around 1,100 with an average fare 
revenue of ca. 0.13 EUR (Steer Davies Gleave 2015). The incumbent of long-
distance transport, DB Fernverkehr AG (“DB Fv”), is separated from the IM DB 
Netz, but both companies are part of Deutsche Bahn holding (“DB”). The 
starting point for competition was the Railway Reforms in 1994. After they came 
into force, all long-distance lines have been run commercially and open access 
competition is allowed (Kirchner 2011, Finger & Rosa 2012, Schwilling & Bunge 
2014). However, the market share of competition is less than 1% of the overall 
transport capacity, and for a long time, competitors focused on niches, fearing 
the direct competition with DB Fv (BNetzA 2017c). Currently, two open access 
competitors operate in the market: Thalys and Flixtrain.  
In 1997, Thalys was the first competitor entering the German market on the 
international high-speed route between Cologne/Dortmund and Brussels with 
five daily train pairs2, as a joint venture of the French and Belgian incumbents 
SNCF and SNCB and temporarily DB Fv (Heuermann & Delfmann 2009, Thalys 
2017). In 2002, InterConnex was the first private competitor that entered 
Germany, providing one to two daily train pairs on the line (Gera-)Leipzig-Berlin-
Rostock(-Warnemünde). InterConnex extended the offer to the lines (Liberec 
CZ-)Zittau-Cottbus-Berlin-Stralsund(-Binz) and Dresden-Neustadt-Berlin-
Stralsund and briefly (Neuss-)Cologne-Berlin-Rostock. In 2014, it ceased 
operations (Seguret 2009, Netzwerk Bahnen 2016). In 2012, the private 
operator Hamburg-Köln-Express (“HKX”) began to compete with DB Fv on the 
 
2 Train pair generally refers to two trains on one line between two destinations, which run in opposite   
  directions, often as a round trip 




Cologne-Hamburg line with up to three daily train pairs. HKX was expected to 
have a market share of 5-10% (CMA 2016). Between 2015 and 2016, HKX 
extended its offer to Frankfurt. However, after reducing its offering, HKX ceased 
operations in 2017 and was acquired by the German coach-operator FlixMoblity 
which started operating the line again in March 2018 under its FlixTrain brand 
(Monopolkommission 2015, HKX 2017a, FlixBus 2018c). In 2016, the private 
operator Locomore started operations with one daily train pair on the highly 
frequented Berlin-Stuttgart line in direct competition to DB Fv (Locomore 
2017c). After five months of operations, Locomore went bankrupt and ceased 
operations. It was bought by FlixMobility and the Czech company LEO Express 
(“LEO”) and is operated on the same line under the brand FlixTrain (FAZ 2017, 
Locomore 2018).  
2.2.2.    Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic, with 10.6 million inhabitants, is significantly smaller than 
Germany and characterised by a high degree of urbanisation, a stable 
economy, and relatively low purchasing power, but with high variability between 
regions (Eurostat 2019a). The Czech railway network, with 9,460 km, is among 
the densest in Europe (SZDC 2018). The modal split of passenger rail is 8.9% 
(Eurostat 2019b). The average yearly figure for rail passenger kilometres per 
inhabitant is ca. 700 (Steer Davies Gleave 2015). The incumbent is České 
dráhy (“CD”), it is fully separated from IM SŽDC (Kirchner 2011). The formal 
market opening took place with the Railway Act in 1994, but national and 
international open access was only possible from 2003 onwards after the 
separation of infrastructure and operations. However, open access is only 
possible on those routes which the Ministry of Transport removed from PSO. 
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This is the case on the Prague-Ostrava route (Tomes et al. 2014). Two open 
access competitors exist: LEO and RegioJet (Tomes et al. 2016).  
In 2011, the private operator RegioJet, subsidiary of the tourism company 
Student Agency, started operations on Prague-Ostrava(-Hvirov) with nine daily 
train pairs, in direct competition to CD. In 2016, it expanded its operations in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, and later to Austria (Tomes et al. 2016, RegioJet 
2017). On the Prague-Ostrava route, RegioJet is expected to have a market 
share of 35-40% (CMA 2016). In 2012, the second private competitor LEO 
started operations, also on the Prague-Ostrava line with eight daily train pairs. 
The company also expanded its operations within the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and later Poland (Tomes et al. 2014, LEO 2016, LEO 2017). On the Prague-
Ostrava route, LEO is expected to have a market share of 25-30% (CMA 2016). 
In 2017, LEO and FlixMobility invested in the bankrupt Locomore, where LEO is 
also responsible for operating trains (FAZ 2017).  
2.2.3.    Italy 
Italy, with 60.6 million inhabitants, is one of the bigger countries in Europe 
(Eurostat 2019a). It is characterised by its long and narrow geographical shape, 
by a weakening economy in recent years, and average purchasing power. The 
rail network in Italy has a total length of 16,700 km, and the high-speed lines are 
designed to connect the densely populated and economically important regions 
with one another (Croccolo & Violi 2013, RFI 2017a). The modal split of 
passenger rail is relatively low at 6.1% (Eurostat 2019b). The average yearly 
figure for rail passenger kilometres per inhabitant is around 750 with an average 
fare revenue of ca. 0.065 EUR (Steer Davies Gleave 2015). The incumbent is 
Trenitalia S.p.A. (“TI”), it is separated from IM Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (“RFI”); 




both companies are part of Ferrovie dello stato Italiane holding (“FSI”). The 
starting point for liberalisation was the separation of infrastructure and 
operations in 2000. Open access competition in Italy has been allowed since 
2003 for purely commercial services, including all high-speed lines (Bergantino 
2015). However, when competition affects PSO lines negatively, open access 
can be limited (Kirchner 2011). Currently, two open access competitors operate 
on the Italian network: NTV and DB FV & ÖBB Personenverkehr AG 
(“DB/ÖBB”).  
In 2009, the joint venture of the German and Austrian incumbents DB/ÖBB 
started operations on the international Munich-Innsbruck-Verona/Milan/Venice 
line with five daily train pairs. It partly competed with TI in regional transport, 
which resulted in the prohibition of intermediate stops (Warnecke & Götz 2012). 
In 2010, Arenaways was the first company that started purely commercial 
services, providing two daily train pairs between Milan and Turin. Since TI 
offered regional services on the same route, cabotage was forbidden, denying 
Arenaways intermediate stops. This resulted in the company’s bankruptcy in 
2011 (Warnecke & Götz 2012). In 2012, the private operator NTV started its 
high-speed operations in direct competition to the incumbent on the Rome-
Milan, Rome-Turin and Rome-Venice lines with several daily trains (Warnecke 
2014). NTV gradually expanded to more lines and increased daily connections 
(Bergantino 2015). On the overall Italian high-speed market, NTV is expected to 
have a market share of 35% (NTV 2018b). 
2.2.4.     Sweden 
Despite its size, Sweden is relatively sparsely populated with 10.1 million 
inhabitants. It is characterised by a strong economic status and high purchasing 
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power (Eurostat 2019a). The rail network in Sweden is 14,660 km long, but 
most passenger transport takes place in the densely populated south 
(Trafikverket 2017). The modal split of passenger rail is 9.3% (Eurostat 2019b). 
The average yearly amount of rail passenger kilometres per inhabitant is around 
1,250 with an average fare revenue of ca. 0.055 EUR, which is relatively low in 
a European comparison (Steer Davies Gleave 2015). The incumbent SJ AB 
(“SJ”), is fully separated from IM Trafikverket. The liberalisation process started 
in 1988 with the Transport Policy Act. This formed the basis for open access 
competition, which has been allowed from 2009 onwards on the entire network 
(Alexandersson 2009, Alexandersson & Riga 2013). Currently, two open access 
competitors operate in the market: MTR Express and Transdev.  
In 2009, Veolia Transport (now called Transdev Sverige AB) started its 
operations on the Malmö-Stockholm line in direct competition to SJ with two 
daily train pairs at weekends. The company increased its services after full 
market liberalisation to two daily train pairs in 2011 (Warnecke & Götz 2012, 
Nilsson et al. 2013). Since 2015, MTR Express (“MTR”), a subsidy of MTR 
Corporation, started to compete with SJ on the Stockholm-Gothenburg line, 
providing four daily train pairs. MTR increased the number of train pairs up to 
ten per day (Barrow 2015, MTR 2017). On the route Stockholm-Gothenburg, 
MTR is expected to have a market share of 25-30% (CMA 2016). 
2.2.5.       Austria 
With 8.8 million inhabitants, Austria is one of the smaller countries in Europe 
and is characterised by its mountainous structure, an average purchasing 
power, and the densely populated metropolitan area around Vienna (Eurostat 
2019a). The rail network is over 4,800 km long (ÖBB-Infrastruktur 2018). The 




modal split of passenger rail in Austria is 12.1% which is high in a European 
comparison (Eurostat 2019b). The average yearly figure for rail passenger 
kilometres per inhabitant is around 1,350 with an average fare revenue of ca. 
0.17 EUR, which is high in a European comparison (Steer Davies Gleave 
2015). The incumbent ÖBB-Personenverkehr AG (“ÖBB Pv”) is separated from 
IM ÖBB-Infrastruktur, both companies are part of Österreichische 
Bundesbahnen holding (“ÖBB”). Open access competition in Austria has been 
permitted in theory since 1998 (Schienen Control 2017). However, it is only 
allowed on lines where no PSO exists (Kirchner 2011). Therefore the market 
share of competition is still relatively low. Besides the international competitor 
RegioJet, only one open access competitor operates on the Austrian network: in 
2011, the private operator WESTbahn started operations in competition to ÖBB 
Pv on the Vienna-Salzburg route, providing more than eleven daily train pairs 
(Warnecke 2014). The company has increased the connections and has an 
estimated market share of 20-25% on the route (CMA 2016).  
2.2.6. Great Britain  
GB has 66.3 million inhabitants and is characterised by its division into four 
constituent countries with individual capitals, a high purchasing power and 
densely populated metropolitan areas around the capitals, especially London 
(Eurostat 2019a). The rail network is over 32,000 km long (Network Rail 2019). 
The modal split of passenger rail in GB is 8.8%, which is slightly higher than the 
European average (Eurostat 2019b). The average yearly figure for rail 
passenger kilometres per inhabitant is around 950 with an average fare revenue 
of ca. 0.15 EUR, which is high in a European comparison (Steer Davies Gleave 
2015). What makes the British case special, is that no incumbent operator 
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exists. With the railway reform in 1994, the incumbent was split into over a 100 
companies and RUs and IM have been fully separated ever since. The reforms 
also resulted in the privatisation of the IM until 2002, when it was once again 
taken under state control.  
The infrastructure is now owned and operated by Network Rail and is regulated 
by the Office of Rail and Road (“ORR”) (Nash 2008, Kirchner 2011). 
Competition in GB mainly takes place for the market: RUs bid for a franchise by 
naming an amount of needed funding to run the specified services or a premium 
they are prepared to pay. A weighted scoring system is used to select the 
winner. What makes the British case special is the fact that competition for the 
market is mixed with elements of competition in the market: open access 
competition is allowed, but only to a certain degree. The RU needs to apply at 
ORR and Network Rail for permission (CMA 2016).  
Three main open access providers currently operate on the British network, 
First Hull Trains, Grand Central and Eurostar. Since 2000, Hull Trains operates 
services between Hull and London via the East Coast Main Line. It started with 
three daily trainpairs and increased the frequency in the following years, also 
extending the line to Beverley. It was bought by First Group in 2003. Since 
2007, Grand Central operates services between London and Sunderland also 
via the East Coast Main Line, starting with three daily connections. Since 2010, 
it also operates services between Bradford Interchange and London. In 2011, 
the company was bought by Arriva UK, a subsidy of DB. Further, Eurostar runs 
open access connections between mainland Europe and GB since 1994, mainly 
between London and Paris and Brussels. In the next years, more market entries 
are expected, e.g. by First Group on the line London-Edinburgh (Preston 2009, 
Niedhard 2009, Grand Central 2019, Hull Trains 2019, ORR 2019).  




3.  Chapter 3: Literature review 
Railway competition in the context of railway liberalisation is the subject of a 
number of scientific articles and studies. Various types of literature in the field of 
transport economics have been reviewed for this thesis, with a focus on 
intramodal competition in long-distance passenger rail. To file and organise the 
literature, the literature mapping software “Citavi” was used. The literature was 
analysed by clustering the content of the articles into six categories: political, 
economic, social, technical, legal and environmental content, in line with the 
PESTLE analysis (see 4.2.3.). In addition, the topics with the highest relevance 
and the most frequent appearances in existing literature were grouped in sub-
categories. The analysis showed that the knowledge generated could often be 
classified in two or three categories, but that very few articles observed the 
wider portfolio of all PESTLE factors. The largest part of the existing literature 
deals with economic content, e.g. efficiency, profitability, access fees. The 
second largest part covers literature with political and legal content, mostly 
dealing liberalisation, regulation and vertical separation. The category which is 
least observed regarding competition is environmental content. 
In the following, open access competition in long-distance passenger rail is 
placed within the framework of the relevant literature and the key points are 
discussed briefly.  
3.1.   European Railway Reforms and their effect  
Without doubt, the liberalisation process changed the European railway industry 
over recent decades and the change is still ongoing. Three Railway Packages 
have already been implemented and resulted in a market opening, the Fourth 
Package will lead to further transformation in the next years (Finger & 
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Messulam 2015, Holvad 2017). By introducing the Railway Reforms, the EC’s 
primary goal was the building of a single, efficient and competitive market for 
rail throughout Europe, which satisfies the customers and allows a shift of other 
transport modes to rail. Holvad (2017) states that it is complex to assess the 
reform’s outcome at this point, for several reasons: the legal framework is still 
evolving, it has not yet been completely implemented in all member states, and 
the separation of outcomes of legislative initiative from other possible factors is 
difficult. Nonetheless, the reforms and their influence on the industry and on 
competition is widely discussed in the literature and some studies give initial 
evidence on the reforms’ success: 
The existing literature widely agrees on the point that the single European 
railway market has not been achieved yet: member states have implemented 
EU law into national law at different speeds and to different degrees which led 
to a fragmentation (Nash 2008, Holvad 2009, Friederiszick et al. 2009, Kirchner 
2011, Finger & Rosa 2012, Steer Davis Gleave 2012). Laperrouza & Finger 
(2009) observe a tension between member states and EC in terms of 
governance and regulation. They also find a fragmentation of the European 
railway sector at the technical (e.g. interoperability), financial (e.g. insufficient 
situation of most RUs), organisational (inadequate organisation structures) and 
administrative/legal level (different designs and ways of implementation). This 
fragmentation led to market opening evolving only slowly and is the reason for 
the low degree of competition (Laperrouza & Finger 2009, Kirchner 2011). Beria 
et al. (2012) find that the de facto level of market opening remains limited and 
that some incumbents are blocking the further liberalisation process, with the 
support of some governments. In their eyes, this is a reason why the entire 
potential has not yet been developed. Everis (2010) observe a gap between 




formal and practical market opening and see impartial and powerful economic 
regulation and the full implementation of EU regulations and directives as part 
of the solution. Friebel et al. (2010) state that “reforms “in the books” are not all 
that matters and that the implementation of reforms is important” (p.16). 
Stronger authorities which enforce the regulation in all member states could 
improve the situation (Kirchner 2011, Alexandersson & Rigas 2013). Overall, 
the European rail market is evidently growing together. However, to achieve a 
single European market, many challenges still lie ahead (Laperrouza & Finger 
2009, Holvad 2017).  
The increase of productivity and efficiency caused by reforms is widely 
discussed in the existing literature. “Their main conclusions are that entry of 
competition results in an increase of efficiency […] and horizontal separation 
increases efficiency […]. There is less consensus about the effect of vertical 
separation on efficiency” (Tomes 2017, p. 144). Only a limited number of 
studies investigate effects of open access competition on long-distance 
passenger rail (Casullo 2016). Oum et al. (1999) compare a wide range of 
papers on rail productivity and efficiency and show that liberalisation and 
deregulation generally increase efficiency. Friebel et al. (2010) agree, but they 
also stress that the effect is dependent on how the reforms are packaged: 
sequential reforms improve efficiency while multiple reforms in packages have 
negative effects. More specifically, Asmild et al. (2009) investigated if efficiency 
of railway systems has been improved by the reform initiatives of the EC 
between 1995 and 2001. They find an improvement in technical efficiency and 
conclude that accounting separation is an important factor in improving 
efficiency in the use of material and staff costs. Bouf et al. (1999) find increased 
productivity of railway companies since the late 80s which they explain mainly 
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by the reduction in the number of employees; they find no clear correlation to 
reforms. A recent study on open access competition by Casullo (2016) indicates 
that until now, greater efficiency is not evident. He finds that the introduction of 
open access competition leads to higher operating costs for railway systems, 
and states that “additional costs linked to the entry of new operators can 
outweigh the potential positive effect of competition” (p. 21). When analysing 
the cost efficiency of open access providers and their PSO counterparts in 
Britain, Wheat et al. (2018) reveal similar results, finding that open access 
providers can exploit lower input prices and more agile business models, which 
is, however, outweighed by the cost disadvantage of operating at lower density 
compared to the PSO providers. They conclude that both types of competition 
can co-exist without major cost disadvantages in the industry.  
Despite active competition in freight and regional passenger rail, open access 
competition in long-distance passenger rail remains limited and incumbents 
continue to have significant market power (Bergantino 2015, Tomes et al. 2016, 
Beria et al. 2016a). The reforms form the basis for the market entry of 
competitors in various countries (Alexandersson & Rigas 2013, Beria et al. 
2016a), but other factors also seem to influence the market entry of new 
competitors (Everis 2010). Kirchner (2011) states that open access seems to 
remain unattractive for RUs. Powerful incumbents still play a big role and retain 
a large market share (Holvad 2009, Finger & Rosa 2012). In recent years, 
however, a wave of new private competitors entered the markets and achieved 
a market share of 20-30% on individual corridors in Austria, the Czech Republic 
and Italy (Casullo 2016). The new entrants are heterogeneous in nature (Tomes 
et al. 2016), but rarely are completely external to the transport industry 
(Bergantino 2015): in most cases, they are a subsidiary of an existing state 




incumbent (e.g. DB/ÖBB in Italy), a company which is partially owned by other 
incumbents (e.g. NTV and WESTbahn), or a company that is established by 
private operators active in the transportation or railway sector (e.g. RegioJet, 
MTR). Tomes et al. (2016) observe two types of open access competition in 
Europe: a niche-approach as in Germany and GB and a head-on-approach as 
in Italy and the Czech Republic. Finally, Beria et al. (2012) state that “the 
absence of competitors does not prove the lack of liberalisation. It might well be 
that the market is too small or unprofitable” (p. 115).  
Until now, it remains impossible to comprehensively assess the success of the 
recent reforms in terms of customer satisfaction and a resulting shift from other 
transport modes to rail. “Overall, it is difficult to demonstrate a direct linkage 
between rail regulatory reform initiatives and the rail modal share in the 
passenger transport market” (Holvad 2017, p. 24). This is due to the indirect 
influence of regulatory framework on modal share. Cost performance resulting 
in lower prices and customer orientation and the adaptation to customer 
expectations of RUs play a major role (Holvad 2017). However, some recent 
examples indicate the positive effect of open access competition for customers. 
Beria et al. (2016) observe open access competition in the Italian market and 
find that the incumbent TI reduced its economy fares by an average of 15%, 
providing prices on a similar level to the competitor NTV. It also introduced new 
services for the customers like NTV’s. Bergantino et al. (2015) state that on the 
lines operated by NTV and TI, a shift away from airlines to rail can be observed. 
In the Czech market, Tomes et al. (2016) show that open access competition 
between incumbent CD and the competitors RegioJet and LEO led to a 
reduction in second class fares by 46% as well as a significant improvement of 
quality of services on the Prague-Ostrava line. Vigren (2017) also finds an 
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average reduction of the incumbent’s fares by 12.8% in Sweden. These 
examples indicate that open access competition, as one result of the market 
liberalisation, increases customer satisfaction and initiates a shift to rail. Everis 
(2010) state that "[t]he prime challenge that the rail industry faces is the threat 
to its position and/or future from failing to develop products and services that 
are as attractive to potential users as those of other modes" (p. 34). 
Lodge (2002) states that “[r]egulatory reform is often seen as a road paved by 
good intentions, but leading to ‘policy hell’” (p. 271). From his point of view, it 
seemed as if the regulatory regime in railway industry was often biased in 
favour of the incumbent and was perceived as too weak. However, his analysis 
of the Railway Reforms in Britain and Germany shows that generally branding 
railway regulation as “wrong” is too simple. He states that the question which 
needs to be asked is why particular regulatory design recipes were chosen and 
to analyse what institutional incentive has influenced the perception of 
regulatory failure. Holvad (2009) also stresses the influence of factors outside 
the railway sector which can have long-term effects on regulation and reforms 
and therefore also need to be considered. Overall, several researchers find that 
the legal framework in the EU is a necessary step to create the basic conditions 
for liberalisation and de facto market access. The recent reforms have already 
brought benefits and led to a visible lowering of entry barriers in Europe (Friebel 
et al. 2004, Nash 2011, Kirchner 2011, Holvad 2017). Holvad (2009) believes in 
the success of rail restructuring and expects a revitalisation and a more efficient 
and customer-oriented sector and Niedhart (2009) and Alexandersson (2009) 
expect the current period to be the crucial stage for the development of 
competition, and also indicate that several problems remain to be solved in the 
coming years.  




3.2.   Factors influencing competition 
In the literature, various factors influencing competition have been identified and 
discussed, e.g. paths allocation processes (Tomes et al. 2014), vertical 
separation (Nash 2008), rail access fees (Lang et al. 2013), productivity of 
incumbent and competitor (Villemeur et al. 2003), network effects (Niedhart 
2009), access to distribution facilities (Seabright 2003), customer loyalty and 
price sensitivity (Paha et al. 2013), rolling stock availability (Warnecke & Götz 
2012), technical compatibility within the EU (Laperrouza & Finger 2009), 
intermodal competition (Heuermann 2007), and discrimination against/conflict 
between competitors (Beria et al. 2016a). To date, no scientific work provides a 
comprehensive overview of the field of influencing factors and their strength, 
correlation and shift over time. Below, the influencing factors which have been 
discussed most prominently in the literature are briefly presented:  
One topic which is discussed widely and frequently is the vertical separation or 
unbundling of rail infrastructure from rail operations. After initial experience with 
vertical separation in Sweden, the starting point was set by Directive 91/440, 
introducing greater transparency regarding cross-financing and non-
discriminatory access for new entrants to the rail network. In the directive, only 
accounts separation was required, organisational or institutional separation 
remained optional (Holvad 2017). From then on, different positions exist in the 
relevant literature and among politicians regarding the necessary degree of 
vertical separation and its effects. This can also be observed in the conception 
phase of the Fourth Railway Package and on several legal proceedings 
between the EC and member states at the ECJ (e.g. Germany and Austria) 
(Nash 2011, Kirchner 2011, Van de Velde 2015). Analysing the existing 
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literature, it becomes apparent that researchers come to divergent and even 
conflicting findings. Unbundling is closely related to the existence of economies 
of scale, scope and density. As described in 2.1.2, railways are typically 
characterised by economies of scale, scope, and density. “The existence of 
substantial fixed costs […] traditionally led economists to assume the presence 
of important economies of scale in the industry”, claim Cantos & Campos (1999, 
p. 5). However, the evidence on economies of scale in European railway 
companies is mixed, but more conclusive on the existence of economies of 
density (Smith & Wheat 2012). Several researchers verify the general existence 
of economies of scale in the railway industry (Cowie 2002, Smith & Wheat 
2012), and Growitsch & Wenzel (2009) find economies of scale in most 
European railways. However, the size of economies of scale varies among 
countries and companies (Merkert et al. 2010, Smith & Wheat 2012). Cowie 
(2002) further states that economies of scale are not only associated with 
infrastructure, but also with service provision. The existence of economies of 
scale and its connection to the efficiency of railway companies forms the basis 
for the discussion of unbundling. Unbundling generally “refers to reforms that 
lead to the creation of several more or less independent units […] out of an 
integrated railway that previously combined train operation and infrastructure 
management within a single line of command” (Van de Velde 2015, p. 53). 
Campos & Cantos (1999) define three main options for vertical organisation of 
railway companies: vertical integration, competitive access, and vertical 
separation. Vertical integration is the historical and traditional model of one 
large single integrated incumbent that incorporated infrastructure and 
operations. Competitive access refers to an integrated operator that is required 
to provide access to the infrastructure on a fair and equal basis. A complete 




vertical separation means the existence of two fully separated companies, the 
IM and the RU, sometimes even privatised. There is a general agreement that 
no “one-size-fits-all” solution is available (Van de Velde 2015). Still, experts and 
researchers from the industry disagree on the ideal model of vertical 
organisation and its effects on efficiency and liberalisation: Blainey (2018) 
summarises that full integration minimises transaction costs, reduces 
complexity of regulation, provides clear accountability and a homogeneous 
customer experience. However, it also produces inefficiencies and cost inflation, 
slower innovation cycles and discourages striving for new market opportunities. 
Nash (2008) states that “separation of infrastructure from operations involves 
costs, but it is the most effective way of achieving within mode competition.” 
Those countries that have succeeded in separating infrastructure and 
operations have been most successful in introducing competition, e.g. Great 
Britain and Sweden (Nash 2008, Alexandersson & Rigas 2013). Beria et al. 
(2012) also see vertical separation as an instrument to enhance liberalisation of 
the industry, Campos & Cantos (1999) state that vertical separation facilitates 
the entry of additional RUs and encourages competition. This could also lead to 
increased efficiency on profitable routes. Kirchner (2011) disagrees to some 
degree: he concludes that market opening does not depend on full separation 
between IM and RU, the enforced non-discriminatory access to rail 
infrastructure for external RUs is more relevant. Growitsch & Wenzel (2009) 
state that the existence of economies of scale in integrated railways results in a 
higher level of efficiency and Mizutani & Shoji (2001) find that the costs for 
vertically separated railway companies are about 5.6% higher than for 
integrated companies. Despite finding that vertical separation has a major effect 
on efficiency, Friebel et al. (2010) find that to increase efficiency, vertical 
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separation might not be a necessary pre-condition. Driessen et al. (2006) agree 
that separation could be beneficial for productive efficiency, but they disagree 
on which form of separation is preferable. They conclude that full vertical 
separation might not be necessary to increase productive efficiency. Even when 
some economists refer to positive effects of unbundling in other network 
industries, Pittmann (2003) stresses that “railroads are different […] in the 
degree to which the effectiveness of the operations depends on the exact point 
where vertical integration or vertical separation takes place” (p. 5). Despite the 
positive effects that unbundling might have on liberalisation and efficiency, a 
great number of disadvantages and risks are associated with unbundling 
(Campos & Cantos 1999): vertical separation can lead to a loss of economies of 
scope, possibly reduced attractiveness to the user compared with the integrated 
system, increased transaction costs, and a possible reduction in investment 
incentives by the company or body managing it. These risks resulted in critical 
questioning within member states whether full vertical separation was the right 
step for the railway industry. Finally, it can be observed that from a global 
perspective, full vertical separation in the railway sector is not the dominant 
institutional configuration and relatively rare (Van de Velde 2015) and that there 
is no difference in the degree of new market entry in countries with full vertical 
separation (Bergantino 2015). 
The literature agrees that network effects have an influence on the level of 
competition. Laird et al. (2005) define network effects “as the second round 
reverberation effects on unit costs, prices and outputs in related markets” (p. 
543). Consequently, they result in entry barriers for new competitors and create 
advantages for incumbents: with an increase in network effects of the 
incumbent, the likelihood of successful market entry of new competitors 




decreases (de Villemeur et al. 2003, Niedhart 2009). Especially when an entrant 
only competes on a point-to-point route with the incumbent, network effects are 
a source of asymmetry and strengthen the incumbent (Seabright 2003). The 
network effects may incur switching costs for customers, which reduces the 
likelihood that they leave the incumbent’s network (Paha et al. 2013). Also, in 
the event of vigorous price competition as in the Czech Republic, the incumbent 
can reduce prices on the competitive route while cross-subsidising profits from 
other routes of the network or the low prices on the route might even increase 
demand in the rest of the network. The incumbent is therefore not as vulnerable 
to price competition as the new entrant is (de Villemeur et al. 2003). 
Infrastructure costs or rail access charges (“RACs”) account for a large 
proportion of RUs' operational costs, ca. 25-30% (Finger & Messulam 2015). 
Therefore the setting of RACs plays a big role for the existence of open access 
competition (Holvad 2009, Nash 2011, Lang et al. 2013). In general, “the level 
of RACs defines the financial gap to be compensated for by government 
subsidies. RACs also define the conditions for the operational margin of train 
operators as well as the overall competitiveness of rail vis-à-vis the other 
transport modes”, say Messulam & Finger (2015, p. 323). Directive 2001/14/EC 
requires that RACs need to be based on short run marginal social costs, but 
where excess demand for capacity exists, scarcity charges can be included. 
This leaves a great degree of leeway for member states, which results in an 
significant variety of type and level of RACs (ECMT 2005, Nash 2011, Calvo & 
De Ona 2012). Due to the high complexity of RACs, several studies observe the 
setting of the right RACs (e.g. Dodgson 1994, ECMT 2005, Kozan & Burdett 
2005). Lang et al. (2013) argue that optimal pricing will increase competition 
and that more competition subsequently results in a reduction in RACs from 
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which the customers can profit. One crucial question is which type of RACs is 
correct: Calvo & De Ona (2012) show that rail charges are generally not 
strongly connected to the level of costs and often are a means of price 
discrimination and cross-financing. They state that in most countries, regional 
passenger trains pay the highest fees (thereby being state-subsidised), followed 
by long-distance passenger trains and finally freight trains, whereas freight 
trains generate the highest maintenance and renewal costs. ECMT (2005) state 
that often, some passenger transport is subsidised by too low access fees 
which do not cover the marginal costs and threaten the financial sustainability of 
the system in the long term. This is especially the case in the new member 
states (Holvad 2009). From their perspective, RACs must be structured 
differently according to the market (freight, passenger, high-speed, etc.) and 
should be harmonised internationally to avoid discrimination. Nash & Sansom 
(2001) note a move of the EC towards firm support of the principle of marginal 
social cost pricing. They show that purely commercial transport pricing would 
push prices in the wrong direction and therefore is not appropriate. They agree 
with Lang et al. that too high RACs hinder competition. Holvad (2009) states 
that “the existence of different approaches towards infrastructure charging can 
create problems for promoting international rail transport” (p. 38). 
Most researchers agree on the poor availability of first and second-hand rolling 
stock on the European market and its influence on open access competition 
(Seabright 2003, Beckers et al. 2009, Kirchner 2011, Warnecke & Götz 2012, 
Beria et al. 2012). Rolling stock is one of an RU’s largest recurring expense 
items, at around 20-30% of its fixed costs (Finger & Messulam 2015). Warnecke 
& Götz (2012) state that new railway rolling stock requires large-scale, long-
term investments which lead to a high risk for new entrants. Moreover, the 




production of rolling stock requires a high lead time. The absence of 
transferability of some rolling stock between countries gives the investment 
costs a sunken character (Seabright 2003). The high costs and the long 
amortisation period of rolling stock in most cases require ensured slots on 
tracks for a sufficient period to provide security for investors. However, this 
guarantee is not provided in most countries (Beckers et al. 2009). This makes it 
difficult to buy new rolling stock for private companies, while most incumbents 
can provide securities through state ownership (Beria et al. 2012). The 
acquisition of cheaper second-hand rolling stock is difficult in most EU 
countries, since no major market could be established till now (Kirchner 2011, 
Nilsson et al. 2013). Rolling stock leasing companies (“ROSCOs”), which lease 
rolling stock to RUs, are quite common in European freight rail and in British 
regional and long-distance transport. However, they remain relatively rare in the 
rest of Europe’s long-distance transport markets which makes it difficult to enter 
a market at short notice (Dillon et al. 2015).  
Another factor influencing open access competition which is closely connected 
to the availability of rolling stock is the absence of technical standardisation in 
the European market. “An initial measure towards ensuring interoperability of 
the European rail network was taken by the Council of the European Union in 
1996 when it adopted Council Directive 96/48/EC from July 1996 on the 
interoperability of the trans-European high-speed rail system” (Holvad 2017, p. 
8). The EC defines interoperability as “the ability of a rail system to allow the 
safe and uninterrupted movement of trains which accomplish the required levels 
of performance for these lines” (EC 2008, Article 2(b)). Despite the first 
successful steps, the process of technical harmonisation is delayed, but 
considered a necessity to achieve a single market. So the TSI system only 
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concerns new systems or old systems that are upgraded or renewed which 
leads to a long time horizon (Finger & Laperrouza 2009). The EC has already 
launched infringement proceedings against some member states (Holvad 
2015). One example of problematic implementation of technical regulation is the 
introduction of the European Train Control System (“ETCS”) and the European 
Rail Traffic Management System (“ERTMS”) which was originally assigned to 
harmonise train control, but shows a development of different sub-levels with 
the need for individual technology (Railway Gazette International 2012). In their 
study, Schwilling & Freese (2014) find that executives from the railway industry 
who were questioned see increased regulatory measures by the EC to support 
the ERA as the biggest help to accelerate the development of ETCS and 
ERTMS. They also state that when suppliers would only be offering equipment 
which is fully compliant with TSI standards, ETCS and ERTMS would further be 
promoted. Holvad (2015) argues that since 2011, a complete set of TSIs is in 
place in the European rail market, but that a single, harmonised European rail 
system exists since this can only be achieved over a time horizon of 40-100 
years, following the replacement of existing infrastructure. Warnecke & Götz 
(2012) state that the different electricity and train control systems within Europe 
hinder the transfer of rolling stock from one country to another and therefore 
reduce the already difficult rolling stock availability.  
Finally, the threat of intermodal competition is an influencing factor that acquired 
significance in recent years. Even if motorised private transport is the biggest 
intermodal competitor for passenger rail (Eurostat 2019b), air and coach 
transportation are discussed more frequently in the existing literature. “It is well 
accepted that rational passengers make their travel choice by comparing the 
generalised cost of each mode (i.e. the ticket price plus the cost of time 




calculated as the journey time multiplied by the value of time) and choosing the 
cheapest one”, says Sanchez-Borras (2015, p. 127). Several studies prove that 
air and rail are in direct, active competition to each other on some routes (e.g. 
Antes et al. 2004, Steer Davies Gleave 2006, Friederiszick et al. 2009). Other 
studies show that coach and rail also compete against each other due to the 
recent liberalisation of the long-distance coach market (e.g. Knorr & Lueg-Arndt 
2016, Thust et al. 2016). Ivaldi & Vibes (2007) find that a small number of 
intermodal competitors in the intercity long-distance travel is enough to create a 
high degree of competition, which forces the players to adapt their business 
strategies permanently. Heuermann (2007) states that airlines force RUs to 
react to competition and that RUs are naturally not ready to react since these 
are new circumstances for them. Heuermann & Delfmann (2009) further state 
that the competition between rail and air has intensified in recent years. While 
high-speed rail is a substitute for air transportation, however, rail and air are not 
completely substitutable: this depends on distance, travel time, changeovers, 
and customers’ preferences. They find that especially on distances between 
200 and 300 km, the faster the train, the higher the level of substitution. From a 
distance over 600 km, the usage of trains compared to air is decreasing, and 
from a distance over 800 km, air is mostly favoured. Some studies find that the 
increased competition between air and rail, especially with low-cost-airlines, 
resulted in an altered perception of prices with the customers and lead to an 
increased group of price-sensitive customers (e.g. Heuermann & Delfmann 
2009, Sanchez-Borras 2015). Heuermann & Delfmann also state that DB has 
adapted its price system and introduced yield management to be more 
competitive with airlines. Antes et al. (2004) state that the mimicking of airlines’ 
pricing structure, especially of low cost airlines, is an effective way to stabilise 
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turnover and regain competitiveness. Sauter-Servaes & Krautscheid (2015) find 
in their analysis of air-rail-coach pricing competition that in 82% of the 
investigated booking cases, travelling by train is cheaper than travelling by air. 
Coach travel, however, is in 95% of the cases cheaper than rail. Murray (2014) 
and Weinrich (2013) find that coach competitors often undercut the railway’s 
special offers and attract especially price-sensitive customers such as students 
and pensioners. On the German example, Knorr & Lueg-Arndt (2016) show a 
rapid market growth of long-distance coach lines and number of passengers 
after liberalisation, where coaches are especially attractive to customers with 
lower incomes. They also indicate rapid market consolidation. Prior to long-
distance coach liberalisation in Germany, the politicians believed that no 
competition between rail and coach would arise, but that coaches would shift 
traffic from car to coach and that new traffic could be generated (Jochim & 
Felden 2013, Breimeier 2013). Thust et al. (2016), however, show that the 
market entry of long-distance coaches did not lead to an improved mobility for 
regions, but to a competition between rail and coach on the lucrative city-to-city 
market. This competition led to a shift from rail customers to coaches and 
resulted in the lowering of DB’s prices. Breimeier (2013) finds that the main 
advantage of coach competitors towards RUs is the low operational cost. He 
also states that due to the high cost profile, railway connections can only be 
operated positively if they are a means of mass transportation – when the coach 
competition succeeds in attracting large numbers of customers away from rail, 
rail transportation cannot be provided in the future. Burgdorf & Eisenkopf (2018) 
agree that coach services' main advantage is its cost structure and find that a 
toll rate would significantly decrease coaches’ modal share, with rail and car 
being the beneficiaries. However, bearing all this in mind, the existing open 




access competition in Italy and Czech Republic shows that under some 
favourable conditions (e.g. shorter travel time, higher comfort), open access 
competition can succeed besides car, air and coach transportation and even 
can take market shares away from intermodal competitors (Croccolo & Violi 
2013, Tomes et al. 2016). 
3.3.   Research methodology in the existing literature  
Besides the analysis of content of the existing literature, it is equally interesting 
to investigate the research methodology used in prior studies. It is clearly 
noticeable that quantitative research methods dominate this field of research, 
especially economic, political and social literature. Many authors chose models 
to prove their hypotheses (Growitsch & Wetzel 2009, Preston 2009, Mancuso 
2014, Li et al. 2015), though game theory approaches are often used: Ivaldi & 
Vibes (2004, 2007) create a simulation model to analyse inter- and intramodal 
competition; they use it as a tool which allows the measurement of 
effectiveness, using the example of passenger traffic competition on the OD-
pair Cologne-Berlin. Lang et al. (2013) chose a game theory model to present a 
liberalised railway market with full vertical separation between IM and RU. 
Niedhart (2009) demonstrates and analyses different competition strategies in 
various basic scenarios in a multi-periodic model. Ruiz-Rúa & Palacín (2013) 
use a game theory approach supplemented by customer behaviour theory to 
quantify minimum requirements for new market entrants to remain in the 
market. Other authors base their research on empirical analysis: Bergantino et 
al. (2015) prove that two railway companies in Italy engage in strategic pricing 
by collecting primary data from the RU’s booking homepage 60 days prior to 
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departure. Driessen et al. (2006) approach UIC3 data and use a Data 
Envelopment Analysis to construct efficiency scores and to prove that 
competitive tendering improves productive efficiency. Li et al. (2015) state that 
more qualitative research needs to be done in this field of study to complement 
the existing quantitative data. Some studies already base their research on 
quantitative methods, but triangulate them with qualitative tools such as expert 
and in-depth interviews (e.g. Röder 2003, Heuermann 2007) and case studies 
(e.g. Mulder et al. 2005, Everis 2010). The quantitative data gathered by Finger 
& Rosa (2012) in their study on governance of competition in the Swiss and 
European railway sector on key performance indicators was not sufficient and 
not fully reliable and they therefore turned to qualitative methods and gathered 
data through semi-structured interviews with different railway stakeholders. 
Petersen et al. state that "[some] impacts cannot be defined or measured in a 
precise way and it follows that a qualitative approach for assessment is 
preferable to an (unrealisable) quantitative approach" (2009, p. 161). Some 
articles with purely qualitative research methods exist, mainly based on 
interviews (e.g. Beirao 2007, Grischkat 2014) or case studies (e.g. Hrelja & 
Antonson 2014). Albers & Heuermann (2013) analyse competition dynamics in 
the German passenger transport industry by gathering data through semi-
structured interviews and using grounded theory. Tomes et al. (2014) choose 
the form of a case study to prove that the promoting of competition has been 
delayed in the Czech Republic by the slow transformation of the passenger rail 
transportation sector. This method reveals valuable background information 
about the Czech market. Bergantino (2015) successfully reviews national 
 
3 Union Internationale des chemins de fer, referring to the international railway federation  




reports, EU documents and railway authorities’ position pagers to draw a 
synthetic picture of access condition.  
All in all, the reviewed qualitative articles were mainly focused on specific cases 
in small, defined environments. This thesis tries to build a bridge between 
specific cases and individual experiences and universal principles in long-
distance passenger rail. 
3.4.   Conclusion and gaps in the existing literature  
Overall, the literature review shows that a wide degree of topics has already 
been discussed in detail. Firstly, it can be concluded that the EU's goal to create 
one single railway market, has not yet been fully reached – the market is 
fragmented, especially regarding implementation of EU regulation, status of 
liberalisation and technical standards. Secondly, the study of the existing 
literature shows that different authors from different backgrounds interpret 
topics in different ways. This represents the different positions of politicians, 
lobbyists, interest groups, and RUs which leads to general disagreement 
regarding topics such as vertical separation, degree of liberalisation and 
structure of RACs. This disagreement may be seen as one reason why the 
progress has been so slow. Thirdly, the literature research indicates that several 
entry barriers exist for new competitors, e.g. the procurement of rolling stock, a 
low profitability in the entire industry and high RACs – clearly, competition in the 
railway industry is still tough and the task of this thesis is to answer the question 
why this is the case. Finally, it is obvious that more qualitative research needs 
to be done to discover the different layers of the topics and to capture the 
different nuances of opinions of the various stakeholders.  
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Despite the broad discussion, the author identifies several gaps in the existing 
literature which this thesis aims to fill. Firstly, the author is not aware of a study 
which analyses the influencing factors on long-distance passenger rail in total – 
some studies provide a first step by including different influencing factors and 
dimensions (e.g. Everis 2009, Petersen et al. 2009, Laperrouza & Finger 2009, 
Kirchner 2011), but the holistic picture has not yet been drawn. Moreover, most 
studies analyse how competition influences the railway market, the incumbents, 
efficiency in the industry, etc. An adequate investigation of what influences 
competition itself has not yet been undertaken, nor an investigation on the 
power and relevance of the diverse drivers and their interplay. Another problem 
is that most literature was written before the first appearance of open access 
competition in the market from 2010 onwards. The consequence is that most 
existing literature is often theoretical and based on hypothesis. Up to date, only 
a few studies provide market data from existing open access competition (e.g. 
Seguret 2009, Tomes et al. 2014, 2016, Bergantino et al. 2015, Beria et al. 
2016a, Vigren 2017). The author further claims that qualitative data in this field 
of study is scarce and therefore a big gap in literature exists. The literature 
review showed that the long-distance passenger rail industry is complex and 
influenced by different stakeholders and factors which are often linked. 
Therefore, qualitative data is of special importance in this field to identify the 









4.  Chapter 4: Research methods  
To answer the research aims described in chapter 1, appropriate research 
methods need to be defined by the researcher. This chapter gives an overview 
of the research methods of this thesis: the philosophical background is outlined 
to define the underlying premises under which this research is done. The 
research methodology of this thesis is presented and the three individual 
elements, Delphi study, case study research and PESTLE analysis, are 
described and discussed critically. Finally, the ethical considerations of this 
thesis are outlined.  
4.1. Philosophical background 
“All research […] is guided by the researcher’s set of beliefs and feelings about 
the world and how it should be understood and studied” (Denzin & Lincoln 
2005, p. 22). 
Mitroff & Turoff (1975) state that “underlying any scientific technique, theory, or 
hypothesis there is always some philosophical basis or theory about the nature 
of the world upon which that technique, theory, or hypothesis fundamentally 
rests or depends” (p. 17). Therefore, before entering the field of research, each 
researcher needs to consider the philosophical premises under which their 
research is to be done. This is of fundamental importance since each 
philosophical background leads to a different application and development of 
techniques (Saunders et al. 2016). In the existing literature and common 
research practice, a variety of approaches exists to categorise epistemology. 
For this research project Mitroff & Turoff’s approach is chosen which is based 
on Churchman’s “The Design of Inquiring Systems” from 1971. Mitroff & Turoff 
(1975) present five different types; this concept has been applied by a variety of 
other researchers (e.g. Kapoor 1987, Engels & Kennedy 2007).  
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The underlying philosophical systems are named Inquiring Systems (“IS”) 
where each IS can be seen as different sets of glasses through which the 
researcher approaches and carries out the research process. For each IS, 
different philosophical criteria need to be met before the findings can be 
accepted as valid or true (Mitroff & Turoff 1975). The difference between the 
systems lies in the way each system produces information and what each 
system regards as information. Information is inseparable from the system of 
inquiry that was used by the researcher to identify and produce it (Mitroff 1973). 
“The model acts on the input to transform it from the state of "input data" to the 
state of "output information"” (Mitroff & Turoff 1975, p. 20). They state that 
generally, there is no “one best” or “one unique” philosophical basis underlying 
any technique.  
 
Illustration 4: The processing of information, adapted from Mitroff & Turoff (1975) 
Mitroff & Turoff (1975), Mitroff (1973) and Kapoor (1987) give a detailed 
overview of the several ISs, where each IS leads to different strengths and 
weaknesses. The two ISs which are relevant for this study will be briefly 
explained below: 
In a Lockean IS, the truth is experimental. It is based upon an empirically-
derived model and not upon theoretical considerations, it is inductive and 
consensual and can compress rich sources of experiential data. Raw data 
always comes before the development of theory. Raw data is transformed into 
factual information, accomplished by human judgement – mostly by the degree 
of agreement (Mitroff & Turoff 1975, p. 18 f.). The Lockean IS is considered the 




epistemological basis for the original Delphi. It is suited to well-structured 
problem situations where a general consensus on the nature of the problem 
exists.  
In a Singerian IS, the truth is pragmatic. Information is not purely scientific and 
experiential, but ethical as well and the system forms an inseparable whole. The 
richly diverse modes of human thoughts are stressed which makes it the richest 
of all IS. This model is goal- and objective-orientated and the archetype of 
synthetic interdisciplinary systems (Mitroff & Turoff 1975, p. 19). A Singerian 
researcher is convinced that the reality described is not synonymous with reality 
itself, but that reality is only a representation and reality itself only materialises if 
enough people/decision makers can be convinced of it being real. The 
Singerian IS embodies synthetic multimodal interdisciplinary systems and often 
includes all the previously described IS as sub-models in the design (Singer 
1909, 1911).  
A combination of Singerian and Lockean IS applied. The truth is pragmatic and 
experimental: the Singerian IS is considered suitable for this research project, 
since the knowledge of the Delphi participants is dependent on their situation 
and their experience with open access competition and must be scrutinised 
against their backgrounds throughout the whole thesis. The case study in the 
next step draws on this perceived reality and complements it by taking further 
perspectives into consideration. The author considers the Lockean IS since it is 
related to the original Delphi process and remains the prime philosophical basis 
of this technique. This is because the raw data inputs are the personal opinions 
of the experts and the validity is challenged by the degree of consensus in the 
next step. Additionally, undesirable psychological effects are prevented due to 
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the anonymity provided to the experts (Mitroff & Turoff 1975). However, the 
Lockean IS has not been chosen solely as a basis for this research project 
since it is best suited for well-structured problem situations where a strong 
consensus can be expected, which is not the case for this project (Mitroff & 
Turoff 1975). The complexity is increased by several political and legal 
influences as well as economic and social factors. Therefore it can be best 
addressed by using continual questioning and considering different 
perspectives of the Singerian IS combined with the inductive and consensual 
approach of the Lockean IS.  
4.2. Research methodology 
After establishing the philosophical basis, the research methodology and 
research plan are now outlined to give a clear overview of the research activity. 
To draw the overall picture, the research onion developed by Saunders et al. is 
used:  
 
Illustration 5: Research onion, adapted from Saunders et al. (2016, p 122 ff.)  
Firstly, in terms of theory development two basic research approaches exist: the 
inductive and the deductive approach. The deductive approach is a means to 
falsify or verify theory, assuming that the conclusion must be true if premises 
are true. It is the predominant type of research in natural science, often based 




on quantitative data. Knowledge is generalised from the overall picture and from 
the general to the specific. In deductive research, data is collected to evaluate 
propositions or hypotheses which are related to existing theory (Saunders et al. 
2016). The inductive approach is a means to theory generation and building, 
using known premises to generate untested conclusions. Knowledge is 
generalised from the specific details to the general and overall picture. In 
inductive research, data is collated to explore phenomena, identify patterns or 
themes and develop an overall conceptual framework. Researchers using 
qualitative data are more likely to use inductive research (Saunders et al. 2016). 
This research will follow an inductive research approach: no underlying theory is 
known at the start of the research process. The research collects data and 
forms a first set of patterns and cluster by using the Delphi study. In the next 
step, a detailed case study will collect further data based on the identified 
patterns. Finally, a conceptual framework is developed taking the outcome of 
the Delphi and the case study into consideration.  
Regarding the methodological choice, Saunders et al. (2016) present three 
concepts: the mono-method which requires the use of one research approach 
only, the mixed-method which involves the use of two or more methods, and the 
multi-method which involves a wider selection of methods. This thesis follows a 
mixed-method approach by creating a single dataset using combined 
methodology. To fulfil the research objectives, both qualitative and quantitative 
data is collected and the findings are combined and triangulated.  
The research strategy describes how the researcher aims to perform research 
(Saunders et al. 2016). Various approaches exist, e.g. experimental research, 
action research, interviews, surveys and case study research. This thesis 
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applies a combination of Delphi study and case study research. The strategy 
combines the knowledge and expertise of experts from the industry generated 
by the Delphi study with practical examples of competition in different market 
settings generated by the case study.  
The time horizon of a research project is the time framework within which the 
project is finalised (Saunders et al. 2016). Two types of horizons exist: the 
cross-sectional and the longitudinal. In a cross-sectional horizon, data must be 
collected within a settled timeframe. In a longitudinal horizon, data can be 
collected repeatedly over a lengthy period. This thesis uses a combination of 
cross-sectional and longitudinal time horizons: the Delphi study is set in a cross-
sectional time horizon; it collects data systematically over a fixed period of six 
months. For the case study, data is collected over a lengthy period of three 
years, and is continually reassessed and complemented.  
The techniques and procedures of research represent data collection and 
analysis. This strongly depends on the methodological approach which has 
been chosen and the process applied significantly affects the study’s validity 
and reliability (Saunders et al. 2016). In this thesis, primary and secondary data 
is gathered: within the scope of the Delphi study, questionnaires are used which 
collect primary data. For the case study, primary data is collected by 
interviewing expterts. The findings are triangulated by the collection of 
secondary data in form of existing literature and reports, published accounts 
and annual reports, directives and other material. The findings from both 
techniques are combined in a mixed-method setting.  
The research methodology described addresses the defined research 
objectives in the following way and is further deepend in the following sections:  





Illustration 6: Integration of research objectives into research methodology (author’s own diagram)  
To answer the research objectives appropriately, not only the right research 
methodology is of importance but also the right choice of markets. Since open 
access competition is not legally allowed in all EU countries and only practiced 
in some, a limited range of markets exists. Competition is allowed in Germany, 
the Czech Republic, Italy, Sweden and Austria, and has already produced 
interesting insights in the last years. Therefore, the Delphi study focusses on 
those countries. In all countries, competition takes different forms and a strong 
incumbent operators exists. This allows the observation of the interplay 
between incumbents and market entrants. Further, enough experts and 
researchers exist that can give valuable insights and are willing to participate in 
the study. Being based on the Delphi study, the case study provides a deep-
dive. Therefore, enough data needs to exist, to generate detailed findings. 
Germany and Italy are chosen, since open access competition has a long 
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history in both countries, recent market entries as well as market exits took 
place and many interesting incidents and changes can be observed. Further, 
the development of competition and the approaches taken by competitors differ 
in both countries, giving valuable insights. In both countries, sufficient data, 
publications and experienced interview partners exist. 
4.2.1.  Delphi study  
The Delphi method is a structured communication technique which ascertains 
and refines the judgement of a group, it “was devised in order to obtain the most 
reliable opinion consensus of a group of experts by subjecting them to a series 
of questionnaires in depth interspersed with controlled feedback” (Dalkey & 
Helmer 1962, p. v).  
In the 1950s, the Delphi method was originally developed at the Research and 
Development Corporation (RAND)4 in California in operations research, by 
Dalkey, Helmer, Rescher and others (Linstone & Turoff 1975, Gordon 1994, 
Rowe & Wright 1999, Hsu & Sandford 2007), it was named after the Delphi 
Oracle in antique Greece (Cuhls 2005). The first Delphi study was based on the 
concept that “two heads are better than one” and consequently “n heads are 
better than one” (Dalkey 1969, p. 6). The original Delphi method was developed 
to produce forecasts of the impact of emerging technologies for the US military 
(Dalkey 1969, Sackman 1974).  
Today, Delphi is considered a legitimate and established research method and 
has been applied in a wide variety of fields (Linstone & Turoff 1975, Day & 
Bobeva 2005, Donohoe & Needham 2009, Häder 2009). It has developed into a 
 
4 RAND Corporation is a research organisation, founded after World War 2 to advise the US military. 
RAND develops solutions to public policy challenges and is a non-profit and nonpartisan organisation 
(http://www.rand.org/about.html).  




“tool for measuring and aiding forecasting and decision making in a variety of 
disciplines” (Rowe & Wright 1999, p. 252). Linstone & Turoff defined Delphi as a 
“method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is 
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex 
problem” (Linstone & Turoff 1975, p. 3), which is most fitting for the use of 
Delphi in this thesis. The method is based on a structural survey process and 
makes use of intuitive information available to the participants and each 
following round is built on the knowledge gained in the previous rounds with the 
goal of reaching consensus (Bergner & Lohmann 2014). The technique 
therefore allows researchers to receive reliable first-hand data from previously 
defined experts (Hallowell & Gambatese 2010), who consider the matter again 
while being influenced by the opinion of the other experts in the panel (Cuhls 
2005). Therefore, Delphi is also termed a self-learning system (Häder 2009). 
Hsu & Sandford say that “[c]ontrolled feedback in the Delphi process is 
designed to reduce the effect of noise” (2007, p. 2). 
Several researchers state that there is no “single” Delphi method, it has been 
widely applied in diverse ways (Mullen 2003, Häder 2009, Cuhls 2005). 
Nevertheless, the core components of Delphi are anonymity, controlled 
feedback, statistical group responses (Dalkey 1969) and iteration (Mehnen et al. 
2013). Several authors tried to categorise and define different types of Delphi 
studies (Häder 2009). Below three basic types of Delphi are presented based 
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Type Conventional Delphi Policy Delphi Decision Delphi 
Origin  RAND in 1950s Introduced by Turoff in 
1970 
Introduced by Rauch in 
1979 
Purpose Produce forecasts, tool for 
decision making process 
Facilitate examination of 
vexing policy issues, 
understanding of points of 
consensus and 
disagreement 
Prepare and assist 
decisions making, 
create future in reality 
instead of making 
predictions 






Panel  More homogenous sample More heterogeneous 
sample  
Experts are recruited 
regarding their actual 




More objectivist / more 
Lockean  
More constructivist   
Table 2: Types of Delphi (Turoff 1970, Linstone & Turoff 1975, Turoff 1975, Rauch 1979, Stewart 2001, 
Hesse et al. 2009, Häder 2009, Linstone & Turoff 2011, Cochrane 2012, Kezar & Maxey 2016, Loe et al. 
2016) 
The application of the Delphi method is of special value in multi-layered, 
complex fields where multiple stakeholders are involved, as well for studying 
phenomena where limited consensus, incomplete knowledge and no hard facts 
or an unknown landscape exist (Donohoe & Needham 2009, Kezar & Maxey 
2016). Delphi is also valuable in research projects where no precise analytical 
techniques can be applied and personal contact is impossible because of cost 
and time constraints (Day & Bobeva 2005). Whenever face-to-face meetings 
can be increased in efficiency by structured group communication, the 
heterogeneity of panels needs to be prevented or disagreements among 
participants need to be refereed, the Delphi study is a helpful tool (Linstone & 
Turoff 1975).  
Delphi as a research method is a subjective-intuitive method (Cuhls 2005); it is 
considered a qualitative research method (Donohoe & Needham 2009), but it 
can be used for both quantitative and qualitative data (Häder 2009, Islam & 
Zunder 2014). From an epistemological point of view, it can therefore be seen 
from a positivist (quantitative analysis) or from an interpretivist perspective 
(qualitative analysis) (Lin & Song 2015). Stewart (2001) states that Delphi 




“could be viewed as deriving from objectivism where the statements generated 
from the experts are considered as facts and objective truths, as in the case of 
a ‘classical Delphi’. But equally it could be derived from constructionism, where 
the findings only represent a shared meaning, developed from an interactive 
process as in a ‘policy Delphi’” (p. 923). Regarding positivist research, Delphi 
serves as a tool to test general assumptions and to define the characteristics of 
complex areas (Day & Bobeva 2005). The varieties of epistemological 
allocations show Delphi’s hybrid epistemological status - this is part of Critcher 
& Gladstone’s (1998) critique which is that Delphi may suffer from this dilemma. 
However, in case of this research project with its defined scope and 
methodological combination between Delphi study and case study research, it 
is not considered as problematic.  
4.2.1.1. Expert panel  
Scheele (1975) states that “[e]ach Delphi interaction produces a shared reality 
which is initially formulated by the panelists from their expectations and the style 
of presentation used in the initial materials; this particular reality is elaborated 
and modified by the succeeding interactions” (p. 61). Since the panelists 
produce reality for the study, the literature agrees on the point that the quality 
and expertise of the panel are crucial for the success of any Delphi study 
(Gordon 1994, Hsu & Sandford 2007, Kezar & Maxey 2016). Consequently, the 
composition of the expert panel is of importance for the research process and 
should be considered thoroughly by the researcher (Dalkey 1969). 
In the existing literature, no common definition of an “expert” may be found 
because each Delphi study requires a different type of expert panel to be 
successful, always depending on the type of research question (Sackman 1974, 
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Mullen 2003). While Pill (1971) describes an expert as anyone with a relevant 
input, Mullen (2003) states that “experts are often assumed to be professionally 
or scientifically qualified and/or to have achieved high status” (p. 40). 
Nevertheless, some underlying principles can be found in previous studies. 
According to several researchers (Gordon 1994, Donohoe & Needham 2009), 
the research problem and study questions should be like the participant’s 
interest, knowledge and skills to achieve high quality, meaningful and legitimate 
results. According to Rogers & Lopez (2002), the expert must fulfil at least two 
of the following requirements: authorship, presenting at conferences, 
member/chair of committee, five years of practical experience, be employed as 
a faculty member at an institution of higher learning. The expert must also be 
willing to devote some of his/her often limited time to the study (Cochrane 2012) 
and be able to articulate judgements (Day & Bobeva 2005).  
Finally, some researchers (Gordon 1994, Donohoe & Needham 2009) 
recommend a clear description of the selection criteria or a matrix for the 
experts and expert groups before each Delphi study to reach the desired 
research purposes. No matter how the expert is defined, it is necessary that real 
experts are recruited. Rowe & Wright (1999) point toward the Theory of Errors 
“in which accuracy is improved over rounds as a consequence of the panel 
experts ‘holding-out’, while the less-expert panelists ‘swing’ towards the group 
average” (p. 372). Best (1974) further states that “[s]elf-rated experts made 
estimates which were significantly […] more accurate than estimates by self-
rated nonexperts” (p. 450). 
Besides the selection process of the experts, the composition of the panel plays 
an important role. As with the definition of an expert, the literature also does not 
reach consensus in the matter of panel size (Hsu & Sandford 2007): Gordon 




(1994) argues that panels mostly contain between 15 and 35 participants, 
Delbecq et al. (1975) recommend a panel size of up to 30 experts, while Kezar 
& Maxey (2016) state that typically 30-60 participants form a panel. Donohoe & 
Needham (2009) consider a minimum of 7-15 respondents as necessary while 
Hallowell & Gambatese (2010) and Sourani & BEng (2015) suggest a minimum 
of 7-8 participants. As a matter of fact, Brockhoff (1975) states that a “general 
positive relationship between group size and group performance cannot be 
recognized” (p. 310). A closer consideration of Delphi studies in the tourist and 
transportation industry shows great differences in the number of participants. 
The Delphi studies which are of greatest interest for this research project vary 
between 22 (Bergner & Lohmann 2014) and 50 (Mäkitalo & Hilmola 2010).  
As described above, a conventional Delphi has a more homogeneous panel 
while the Policy Delphi is known for a more heterogeneous panel. Nevertheless, 
many researchers suggest a heterogeneous panel for Delphi studies to enrich 
and improve the outcome (Linstone & Turoff 1975, Cuhls 2005, Hallowell & 
Gambatese 2010). Heterogeneous groups with experts having different 
perspectives on the research topic are known to produce results of higher 
quality than homogeneous groups (Delbecq et al. 1975, Hallowell & Gambatese 
2010). However, Kezar & Maxey (2016), argue that the degree of heterogeneity 
mainly depends on the study’s objectives.  
When the panel is finally formed, panel stability throughout the study is 
considered as essential since the entry of a new expert will distort the outcome 
of the study (Donohoe & Needham 2009). 
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4.2.1.2. Process of Delphi studies 
In order to benefit from the Delphi method, it is necessary to clearly understand 
the method and its logic; only this enables methodological application and 
adaptation. Further, detailed and careful planning is required as well as reliable 
execution (Donohoe & Needham 2009):  
Phase Explanation Tasks  
1. Exploration Free-flowing and unstructured 
investigation of the issues, 
limitations, challenges and problems 
that affect or are affected by the 
elements within the study domain.  
• Establishing criteria for selection of 
participants 
• Establishing of a Delphi panel 
• Designing of the data collection and 
analysis instruments 
• Eliciting the initial set of issues to be 
tested trough the Delphi rounds  
• Piloting of the toolkit 
• Assembling of information package for 
participants 
2. Distillation Main body of the study, several 
rounds of Delphi and the analysis of 
each round 
• Conducting rounds 
• Reviewing of the returns from rounds 
• Informing participant of outcome of the 
rounds 
• Conducting next round 
3. Utilisation Analysing of the study outcome, 
summarising and utilising the 
outcome of the study 
• Analysing qualitative and quantitative data 
• Writing up of results 
• Drawing conclusions 
• Reflecting experience  
Table 3: Phases of Delphi, adapted from Linstone & Turnoff 1975, Day & Bobeva 2005, Häder 2009  
The exploration phase is important for the researcher to clarify the research 
scope and set the basis for the Delphi study. Most researchers start the Delphi 
process with comprehensive desktop research (Islam & Zunder 2014) followed 
by one or multiple rounds of pilot tests of the questionnaire to guarantee its 
quality (Goldstein 1975, Day & Bobeva 2005, Donohoe & Needham 2009). As 
described above, the composition of the panel is the condition for successful 
data collection. 
The distillation phase incorporates the actual interaction with the expert panel 
and the process of knowledge generation. In most studies, the first round starts 
with open-ended questions and is relatively unstructured to obtain unaffected 
knowledge from the panel (Rowe & Wright 1999). Some researchers, however, 




provide literature reviews and structure the first round to narrow the scope and 
steer the panel (Weston & Davies 2007, Kezar & Maxey 2016). After the first 
round, the data collected will be analysed and on this basis, the questionnaire 
for the second round is constructed. This process is then continued until 
consensus is achieved or the research goal is reached. In general, it can be 
stated that the number of rounds varies between two and ten; but in most 
Delphi studies, the main improvements occur between rounds one and two, 
therefore Delphi studies with two or three rounds are most common (Linstone & 
Turnoff 1975, Hallowell & Gambatese 2010, Lin & Song 2015). Kezar & Maxey 
(2016) state that the number of rounds is largely dependent on the study’s 
purpose.  
To manage the Delphi rounds successfully, Donohoe (2011) recommends 
keeping the time between the rounds short, ideally less than two months and 
putting significant effort into communication with the participants to maintain 
commitment and enable an adequate response level. This leads to an average 
duration of five to eight months of a Delphi study (Häder 2009). Scheele (1975) 
recommends closely considering the quality of the materials provided, their 
style, tone and presentation. “Use lots of colour. Give the material style. […] 
Use emotive language and vernacular expressions to engage panelists and 
convey the importance of results, not another abstract study” (Scheele 1975 p. 
66). This effort can significantly reduce the drop-out rate. Gordon (1994) 
indicates an average response rate from 40 to 75%; however many recent 
Delphi studies show that it is often even lower.  
In the last phase, the utilisation phase, the outcome of the study is closely 
analysed and summarised. The researcher writes up the results to a report or 
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presentation and reflect the experience to collect knowledge for future studies 
(Day & Bobeva 2005). 
4.2.1.3. Delphi studies in existing literature 
The diversity of Delphi studies shows how wide the spectrum of Delphi 
application is (Day & Bobeva 2005). Over the years, the technique has been 
applied in various fields of studies, e.g. government planning (e.g. Hesse et al. 
2009), environmental management (e.g. Abukhader & Jonson 2013), health 
(e.g. Lange et al. 2007), marketing (e.g. Bonnemaizon et al. 2007), corporate 
management (Day 1975) and tourism & transportation (e.g. Bergner & Lohmann 
2014, Islam & Zunder 2014, Hsu 1999). Overall, the literature on Delphi can be 
divided into three categories: articles about the Delphi technique itself and its 
usage (Sackman 1974, Day & Bobeva 2005, Donohoe 2011, Lin & Song 2015, 
Kezar & Maxey 2016), articles with Delphi as a foresight technique (Weston & 
Davies 2007, Bergner & Lohmann 2014) and articles with Delphi as a means to 
generate knowledge in a new field of study (partly Mäkitalo 2011, Cochrane 
2012, Islam & Zunder 2014).  
Bergner & Lohmann (2014) used an exploratory Delphi survey to identify 
challenges to global tourism through 2020 and to further comprehend their 
drivers, effects and nature. Of special interest in this thesis is that the authors 
identify that the tourism industry is affected by several external and internal 
drivers, including political, economic, social and environmental dimensions, like 
the passenger rail industry. To explore this complexity, Bergner & Lohmann 
chose qualitative research methodology in an exploratory approach. They 
addressed 22 experts with a research or consulting background of which 16 
participated in the first round. The first and second round consisted of a written 




questionnaire, the last round was a focus group with the possibility to send final 
comments via email. Bergner & Lohmann started the first round by posing 
open-ended questions to identify challenges and drivers. In the next round, they 
exported the 53 challenges identified and the participants ranked the challenges 
according to their prominence on a graphic scale (0 to 100 mm). The second 
round revealed that the experts had divergent views regarding the prominence 
of challenges; the researchers then allocated the challenges which had their 
average score in the highest quartile in the “most prominent” group. In the final 
round, the results were summarised in five areas of meta-challenge categories. 
With this research design, Bergner & Lohmann created a holistic picture of 
challenges despite the complexity and the dynamics within the system. For 
future research, they suggest their Delphi technique as a first step to study 
complex systems. 
Islam & Zunder (2014) used a multi-technique qualitative approach combining 
desktop research, a Delphi study in two stages and an expert focus workshop to 
investigate the necessity for a new quality standard for freight transport and 
logistics in Europe. They addressed 100 experts of whom 90 were considered 
valid in the first round. Islam & Zunder used a mixed panel of experts from 
industry and politics. They addressed experts from top and middle management 
with long-term experience. For the first round, Islam & Zunder used 14 
standards, developed in desktop research, which were then commented on by 
the experts on awareness, usage, strength and weaknesses. The expert focus 
workshop seems to confirm the findings from the two rounds and gives some 
additional recommendations. In conclusion, Islam & Zunder can confirm the use 
of Delphi as a research method, but they stress that “Delphi surveys can be 
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prone to supporting the status quo” (p. 409) since the results of their study are 
not radical.  
Cochrane (2012) applies the Policy Delphi method to explore the concept of 
freight in transit. He carried out a three round Delphi based on online surveys by 
conducting 34 transportation experts with heterogeneous backgrounds. He 
started the first round with open-ended questions to animate the panel to 
brainstorm, followed by asking the participants to list, amongst other things, 
influencing factors. The outcome was a variety of different impact factors, which 
were grouped together and the most frequent factors were used for the next 
round. Then, the findings were rated on a five-point Likert scale. The outcome 
showed no great level of agreement, where Cochrane analysed the different 
panelists regarding their background. The third round implied a re-rating and a 
discussion and evaluation of strategies based on the answers from the previous 
rounds. The opinion of the panelists remained mostly stable. The Delphi method 
was considered a useful but time-consuming tool by the author. It was not the 
consensus that embodied the success, but the responses by the individual 
experts.  
Of special interests for this project is Mäkitalo & Hilmola’s research from 2010. 
They used the Delphi method to analyse competition in the Finnish railway 
freight market. They asked why competition is not more frequent despite a 
liberalised market and test if Delphi is the appropriate technique for this 
research question. Mäkitalo & Hilmola used a panel of 50 experts from a more 
heterogeneous background. They carried out two rounds of Delphi by using 
questionnaires, starting with open-ended questions but also collecting 
quantitative data by using seven-point Likert scales. They discovered that the 
future expectations varied greatly among the experts questioned, they saw 




reaching of consensus as not realistic. Therefore the experts were classified 
into a two-dimensional matrix and grouped into three types. In conclusion, they 
state that the Delphi method “worked well in collecting wide-range on 
arguments and views” (p. 32) and even say that it might be the only method to 
explore competition which does not yet exist. From their point of view, the 
method is suitable for the railway industry due to the diversity of players with 
various interests.  
4.2.1.4.  Strengths and weaknesses of Delphi studies 
Gordon (1994) states that “Delphi studies are difficult to perform well” (p. 9) and 
Linstone & Turnoff (1975) argue that on the surface, the method seems to be a 
simple concept and that some researchers therefore chose it without 
considering its weaknesses. Table 4 gives an overview of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Delphi method, compiled from the work of different 
researchers (Cuhls 2005, Donohoe & Needham 2009, Hesse et al. 2009, 
Cochrane 2012, Mehnen et al. 2013, Islam & Zunder 2014, Kezar & Maxey 
2016):  
Strengths Weaknesses  
• Closes gap between research and practice 
• Overcomes geographical and time differences 
• Experts are guaranteed anonymity  
• Reflexive and repetitive process 
• Flexible framework  
• Succeeds in research fields where other, 
more quantitative methods fail  
• Unbiased input due to prevention of negative 
effects of group dynamics and peer pressure 
• Free of personality influence, individual 
dominance and social pressure 
• Iterative process which encourages experts to 
converge on a consensus view  
• Can discover and explain disagreements 
• Cumulated opinion of individuals, no objective 
truths  
• Rather complex procedure 
• Time-consuming and high workload  
• Anonymity of experts may lead to careless 
responses 
• Existing paradigms could be reinforced 
• Can be biased to promote status quo 
• Danger of eliminating extreme positions and 
forcing middle-of-the-road consensus  
• If panel is designed unsatisfactorily, it reflects 
the personal bias of the researcher  
 
Table 4: Strengths and weaknesses of Delphi (author’s own diagram) 
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4.2.1.5. Critical discussion of Delphi studies  
In principle, Delphi is considered an established, successful and legitimate 
research method which is widely applied (Linstone & Turoff 1975, Day & 
Bobeva 2005, Donohoe & Needham 2009). Nonetheless Delphi has often been 
an object of criticism. Criticism was mostly expressed regarding the concept of 
Delphi as a research method, its subjectivity of outcome and the interpretation 
of its results.  
Linstone & Turoff (1975, p. 223) argue that “[s]ceptics from the allegedly “hard” 
sciences have at times considered Delphi an unscientific method of inquiry”. 
Sackman (1974) states that Delphi is considered a judgemental technique 
lacking internal validity and that the conventional Delphi is therefore “basically 
an unreliable and scientifically unvalidated technique in principle and probably 
in practice” (p. vi). However, some authors go as far as to state that in some 
fields where data is lacking or sparse, the Delphi method might be the only 
available possibility (Kaynak et al. 1994, Häder 2009).  
The content of Delphi studies are always issues where uncertain or incomplete 
knowledge exists (Cuhls 2005, Häder 2009). The basic nature of Delphi is that 
individuals interact and develop consensus over time. Therefore, “the results of 
a Delphi are not just the individual items produced in the interaction but the 
reality comprised by the whole” (Scheele 1975, p. 65). This process results in a 
subjective reality, which cannot be compared to the outcome of objective, 
quantitative studies. Delphi is a judgemental process with some uncertain 
aspects (Cuhls 2005). Bearing this in mind, one needs to closely investigate the 
experts used for the study to guarantee high-quality and representative 
outcomes. The data generated by Delphi could be additionally triangulated with 




other methods or existing data to challenge the outcome with a more objective 
reality (Höjer 1998, Gunhan & Arditi 2005, Weston & Davies 2007, Islam & 
Zunder 2014). 
It is argued that some researchers do not consider the drawbacks of Delphi 
properly and therefore fail to evaluate the data in the right way which leads to 
falsified outcomes (Linstone & Turoff 1975). The Delphi study does not provide 
a common method to analyse and utilise data. “The epistemological confusion 
arises from focusing on Delphi results and naively taking them at face value as 
expert predictions of the future, rather than looking at the underpinning method 
which reveals Delphi as an attitude polling technique dealing in snap 
judgements of ill-defined issues” states Sackman (1974, p. 58). 
Bearing all this in mind, the researcher must carefully evaluate if the Delphi 
method is the right method for the field of study – in fields where quantitative 
methods can be applied, this might lead to better outcomes. The researcher 
must also always bear in mind that the outcome of a Delphi study is the 
subjective reality of a group of individuals; it is therefore advisable that other 
modes of research are employed to triangulate the outcome. In 1974, Best 
agrees to this point by saying that further development regarding validation 
needs to be done. In 2009, Häder states that by then, no fundamental doubts 
about the basic functioning of Delphi had been expressed.  
4.2.2.  Case study research  
A case study can be defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 
1994, p. 13). It is considered a flexible, detailed and intensive study of context-
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dependent phenomena (Luck et al. 2006), being down-to-earth and attention-
holding (Stake 1978) and providing a form of inquiry that enables researchers to 
generate a view of life in its complexity (Thomas 2016).  
The origin of case study research is relatively unclear. Some see the roots in 
psychology, sociology and anthropology in the early 20th century, when new 
theory was created using case studies, as in Glaser & Strauss’ work (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967, Eisenhardt 1989). Others see the roots even further back in time 
and name Frederic Le Play as the originator, when working on his studies on 
family budgets in 1829 (Gerring 2007, Thomas 2016). Today, case study 
research holds a central position in various fields of education and research, 
e.g. business, political science, medicine and social work (Yin 1994, Gerring 
2007). Gerring states that “we are witnessing a movement in the social science 
away from a variable-centred approach to causality and towards a case-based 
approach” (2007, p. 3). This states that case study research plays a central role 
in today’s research in social science, even though it is not without controversy 
(e.g. Miles 1979, Flyvbjerg 2006).  
Case study research assumes various roles in a scientific context: it is defined 
as a data collection technique, a design feature and a research approach. Luck 
et al. (2006) state that case study research has no fixed methodological 
position, it should rather be considered a “paradigmatic bridge”. This thesis will 
apply Yin’s definition of case study research as a comprehensive research 
strategy (1994). Yin says that “the case study as a research strategy comprises 
an all-encompassing method – with the logic of design incorporating specific 
approaches to data collection and to data analysis” (1994, p. 13). Luck et al. 
state that such case study research “provides a delineated boundary for inquiry, 




and a structural process within which any methods appropriate to investigating 
a research area can be applied” (2006, p. 103).  
The case as the central element can be defined as an “individual element or 
group member within a sample or population such as an employee” or an 
“individual unit for which data have been collected” (Saunders et al. 2012, p. 
666). Stake states that it “can be whatever “bounded system” […] is of interest” 
for the research: a population, an institution, a specific programme or even a 
responsibility (1978, p. 7). Stake (1995) sees the case as an integrated system 
and uses the Greek symbol Θ to represent a case. When undertaking an 
intrinsic case study, the researcher wants to learn more about a phenomenon or 
a person. Therefore, a clear definition of Θ is essential. By doing instrumental 
case studies, these studies aim to gain understanding of a specific issue. 
Therefore, besides the definition of case, the definition of the issue is of special 
importance. Stake uses the Greek symbol ϑ to represent the issue or issues. He 
uses the issue-question as a research question, “in order to force attention to 
complexity and contextuality” (1995, p. 16).  
Case studies are best applied whenever “how” or “why” questions need to be 
answered, when the behaviour of the subjects and events in the study cannot 
be manipulated, when the collection of contextual conditions is relevant to the 
phenomenon, and when boundaries between context and phenomenon are not 
clear (Yin 1994, Stake 1995, Baxter & Jack 2008). In addition, case study 
research is relevant when more variables of interest exist than data and when 
multiple sources of evidence are needed and mixed (Yin 1994). It is important 
when “rich understanding of the context of the research and the processes 
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being attached” is required, mostly in explanatory and exploratory research 
(Saunders et al. 2012, p. 179).  
However, case study research is applied to satisfy various research aims, such 
as providing description, testing or generation of theory, and different research 
questions require different case study designs (Eisenhardt 1989). According to 
Yin (1994), four variants of case study design exist:  






single unit of analysis of a single case 
TYPE 2: 




multiple units of analysis of a single 
case 
TYPE 4: 
multiple units of analysis in multiple, 
different cases 
Illustration 7: Variants of case study design, adapted from Yin 1994 
A single-case design is best applied if the case is critical in testing a well-known 
theory or the case is especially revelatory, extreme or unique. A multiple-case 
design should be applied when more than one case is relevant for the 
investigation with every case serving a specific purpose within the overall scope 
of inquiry and when replication logic can be followed. A case design should be 
holistic if the case investigates the global nature of a phenomenon on a more 
abstract level and no logical sub-units exist. An embedded case design is best 
applied when a phenomenon incorporates sub-units which need to be analysed 
individually (Yin 1994). 
To achieve the research aim, there is no set of methods for case study research 
on which the existing literature agrees, which provides the researcher with a 
high degree of flexibility (Yin 1994, Luck et al. 2006). Data comes to a large 
extent from documentation, systematic interviewing, archival records, physical 
artefacts, direct and participant observation (Yin 1994, Zucker 2009). Case 




study researchers typically apply mixed methods with multiple data sources to 
capture the phenomenon’s complexity (Rosenberg & Yates 2007). The 
combination of data types within the case study can be highly synergetic and 
imply a triangulation of data (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1994). “This ensures that the 
issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allow 
for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood” (Baxter & 
Jack 2008, p. 544). However, this high methodological flexibility of case study 
research can pose a risk for researchers, since uncertainty about suitable 
procedural steps exists to ensure methodological accuracy (Rosenberg & Yates 
2007). 
Case study research is often characterised as a qualitative research 
methodology (Baxter & Jack 2008), but the flexibility of methods shows that 
case study research can be qualitative and quantitative and often is a mixture of 
both (Yin 1981, Gerring 2007, Saunders et al. 2012). Gerring states that “the 
methodological status of the case study is still highly suspect” (2007, p. 7). Luck 
et al. argue that “because any set of methods that will help to develop 
understanding can be used, case study is a bridge that spans the research 
paradigms” (2006, p. 105). They further state that case study research therefore 
has no fixed epistemological and ontological position. Indeed, the existing 
literature gives no clear indication of the epistemological and ontological 
positioning of case study research. While some consider that most case study 
research is considered interpretivist (Taylor & Thomas-Gregory 2015), Yin 
(2003) and Stake (1995) relate their approach to case study research to 
constructivism, which leads to a closer collaboration between the researcher 
and the phenomenon of research (Baxter & Jack 2008).  
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Taking this into consideration, it is the researcher’s task to manage the 
opposing philosophical perspectives, and it is important that the researcher 
demonstrates consistency between theoretical and philosophical positions, 
research questions and design, and the set of applied methods (Luck et al. 
2006, Taylor & Thomas-Gregory 2015).  
4.2.2.1. The case study research process 
Various researchers address the importance of appropriate procedural steps 
and a clear and transparent framework to maintain methodological integrity (Yin 
1994, Stake 1995, Luck et al. 2006, Zucker 2009, Taylor & Thomas-Gregory 
2015). However, a clear example or definition of the individual process steps of 
a case study is found only rarely (Rosenberg & Yates 2007). Rosenberg & 
Yates (2007) provide a clear process in nine steps, which gives a good 
guideline for the conception of a case study, building on and including 
knowledge of the existing literature (Yin 1994, Stake 1995, Luck et al. 2006, 
Baxter & Jack 2008, Taylor & Thomas-Gregory 2015). Their framework also 











No Step  Explanation 
1 Posing of research question  • Clear definition of what question(s) the case study 
aims to answer, ideally “how” and “why”  
2 Identification of underpinning 
theories 
• Gain understanding of research context, e.g. in form 
of literature research  
• Identification of underlying themes and underlying 
theories 
3 Definition of case, its context and 
the phenomena of interest 
• The most important step in the process: clear 
definition of boundaries enables an easier and more 
transparent management of data 
• Boundaries may be set regarding time, region, units, 
sub-units, etc.  
• Participants/research subjects need to be named  
4 Determination of specific case 
study approach / case study design 
• Stake proposes three forms of case study research: 
o Intrinsic (case is studied for its own sake)  
o Instrumental (case is studied to understand 
issue or phenomenon of interest) 
o Collective (single case is extended to include 
other cases) 
• Yin proposes the four types of case study design 
described above 
5 Identification of data collection 
method(s) most suitable to answer 
the research question 
• Dependent on the type of research question  
• Often a mixed methods approach is used 
• Most common are interviews, questionnaires, 
documentation reviews, participant observation, etc. 
6 Selection of analysis strategies 
appropriate to each of these data 
collection strategies 
• This step overlaps with the identification of data 
collection since the appropriate analysis strategy is 
highly dependent on the method of data collection 
7 Refinement of analysed data 
through analytical filter  
• Not necessary for every case study  
• Facilitates methodological rigour  
• Maintains the set boundaries 
8 Reduction of data into manageable 
units 
• Not necessary for every case study  
• Organising the large volumes of data from multiple 
sources in a systematic and rigorous way  
• Can be done in the form of matrices  
9 Determination of conclusion and 
case description 
• Further analysis of data. Final conclusions are drawn 
on this basis 
• Matching of patterns in the data that are defensible  
• Writing up of case description as the product of case 
study research  
Table 5: Case study framework, adapted from Rosenberg & Yates 2007 (author’s own diagram)  
In addition to the described case study process, Taylor & Thomas-Gregory 
(2015) name further characteristics of good case study research which aim to 
enhance the research process: it is important that the rigour of the research is 
well-defined to enhance credibility. All ethical issues of the research project 
need to be addressed clearly and appropriately. Finally, the presentation of the 
case needs to be accessible and allow the reader to evaluate and judge the 
case on its transferability, credibility and the trustworthiness of the data 
included.  
PhD Thesis Lisa Feuerstein 
101 
 
4.2.2.2. Strengths and weaknesses of case study research 
Yin states that despite all strengths and advantages, “good case studies are 
very difficult to do” (1994, p. 10). Table 6 gives an overview of case study’s 
main the strengths and weaknesses, compiled from the work of different 
researchers (Yin 1994, Bergen & While 2000, Luck et al. 2006, Baxter & Jack 
2008, Zucker 2009):  
Strengths Weaknesses  
• Closes gaps between research and practice 
and shows a “lived reality” 
• Succeeds in research fields where other, 
more quantitative methods fail and help in 
fields where large samples are not available  
• Allows internal triangulation by the application 
of mixed methods 
• Has a high degree of flexibility which allows 
adaptation to research phenomena 
• Generates a rich, holistic and in-depth 
account of research phenomena  
• Helps to manage research topics with high 
complexity and deals with a full variety of 
evidence  
• Difficult to generalise on a scientific basis 
• Time-consuming and often expensive 
• Danger of drifting off the initial phenomenon of 
observation due to the mass of data and 
impressions 
• Amount of rich data can be hard to analyse 
• Difficult to draw direct conclusions 
• Results are often massive, complex and broad 
documents: complexity of research 
phenomena is often hard to present simply  
• Possible bias when a single researcher does 
data collection and interpretation 
• Validation of solution is challenging and often 
complex  
Table 6: Strengths and weaknesses of case study research (author’s own diagram) 
In order to do successful case study research, the strengths and especially the 
weaknesses need to be reconsidered by the researcher throughout the case 
study process.  
4.2.2.3.  Critical discussion of case study research  
Case study research is considered an established and legitimate research 
method that is applied in a wide field of research topics (Yin 1981, Bergen & 
While 2000, Flyvbjerg 2006). Nonetheless, case study research is not without 
controversy and often leads to criticism and misunderstandings (Miles 1979, 
Flyvbjerg 2006). Criticism was mostly expressed regarding a lack of rigour, 
biased towards verification, and a lack of generalisation capacity.  




Yin states that case studies have been described as a “less desirable form of 
inquiry than either experiments or surveys” (1994, p. 9), especially regarding 
lack of rigour. He agrees that case study investigators in the past had been too 
sloppy by using biased views and equivocal evidence which influenced their 
direction of findings and finally their conclusions. Rosenberg & Yates (2007) 
note that the methodological flexibility of case study research may lead to 
uncertainty of suitable procedural steps to ensure methodological rigour. 
However, by following a clear, pre-defined process, keeping a research diary 
recording the decision-making process, expert verification and other tools, the 
researcher can demonstrate rigour and high quality of the research and its 
findings (Rosenberg & Yates 2007, Taylor & Thomas-Gregory 2015).  
Regarding verification and credibility, Miles finds the analysis process during 
case-writing to be “essentially intuitive, primitive, and unmanageable in any 
rational sense” and “memorable for its moments of sheer despair in the face of 
the mass of data” (1979, p. 597). Also critical in case study research “is the 
collection of overwhelming amounts of data that require management and 
analysis. Often, the researchers find themselves “lost” in the data” (Baxter & 
Jack 2008, p. 554). Yin (1981) agrees, saying that researchers failed to 
establish a clear chain of evidence for each analytical step which leads to doubt 
about specific conclusions. Bergen & While describe case study research as “a 
method as credible and robust as any other” (2000, p. 933). Zucker states that it 
is the researcher’s role “to test and confirm his/her findings in order to indicate 
the findings are valid“ (2009, p. 10). Therefore, a clearly defined framework of 
the process of data analysis is needed to enhancing credibility (Yin 1994). Tools 
like Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), which help 
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to collect and organise data as well as recordings and source details, can 
further guarantee the credibility of the findings (Baxter & Jack 2008).  
The possibility of generalising case study findings is also discussed in the 
existing literature. Zucker states that “[g]eneralization of case study findings is 
limited to the case itself or types of cases” (2009, p. 10). Miles (1979) believes 
unmanageable complexity arises when generalisation of compared cases was 
considered. Yin (1994) states that the answer to the question how 
generalisation is done is not simple. He refers to the fact that scientific facts are 
mostly based on multiple sets of experiments and that multiple-case studies 
could be a solution for generalising theoretical propositions, but not to 
populations or universes. Finally, Flyvbjerg states that a generalisation is not 
always important since “purely descriptive, phenomenological case study 
without any attempt to generalize can certainly be of value in this process and 
has often helped cut a path toward scientific innovation” (2006, p. 227). Stake 
states that after all, “[t]he real business of case study is particularization, not 
generalization” (1995, p.8).  
Taking all this into consideration, the researcher must carefully design and set a 
clear process for the case study (Rosenberg & Yates 2007). Transparency and 
the presentation of evidence of each analytical step is important to build a chain 
of argumentation and to give the case study further credibility (Yin 1981). The 
researcher must also carefully consider if the case study method is the right 
research strategy in the relevant field of study, depending on the existence of 
relevant qualitative and quantitative data. Finally, Flyvbjerg states that, “the 
case study is a necessary and sufficient method for certain important research 
tasks in the social science, and it is a method that holds up well when compared 
to other methods in the gamut of social science research methodology” (2006, 




p. 241). “The case study research has under used and under-explored potential, 
with broach research application and methodological flexibility,” claim Taylor & 
Thomas-Gregory (2015, p. 36).  
4.2.3. PESTLE framework 
Various studies prove how important the influence of external and internal 
factors is for strategic decisions in companies, especially regarding market entry 
strategies (e.g. Röder 2003, Ravelomanana et al. 2015). The existing literature 
about open access competition shows how complex and diffuse the 
environment of long-distance passenger rail is (Kirchner 2011) and that a clear 
structure is needed to analyse this type of competition in its industrial setting. 
The critical discussion of both the Delphi study and the case study research 
also reveal that a clearly structured framework is necessary to process large 
amounts of rich data. The PESTLE analysis, as an analytical framework of 
macro-environmental factors, is well suited to support the research process in 
this thesis: it helps to investigate complex and mulitlayered environments, 
clustering the factors in political, economic, social, technical, legal and 
environmental circumstances that characterise the business environment of an 
organisation, an industry or sector, or management decisions (Vronti & Vignal 
2001, Peng & Nunes 2007). It is a tool to collect and categorise factors. The 
PESTLE framework is a common technique in business and is frequently used 
by practitioners and consultants in the industry.  
The PESTLE framework implies that the success of an 
organisation/industry/management solution, and in the case of this thesis the 
successful implementation of open access competition, cannot be fully 
estimated without taking the business environment into consideration. Thus 
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PESTLE gives a “satellite view” (Peng & Nunes 2007). This is of special 
importance for this thesis, since the liberalisation process and the resulting 
competition in the railway market has various layers and many players with 
different backgrounds and motivations.  
In 1965, Harvard Business School Professor Francis Aguilar conceived the 
“ETPS” framework to scan the environment in terms of economic, technical, 
political and social categories (Aguilar 1967). A few years later, Arnold Brown 
rephrased it to “STEP” or “Strategic Trend Evaluation Process” to organise and 
categorise his result of environmental scanning (Brown & Weiner 1984). It is not 
clear when “ETPS” or “STEP” were transformed to “PEST”, which is the 
predominant term used today. A few years later, the second “E” was added and 
defined as “ecological taxonomy”. More recently, the “L” for “legislative or legal 
concerns” has been added, where the “L” is often closely connected to the “P” 
for “politics”, which can also be observed in this study (Richardson 2012).  
Today, many companies use PEST or PESTLE analysis for their strategic 
planning, especially due to its uni-dimensional outcome (Collins 2010, p. 2). 
However, the PESTLE analysis as an analysis framework itself is not precise 
and not clearly circumscribed. By using PESTLE, an unlimited number of 
variables occur: an important task for the researcher therefore is to prioritise 
and weight the variable with the highest impact on the field of research (Peng & 
Nunes 2007). In literature about research methodology, PESTLE is generally 
not seen as a research method or a research strategy, so it will not be used as 
either in this thesis.  
As described above, the PESTLE framework helps to investigate complex 
environments by providing a structure and brings transparency into specific 
market circumstances. When using the PESTLE framework, the researcher 




needs to observe the research topic and the market environment from a satellite 
perspective. This includes four basic steps: the researcher needs to identify and 
collect all relevant factors influencing the research topic. Next, the researcher 
needs to allocate the influencing factors within the PESTLE clusters. Thereby, 
the nature of the factors must be considered and follow-up questions must be 
asked. Then, the relationships between the factors need to be analysed. Finally, 
the researcher needs to transfer the grouped influencing factors and their 
relations into a holistic picture, which reflects the market environment of the 
research topic. Tovstiga & Aylward (2008) state that it is relatively easy to 
produce a list of factors with the PESTLE analysis; the real challenge lies in the 
identification of the cause-and-effect relationship between the factors.  
To identify the core findings, this thesis will use the PESTLE framework as 
described above: the influencing factors on open access competition will be 
collected in the course of the Delphi study. Then, they will be grouped into the 
PESTLE clusters. In the further course of the Delphi study and the case study, 
the relationships between the influencing factors and the clusters will be worked 
out, assessing qualitative and quantitative data. This finally results in the holistic 
picture of the interrelations of influencing factors on open access competition, 
where cause-and-effect relationships become apparent.     
The following graphic gives an example of which topics fit into a rail-specific 
PESTLE framework, deduced from what has been discussed in the literature 
review:  




Illustration 8: Rail-specific PESTLE framework (author’s own diagram)  
4.3.  Ethical considerations 
To finalise the chapter on research methods, the ethical considerations for this 
thesis are discussed in the following section. No ethical risks could be identified 
that would lead to a cancellation of the research project. However, some risks 
could be identified which are named in the following. For each risk, a strategy to 
control the risk has been successfully implemented:   
The author is employed at DB Fv and DB Fv supports the author by paying part 
of the student fees. Therefore, a risk of influence on the neutrality of the 
researcher exists. To fully avoid interference of DB Fv on the research outcome, 
an agreement has been made that the author can do the research freely and 
that DB Fv has no influence on the research process and outcome. Further, no 
internal data from DB Fv is used by the researcher. Also, the research data 
cannot be accessed by DB Fv at any time and remains strictly confidential.  
The researcher receives both, personal information of the participants and their 
input. Therefore, confidentiality is of high importance and the risk of disclosure 
needs to be addressed. During the whole research process the names and 
contact details of the participants are kept private on the researcher’s private 
computer and email account, under password protection. In the Delphi study, all 
statements and ratings are kept anonymous and no association with the 
participants is possible. In the interviews for the case study, due to the specific 




company insights, the statements could be associated with the participants’ 
working background. However, the interviewees are aware of this fact and this 
represented no obstacle for anyone of them.  
With a high amount of rich, qualitative data, a risk of incorrect interpretation 
exists. Therefore, the research methodology is designed to process this type of 
data. However, to avoid further misunderstandings with the participants, the 
research process is designed transparently: to make sure that the participants 
are informed about the topic, the data collection method and their right to 
withdraw, information sheets are sent out and handed to all participants (see 
Appendix 1, 2, 6 and 7). The Delphi participants receive an update of the results 
with each following round and a detailed final report, which they can comment 
on (see Appendix 5). The case study interviewees receive a detailed interview 
protocol which they can also comment on and their feedback is fully included 
(see Appendix 9). 
Finally, all research on this thesis is done in full consistency with the University 
of Plymouth’s Principles for Research Involving Human Participants and ethical 
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5.   Chapter 5: Identification of influencing factors: a Delphi study  
After an in-depth study of the Delphi method and its strengths and weaknesses, 
the method is considered as suitable for this research project, in combination 
with a previous in-depth literature review and a subsequent case study. 
Linstone & Turoff (2002) name some properties that lead to the need to employ 
Delphi, which also apply to this research:  
• In this field of study, no precise analytical technique would answer the 
research question, but the project benefits from the subjective judgements 
of the experts from the industry.  
• More individuals are needed to answer the research question than can be 
brought together in a face-to-face exchange, due to the demographic 
division of the experts and their lack of time. This is also the reason why 
frequent group meetings could not be realised.  
• For this project, it is an advantage to prevent the heterogeneity of the 
experts since this provides important input about what competition is like 
in the books and in reality – therefore Delphi is a possibility to assure the 
results are valid. 
This research project is multi-layered and characterised by political influences, 
multiple stakeholder interests, consensus is limited and no hard facts exist, 
which also encourages the employment of a Delphi study (Donohoe & 
Needham 2009, Kezar & Maxey 2016).  
5.1.    Setting of the Delphi process   
The process of this Delphi study is based on the traditional Delphi process, 
described by Day & Bobeva (2005). It is therefore divided into three phases: the 




exploration, distillation and utilisation phases. The following flow chart gives an 
overview of the design of the Delphi process:  
 
Illustration 9: Design of Delphi study, based on Day & Bobeva (2005) 
5.1.1.    Preparation of the Delphi study: the exploration phase  
The Delphi process starts by doing extensive desktop research to gather and 
analyse existing literature and to define the knowledge gaps (see chapter 3). In 
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the following Delphi planning phase, the basic setting of the Delphi framework is 
detailed and a first version of the online questionnaires is prepared. The 
researcher plans to perform three stages of Delphi, since the main 
improvements in a Delphi process occur in rounds two to three and most Delphi 
studies have two to three rounds. However, after the third round, the researcher 
considers if an additional round would further enhance the findings.  
The selection of the panel is of special importance, since the expertise of the 
participants is crucial for the success of the study. Firstly, the selection criteria 
for the panel are defined; the researcher divides between compulsory criteria 
and desirable criteria to enhance quality:  
 
Illustration 10: Delphi panel selection criteria (author’s own diagram)  
Since the railway industry is multi-layered and diverse stakeholders with 
different experience play a role, the researcher chose a more heterogeneous 
and international panel. As a first step, the researcher contacted experts from 
her own network who fulfilled the selection criteria. Each expert received a short 
explanation of the research project, including the compulsory selection criteria. 
By asking some selected contacts to nominate further competent experts in the 
next step, a snowball sampling technique was applied. Those possible 
participants were addressed by the researcher to validate if all the selection 




criteria were fulfilled and if they were willing to participate throughout all rounds 
of the Delphi study. Experts who could give valuable input on the research 
topic, are scarce and often connected among themselves; therefore the 
snowball sampling technique was considered suitable. In total, a panel size of 
30 experts was set up, which fits into the range of average Delphi panels. To 
guarantee the quality of the participants, the researcher prepared individual 
profiles for each participant, listing job positions, publications, participation in 
conferences, etc.  
The researcher considered several types of questionnaires, e.g. online/web-
based, paper and PDF questionnaires. Leading online providers, such as 
SurveyMonkey, are used by researchers in all fields. The researcher decided 
against using online providers to protect the panel’s anonymity, since server 
location and access to data and contact information is often unclear. The paper-
based questionnaire was considered too time-consuming. The PDF 
questionnaire was finally chosen, since it was easy to send to the participants 
via email and easy for the participants to fill in (e.g. on iPads). The text could be 
copied from the textboxes directly and it guaranteed anonymity to the 
participants.  
To avoid uncertainties and misunderstandings in the questionnaires, they were 
pre-tested by three experts from the railway industry: one expert had a 
background in engineering, and was well-informed about research questions 
and processes. The second expert had a management background, several 
years of experience in the field of study and was well-informed about research 
questions and processes. The third expert had a consulting and business 
development background, little experience in the field of competition and was 
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not well-informed about research questions and processes. The different 
profiles of the testers were a means to ensure good comprehensibility of 
definitions, questions and the researcher’s intention. The feedback of the 
testers is included in the questionnaires.  
5.1.2.   Performance of the Delphi study: the distillation phase  
All questionnaires were structured similarly: they started by giving the experts a 
brief introduction and explanation of the research project and its research goals 
as well as the process of the current questionnaire. Some fundamental terms 
were defined to make sure that all participants understood industry-specific 
terms in the same way. The questions posed were divided into four fields: firstly, 
the experts were asked to give some personal information on their experience 
and background to group them into a matrix to monitor the panel. This enabled 
the researcher to interpret the responses, bearing the experts' backgrounds in 
mind. Secondly, some open-ended questions followed by closed-ended 
questions were asked about the experts understanding and the future of 
competition. Many Delphi studies use open-ended questions in the first round 
(Sourani & BEng 2015). This is how the traditional Delphi process begins and it 
forms a cornerstone for the further research process (Rowe & Wright 1999, Hsu 
& Sandford 2007). This ensures that the participants were not influenced by 
preselected literature or the researcher’s view. The third field was about 
collecting and rating factors influencing competition. The fourth field asked 
about linkages between and a shift of influencing factors. Those questions were 
not incorporated until after the first round, since they depended on the 
generated list of influencing factors.  





Illustration 11: Design of questions (author’s own diagram)  
Each questionnaire was accompanied by an information sheet which gave the 
participants an overview of the research process, their rights as participants and 
the risks and benefits of participating. It is in Appendix 1.  
The first round was organised as follows: as explained above, the first 
questionnaire consisted of sections. Firstly, four questions on working 
background and personal information were asked, using a text field and ticking 
boxes. Next, the experts’ perspective on competition was identified by posing 
five questions, all questions were open-ended and answered in text fields. 
Finally, the influencing factors were identified by giving the experts the 
possibility to enter 15 lines and an additional text box and asking them to tick 
whether the factors named were positive or negative. The first questionnaire is 
in Appendix 2. After the arrival of the responses, the personal information was 
entered in an Excel sheet where the composition of the panel was monitored. 
The data from the open-ended questions in the second part was analysed and 
the participants’ replies were summarised and coded. In Excel, all codes were 
listed and for every reply and if one of the codes occurs, it was marked with a 
“1”. The total for each code gave an overview, on which the statements for the 
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next round were formulated. The influencing factors stated by the experts were 
first collected, then entered in the clusters “political/legal” “economic” “social” 
“technical” “environmental” and “other”. Next they were compared and similar 
influencing factors were grouped into sub-clusters. Influencing factors that were 
named only once and considered as negligible by the researcher were not 
included in the final list.  
After the finalisation of the first round, the second round was organised as 
follows: most Delphi studies use a combination of closed- and open-ended 
questions to advance the process of forming consensus (Bergner & Lohmann 
2014). This research also combines the qualitative data from the first round with 
quantification in the second round (Häder 2009). The second questionnaire was 
again divided into three sections: firstly, the replies on the questions about the 
experts’ perspective on competition were given. The panel was requested to 
rate the statements on a scale between 1 and 5, where 1=strongly agree, 
2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree and 5=strongly disagree. The statements were 
grouped into three main sections, supplemented by sub-items. When the 
participants did not agree with the statement, they were asked to comment. 
Next, the collected influencing factors were stated. The participants were asked 
to rate these factors according to how important they were and how positive or 
negative their impact was on a scale from -4 (very strong negative influence) to 
+4 (very strong positive influence). Finally, two open-ended questions were 
posed to find linkages between the given influencing factors and detect a shift of 
influencing factors over time. For the linkages, five lines with two boxes were 
provided, and a text field for further comments. For the shift of factors, a textbox 
was given. The second questionnaire is in Appendix 3. After the arrival of the 
responses, the consensus for the first and second part of the questionnaire was 




measured. The answers were then evaluated statistically and summarised 
using means and medians, which is the most common tool to process feedback 
(Hallowell & Gambatese 2010, Cochrane 2012). The following scheme was 
used to define consensus (based on Kapoor 1987):  
 
Illustration 12: Definition of consensus (author’s own diagram)  
The third part of the questionnaire was analysed like the first part of the first 
questionnaire: the replies for question 5 were entered in an Excel sheet and 
sorted after the number of mentions by the panel. The data from the open-
ended question 6 is entered in an Excel sheet and coded according to which 
influencing factor the participant is writing about. All replies were listed in Excel 
and the included codes were marked with a “1”. The sums for each code gave 
an overview, on which the statements for the next round were formulated. 
Finally, the third round was organised as follows: the panel received a 
questionnaire including all statements that could not reach consensus in section 
1, the list of influencing factors in section 2 and the newly formed statements for 
section 3. The calculated means from the second round were included in the 
questionnaires in section 1 and 2. The panelists needed to rate the statements 
and influencing factors once again, using the means of the last round as a 
reference value. Moreover, in section 2, an altered scale was introduced: the 
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panel was asked to rate the influencing factors on a scale between 0=neutral to 
4=very strong influence and the possibility was now given to group a factor as 
either positive or negative. The statements in section 3 were rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale, like section 1. The third questionnaire is in Appendix 4. After the 
arrival of the responses, the answers were evaluated statistically and 
summarised using means and medians. The consensus for the first and second 
section of the questionnaires was measured, using the same logic as for the 
second questionnaire. Additional comments of experts were analysed and 
entered in an Excel sheet. After the finalisation of the third round, it was once 
again considered if an additional round would result in further consensus or 
additional findings and if it was therefore needed. In this research project no 
fourth round was undertaken.  
5.1.3.     Post-processing of the Delphi study: the utilisation phase  
Finally, the generated data was analysed and converted into diagrams and 
charts. The researcher considered what impact the generated knowledge had 
on the industry and what consequences might arise. The Delphi report was 
prepared and sent out in the last step. It was prepared in PowerPoint, since that 
is the tool most commonly used in the industry and therefore convenient for the 
panel. It gave the panel a brief management summary, an overview of 
methodology and the panel, the findings and a brief discussion of the findings. 
The report was sent out via email and the participants were encouraged to 
contact the researcher in case of further questions and to give feedback on the 
report. The report is in Appendix 5. 
 
 




5.2.    Presentation of the Delphi results   
This section presents the results of the three Delphi rounds. First, each round is 
described individually and finally summed up and discussed as a whole. For 
each round, the panel is described, the evaluation of the returned 
questionnaires is explained and also the transformation of content from one 
round to the next.  
As described in section 4.2.1.1., it is essential to define criteria for the 
designated panel. The first personal contact with the selected experts showed 
that all experts fulfilled the compulsory criteria and most experts fulfilled two or 
more of the desirable criteria as well: 67% of all participants have more than 10 
years of working experience, 60% attend forums and conferences, 50% have 
one or more publications, and 10% are members of transport committees. 
Therefore, the panel was considered good quality and the first questionnaire 
was send to a total of 30 experts. The original panel had the following profile:  
 
Illustration 13: Profile of the initial Delphi panel (author’s own diagram)  
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43.3% of all participants had over 15 years' experience in the industry. 63.3% of 
all participants work or worked for an incumbent since competition is a new 
phenomenon. Many experts working for competitors started their career with 
incumbents. 47.7% of the participants experienced competition in Germany, 
since the researcher’s network is centred on Germany. 33.3% of the experts 
hold or held CEO or board member positions, often with competitors. 30% are 
researchers, many of them published papers or books discussed in the 
literature review. Overall, the high profile of participants in the Delphi panel 
shows that the research topic is of relevance and of great interest to managers 
and researchers from the industry.  
5.2.1.   Gathering of experts’ statements and factors: 1st Delphi round 
Of the 30 experts, 25 returned a filled-out questionnaire, which leads to a 
response rate of 83%. 40% of the experts sent their replies before the 
announced deadline, 60% of the replies arrived after the reminder. All returned 
questionnaires were valid and could be processed. The panel for the first round 
had the following profile:  
 





Illustration 14: Profile of the 1st round’s panel (author’s own diagram) 
The individual questions from the first questionnaire are presented below.  
Question 1-4: working background & personal information  
The data generated from these questions was entered in an Excel sheet, 
connecting the participants’ names with years of working experience, the role(s) 
in which they experience/experienced competition, their countries of experience 
and their past and present working positions. This lays the foundation for further 
analysis, matching the generated data to the participants’ background.  
Questions 5-6: How does competition shape the long-distance passenger rail 
market? What has changed due to competition? and What is the core effect of 
open access competition in the passenger rail market?  
Originally, questions 5 and 6 were planned to be analysed separately, whereas 
question 6 was intended as the aggregation of question 5. The participants, 
however, linked both questions and refer from one to another. The researcher 
therefore decided to evaluate both questions together.  
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In a first step, all statements were read and the factors and changes that affect 
the passenger rail market were marked. Those factors were grouped into three 
categories: effects on passengers, on incumbents and on the railway industry 
as a whole. All factors which were mentioned by at least 16% of the experts 
were included. The effects on passengers are: a higher customer focus with 
better prices, higher frequency of connections, better quality, better services 
and more innovation – all effects are positive in nature. The effects on the 
incumbent are: an increase in efficiency and higher quality – also positive in 
nature. The effects on the railway industry are: more customers, lower overall 
profitability and a greater complexity of the system – positive and negative 
effects. This results in an overall positive effect of open access competition on 
the passenger rail market. The information was formulated into one statement 
and three sub-statements:  
 
Question 7: From an EU perspective, competition is a means to increase 
efficiency of railway undertakings and to modernise them, make them more 
responsive to customer demand and decrease overall transport emissions. 
From your perspective, is open access competition the right tool to reach these 
goals? Why? 
Firstly, the experts’ statements were analysed regarding agreement or 
disagreement with the EU’s perspective. Therefore, the statements were 
clustered into -1 (clearly disagrees), -0.5 (disagree to some extent), 0 (pro and 
5. Open access competition has an overall positive effect on long-distance passenger rail, 
especially for customers.  
5.1. The positive effect for customers is a higher customer focus with better prices, better 
quality, higher frequency of trains, better services and more innovation.  
5.2. The positive effect for the incumbent is a development to higher efficiency and quality. 
5.3. The positive effect for the industry is the gaining of new customers. It also has negative 
effects such as a lower overall profitability and a higher complexity of the system.  
 




contra arguments given), 0.5 (agree to some extent) and 1 (clearly agree), 
according to how clearly the experts gave their opinion or how many pro and 
contra arguments were given. This resulted in a score of 8.5 on a range of -25 
to -25 which indicated a slight agreement. Several experts indicated that open 
access is a tool to achieve those goals, but it might not be the only tool. 
When the content of the experts’ statements was analysed regarding its 
justifications, it showed that 24% of all participants stated that open access 
competition is necessary for incumbents to change much faster and to achieve 
higher customer focus and passenger comfort. Of those who disagreed with 
open access being the right tool, 24% stated that a tendering/franchising-
system could be a better solution to reach the goals.12% stated that intermodal 
competition has been the reason for many positive changes and is a tool to fulfil 
similar goals. Of those participants who stayed neutral or gave balanced 
arguments, 16% stated that the success of open access competition is 
dependent on the fact that the line(s) can be produced profitably, 12% stated 
that it depended on free and independent infrastructure capacity and a further 
12% stated that open access competition needed to be implemented completely 
and sufficiently. This evaluation led to the following statement and four sub-
statements: 
 
6. All in all, open access is one of the tools to achieve increased efficiency in the market, 
modernise passenger rail, establish a higher customer focus and decrease emissions by 
attracting more customers. 
6.1. Incumbent operators change much faster and adapt much more quickly to the market. 
6.2. More customers use long-distance passenger rail. 
6.3. However, the success depends on infrastructure capacity, if open access is implemented 
sufficiently and if ODs (origin-destinations) or lines can be produced profitably. 
6.4. A tendering/franchising-system could possibly fulfil the goals better.  
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Question 8: How would the number of competitors in the European rail market 
change in the next 10 years? In your opinion, will there be more or less 
competitors compared to today? 
Firstly, the experts’ statements were analysed regarding the number of 
competitors and the degree of competition. This showed that 52% of the 
participants predicted an increase, 28% were of the opinion that the number of 
competitors would stay the same as today, 12% predicted a decrease and 8% 
were unsure about the future development. Of those who predicted an increase, 
69% stated that the increase would only be small. 20% of the participants 
expected mergers and consolidation of companies in the future. The evaluation 
led to the following statement and sub-statement: 
 
Question 9: How would you describe your personal attitude towards open 
access competition? 
The data generated displays that 48% of all experts had a positive attitude 
towards open access competition, 40% were ambivalent, 4% had a negative 
attitude, 4% had a neutral to positive attitude and 4% did not comment. The 
content of this question was not included in the further Delphi process, it rather 
laid the foundation for further analysis matching the generated data with the 
participants’ opinion. 
Question 10: identification of influencing factors 
Firstly, the influencing factors were catalogued in a list in Excel, relating to the 
experts’ names and whether they regarded the given influencing factor as 
positive or negative. 206 factors were generated in total, each participant  
7. The number of competitors and the degree of competition will increase only slightly. 
7.1. The consolidation and merger of companies is expected. 




named an average of 8.24 factors. Within the PESTLE framework, all factors 
were assigned to a “political/legal”5, “economic”, “social”, “technical”, 
“environmental” or “others” cluster. Two factors contained content from two 







Political/legal 23 40 12 75 36.41 
Economic 33 24 3 60 29.13 
Technical 18 12 3 33 16.02 
Social 6 10 3 19 9.22 
Others 9 4 2 15 7.28 
Environmental 0 2 0 2 0.97 
Technical & 
economic 
1 0 0 1 0.49 
Political/legal & 
economic 
1 0 0 1 0.49 
SUM 91 92 23 206 100.00 
Table 7: Overview of clustered influencing factors (author’s own diagram) 
The overview shows that political/legal and economic influences were named 
most frequently by experts. Environmental influencing factors can be neglected 
which also goes hand in hand with the small number of publications in this field. 
This first evaluation indicated that positive and negative influencing factors 
seem to be balanced.  
In a next step, the influencing factors within the clusters were grouped, sorted 
and finally sub-clusters were conceived. Those factors which could not fit into a 
sub-cluster were analysed closely and considered, regarding the existing 
literature. If the researcher deemed these influencing factors as important, it 
was added as a new sub-cluster. If it was considered irrelevant, it was removed. 
In this process, the researcher also decided to remove the “environmental” 
 
5 Political and legal influencing factors were grouped together due to their interdependence and 
overlapping.  
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cluster. This resulted in a total of five clusters and 34 sub-clustered influencing 
factors, 200 of the original 206 influencing factors were incorporated:  
Cluster No Influencing factor % 
Political & 
legal 1 
Existing EU and national law in the books (e.g. regarding number and 
complexity of regulations, transparency, operational rules, 
independences and strength of regulator)  
10.00 
2 
Existing law in action (e.g. regarding frequency, operational rules, 
independence and strength of regulator)  
4.00 
3 
Access to facilities (stations, maintenance depots, sales offices in 
stations, etc.) as well as data (e.g. sales information) 
7.50 
4 Access to and availability of attractive train paths 7.00 
5 
General facilitation and attitude of government and politicians towards 
competition  
4.50 
6 Unbundling (separation between infrastructure and operations) 3.50 
7 State of and investment in infrastructure 2.00 
8 Willingness or ability to subsidise operations in the country 2.00 
9 Consumer policy (e.g. customer protection, passenger rights) 1.00 
Economic 
10 
Market potential and market size of the origin-destination (“OD”), the line 
or the network 
8.00 
11 Costs for infrastructure (paths, stations, traction, etc.) 5.00 
12 




Presence of intermodal competitors (e.g. car, coach, plane), enabled by 
economic privileges for other transport modes 
3.00 
14 Existence of network effects for incumbents 2.50 
15 Generally low profitability of the industry 3.00 
16 Access to financing (e.g. for rolling stock) 2.00 
17 Existence of cooperation or coopetition within the industry 2.00 
18 Cross-financing of RUs in the market and a lack of transparency 1.50 
19 Existence of cooperation with other transport modes (e.g. coach) 0.50 
20 Possibility for cherry-picking in the market  0.50 
Social 21 Existence of (strong) unions 1.50 
22 Customer loyalty 1.00 
23 Sharing economy (e.g. rideshare, carsharing) 0.50 
24 Adjustment to customer expectation 1.50 
25 Customers’ willingness to pay 1.00 
26 Entrepreneurship (capacity/willingness to develop a new business) 0.50 
27 Attitude of press and population toward competition 1.00 
Technical 28 Access to rolling stock (first and second-hand as well as leasing) 6.50 
29 Lack of technical harmonisation within the EU 4.00 
30 Existence of innovation (of rolling stock, sales system, etc.) 1.50 
31 Homologation process (vehicle authorisation)  1.50 
32 Railway safety systems 1.00 
33 Availability of necessary personnel (e.g. train drivers, service staff) 0.50 
Other 34 Incumbent’s performance (reputation, service quality, efficiency) 4.00 
SUM 100.00 
Table 8: The 34 sub-clustered influencing factors (1st round) (author’s own diagram)  




This first weighting gives an indication of the importance or strength of the 
influencing factors, which is not communicated to the participants. When 
analysing the positive or negative influence of the above factors, it became 
clear that some of the influencing factors were considered both positive and 
negative by the participants. Some formulated the factors in different ways, 
while others had differing experiences concerning one factor in different 
countries. It is therefore not possible to undertake further analysis before rating 
by the experts.  
5.2.2.   Rating of experts’ statements and factors: 2nd Delphi round 
Of the 25 experts addressed, 25 returned a filled-out questionnaire which leads 
to a response rate of 100%. The high response rate was achieved due to a 
relatively short time of two months between the sending out of the 
questionnaires, a significant effort at communication and discussion with the 
participants and the high degree of interest of the participants in the topic 
(Donohoe 2011). 52% of the experts sent their replies before the deadline, 48% 
after the reminder. A few participants forgot to tick individual boxes in the 
questionnaire, they were contacted directly and the feedback was included in 
the questionnaire by the researcher. Therefore, all returned questionnaires were 
valid and could be processed and analysed. The constellation of the panel was 
identical to the previous round. The individual questions from the second 
questionnaire are presented below:  
Question 1-3: rating of statements on perspective on competition on a scale 
between 1 and 5, where 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree and 
5=strongly disagree. 
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The ratings of the three statements and eight sub-statements of each 
participant were entered in an Excel sheet and analysed by calculating the 
mean, median, variance, standard deviation and the percentage of agreement 
or disagreement. As described in section 5.1.2, a statement reaches consensus 
when 75% of the participants agree or disagree. The following table gives an 
overview of the outcome:  





Mean Median v2 S 
1. Open access competition has an overall 
positive effect on long-distance passenger 
rail, especially for customers. 
80.00 12.00 1.72 1 1.08 1.04 
1.1. The positive effect for customers is a higher 
customer focus with better prices, better 
quality, higher frequency of trains, better 
services and more innovation. 
88.00 8.00 1.68 1 0.78 0.88 
1.2. The positive effect for the incumbent is a 
development to higher efficiency and quality. 
96.00 4.00 1.68 2 0.46 0.68 
1.3. The positive effect for the industry is the 
gaining of new customers. It also has negative 
effects such as a lower overall profitability and 
a higher complexity of the system. 
76.00 16.00 2.12 2 1.23 1.11 
2. All in all, open access is one of the tools to 
achieve increased efficiency in the market, 
modernise passenger rail, establish a 
higher customer focus and decrease 
emissions by attracting more customers. 
84.00 4.00 1.76 2 0.66 0.81 
2.1. Incumbent operators change much faster and 
adapt much more quickly to the market.  
88.00 4.00 1.88 2 0.51 0.71 
2.2.  More customers use long-distance passenger 
rail 
88.00 4.00 1.72 2 0.84 0.92 
2.3.  However, the success depends on 
infrastructure capacity, if open access is 
implemented sufficiently and if ODs or lines 
can be produced profitably. 
76.00 8.00 2.08 2 0.95 0.98 
2.4. A tendering/franchising-system could possibly 
fulfil the goals better. 
36.00 36.00 2.92 3 1.91 1.38 
3. The number of competitors and the degree 
of competition will increase only slightly. 
72.00 4.00 2.00 2 0.96 0.98 
3.1. The consolidation and merger of companies is 
expected. 
52.00 20.00 2.52 2 1.21 1.10 
Table 9: Outcome of experts’ perception of competition (2nd round) (author’s own diagram) 
Because of this evaluation, three statements needed to be further clarified in the 
next Delphi round. The further analysis of the comments of participants on 
those three statements revealed the following arguments: 
 




• 2.4. A tendering/franchising-system could possibly fulfil the goals better. 
A tendering system reflects the interests of authorities; these are sometimes 
biased to the customers’ interests and therefore open access competition is 
the better option. In addition, which system is better suited is too dependent 
on the OD. One participant stated that a fully implemented tendering system 
might not be realistic due to limitation of funds.  
To further clarify this statement, the following sub-statements were added to 
the questionnaire at the third round:  
 
• 3. The number of competitors and the degree of competition will increase 
only slightly. 
The only explanation given for disagreement was that the negative factors 
influencing competition are still too high – if they change drastically in the 
coming years, more competition would be possible. No further specification 
was done by the participants, since six of seven participants, who did not 
agree, remained neutral. Consequently, the question was only altered 
slightly to give a clear timeframe of ten years and once again added to the 
questionnaire at the third round. 
 
• 3.1. The consolidation and merger of companies is expected. 
Three participants stated that there will be too few competitors in the 
market, often only one in each country, and therefore no one would be there 
to merge with. Further, some competitors are or were already linked to 
incumbents in other countries (e.g. WESTbahn and NTV with SNCF). 
2.5. … however, this strongly depends on the characteristics of individual lines (e.g. market size, 
degree of intermodal competition, etc.) 
2.6. … and on the availability of funds to finance such a system. 
3. The number of competitors and the degree of competition will increase only slightly in the    
next 10 years. 
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Moreover, regulators should prevent the merging of the main competitors in 
the market. One participant states that new competitors would rather give 
up the business than merge. Consequently, the statement was 
complemented for the third round of Delphi: 
 
Question 4: rating of influencing factors on a scale between -4 (very strong 
negative influence) and +4 (very strong positive influence)  
Firstly, the rating of each participant was entered in an Excel sheet and linked to 
several evaluations: one that investigated the total number of replies, one that 
took the country background into consideration and one that differentiated 
between the working backgrounds of participants.  
For the second questionnaire, a scale was chosen which took the strength as 
well as the type of influencing factors into consideration (-4 to +4). By analysing 
both dimensions, it became clear the outcome was too fuzzy to detect overall 
trends. Therefore the strength of the factors is investigated in a first step (+4 = 
4; -4 = 4) and the fact that they are positive or negative was ignored. This 







3.2.… however only a very limited number of companies exist which could merge.  




No Influencing factor PESTL Mean Median v2 S 
4 Attractive train paths P/L 2.52 3 1.69 1.30 
10 Market potential and market size E 2.40 3 1.68 1.30 
13 Presence of intermodal competitors E 2.36 2 1.51 1.23 
28 Access to rolling stock T 2.32 2 1.42 1.19 
29 Lack of technical harmonisation T 2.32 2 1.42 1.19 
15 Low profitability E 2.28 2 1.72 1.31 
31 Homologation process T 2.28 2 1.08 1.04 
3 Access to facilities and data P/L 2.24 2 1.22 1.11 
11 Costs for infrastructure E 2.24 2 1.62 1.27 
12 Access to distribution systems E 2.00 2 1.68 1.30 
20 Possibility for cherry-picking E 2.00 2 2.08 1.44 
26 Entrepreneurship S 1.88 2 2.11 1.45 
2 Law in action P/L 1.84 2 1.33 1.16 
6 Unbundling P/L 1.76 2 2.42 1.56 
5 Facilitation and attitude of government and politicians P/L 1.72 2 1.40 1.18 
1 Law in the books P/L 1.71 2 0.71 0.84 
21 Existence of unions S 1.68 2 1.66 1.29 
16 Access to financing E 1.64 2 1.67 1.29 
7 State of and investment in infrastructure P/L 1.48 1 1.93 1.39 
25 Customers’ willingness to pay S 1.48 1 1.13 1.06 
14 Existence of network effects for incumbents E 1.40 1 0.96 0.98 
18 Cross-financing of RUs and a lack of transparency E 1.40 1 1.76 1.33 
34 Incumbent’s performance  1.32 1 1.74 1.31 
23 Sharing economy S 1.24 1 1.62 1.27 
27 Attitude of press and population S 1.24 2 1.22 1.11 
22 Customer loyalty S 1.20 1 1.20 1.10 
30 Existence of innovation T 1.20 1 0.88 0.94 
8 Willingness or ability to subsidise operations P/L 1.13 1 0.98 0.99 
24 Adjustment to customer expectation S 1.13 1 1.11 1.05 
33 Availability of necessary personnel T 1.08 1 0.95 0.98 
17 
Existence of cooperation or coopetition within the 
industry 
E 1.00 1 1.36 1.17 
19 Existence of cooperation with other transport modes E 1.00 1 1.36 1.17 
32 Railway safety systems T 0.84 0 1.17 1.08 
9 Consumer policy  P/L 0.56 0 0.73 0.85 
Table 10: The 34 influencing factors (2nd round) (author’s own diagram) 
When testing the experts’ rating for consensus at a rate of 75% percent, no 
factor reached consensus. The rating was then grouped in three categories: 
0=neutral, 1 and 2=low influence, 3 and 4=high influence. With this approach, 
only the factor “law in the books (1)” was rated as low influence with 83.33% by 
the experts and therefore consensus was achieved. 
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The next step investigated whether a factor was positive or negative. All factors 
<0 were considered as negative influences, all factors >0 were considered as 
positive influences. All factors rated as 0 were excluded, since no influence was 
expected by the experts.  
No Influencing factor % neg. % pos. 
14 Existence of network effects for incumbents 100.00 0.00 
18 Cross-financing of RUs and a lack of transparency 100.00 0.00 
29 Lack of technical harmonisation 91.67 8.33 
15 Low profitability 90.91 9.09 
21 Existence of unions 90.00 10.00 
31 Homologation process 88.00 12.00 
32 Railway safety systems 83.33 16.67 
13 Presence of intermodal competitors 78.26 21.74 
23 Sharing economy 75.00 25.00 
33 Availability of necessary personnel 75.00 25.00 
11 Costs for infrastructure 63.64 36.36 
16 Access to financing 63.16 36.84 
22 Customer loyalty 62.50 37.50 
28 Access to rolling stock 54.17 45.83 
1 Law in the books 52.17 47.83 
2 Law in action 50.00 50.00 
12 Access to distribution systems 50.00 50.00 
17 Existence of cooperation or coopetition within the industry 46.15 53.85 
3 Access to facilities and data 41.67 58.33 
5 Facilitation of and attitude of government and politicians 40.00 60.00 
8 Willingness or ability to subsidise operations 40.00 60.00 
34 Incumbent’s performance 37.50 62.50 
4 Attractive train paths 34.78 65.22 
30 Existence of innovation 30.00 70.00 
7 State of and investment in infrastructure 29.41 70.59 
25 Customers’ willingness to pay 25.00 75.00 
6 Unbundling 25.00 75.00 
9 Consumer policy  22.22 77.78 
19 Existence of cooperation with other transport modes 21.43 78.57 
20 Possibility for cherry-picking 15.00 85.00 
27 Attitude of press and population 6.67 93.33 
24 Adjustment to customer expectation 6.25 93.75 
26 Entrepreneurship 5.56 94.44 
10 Market potential and market size 4.35 95.65 
Table 11: Positive and negative rating of the 34 influencing factors (2nd round) (author’s own diagram)  
Some participants gave the feedback that they would like to give positive and 
negative votes since they had different experiences in different countries. 




Therefore a new scale was developed for the next round, giving the participants 
this possibility. 
Question 5: Linkages between and mutual dependency of influencing factors  
A total of 163 linkages were named by the participants. These were entered in 
an Excel sheet and analysed regarding number of mentions and frequency of 
linkages between the factors. This revealed a high spread of linkages and a 
high degree of interconnection of the whole system. The following factors 
revealed the highest number of linkages. 
No Influencing factor # % Mean 
2 Law in action 33 20.25 1.84 
1 Law in the books 27 16.56 1.71 
6 Unbundling 23 14.11 1.76 
15 Low profitability 19 11.66 2.28 
14 Existence of network effects for incumbents 18 11.04 1.40 
5 Facilitation and attitude of government and politicians 17 10.43 1.72 
Table 12: Overview of factors with the highest number of linkages (2nd round) (author’s own diagram) 
The most frequently mentioned linkages are the following. All linkages are listed 
that were named at least three times:  
No Influencing factor No Influencing factor # % 
1 Law in the books 2 Law in action  6 3.68 
3 Access to facilities and data 12 Access to distribution systems  6 3.68 
15 Low profitability 25 Customers’ willingness to pay 4 2.45 
1 Law in the books 29 Lack of technical harmonisation 3 1.84 
2 Law in action 4 Attractive train paths 3 1.84 
2 
Law in action 
5 
Facilitation and attitude of 
government and politicians 
3 1.84 
2 
Law in action 
18 




Facilitation and attitude of 
government and politicians 
27 
Attitude of press and population  
3 1.84 
11 Costs for infrastructure  15 Low profitability 3 1.84 
15 Low profitability 16 Access to financing  3 1.84 
Table 13: Overview of the linkages named at least three times (2nd round) (author’s own diagram) 
The comments in the text box were also copied into an Excel sheet and 
analysed individually. Participants stated that in a holistic view, almost all 
factors are interrelated and dependent on each other. However, it is hard to 
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generalise since the answers may differ between countries. One participant 
proposed establishing clusters to show the grouping of three or more factors. 
Another participant stated that most factors are based on and strongly 
connected to the political basis and the legal framework, which can also be 
seen in table 12 and 13 above. The evaluation of question 5 led to the following 
statement and sub-statements: 
 
Question 6: Shift of influencing factors in the last years 
Firstly, all statements from the text box were transferred to an Excel sheet, 
analysed and the factors which shifted were marked. Of a total of 25 
participants, 21 participants answered this question while 20 gave examples of 
shifts of one or more influencing factors and one participant could not observe 
any shifts. In total, 52 shifts of factors were identified, of which most participants 
gave country-specific examples. Four shifts could be identified that seemed to 
play an overall role and would be validated in the next round; the country 
examples would be investigated more closely in the case study:  
 
5.   Influencing factors are strongly interconnected and determine one another. It is difficult to 
analyse them from a standalone perspective.  
5.1.   Law in the books (1) and law in action (2) show the highest frequency of links to other 
influencing factors.   
5.2.  The following factors show the strongest connection: 
 5.2.1.:  Law in the books (1) & law in action (2) 
 5.2.2.:  Access to facilities and data (2) & access to distribution system (12) 
 5.2.3.:  Low profitability (15) & customers’ willingness to pay (25) 
 5.2.4.:  Law in the books (1) & lack of technical harmonisation (29)  
 5.2.5.:  Law in action (2) & access to and availability of attractive train paths (2) 
 5.2.6.:  Law in action (2) & facilitation and attitude of government and politicians (5) 
 5.2.7.:  Law in action (2) & cross-financing and lack of transparency (18) 
 5.2.8.:  Facilitation and attitude of government and politicians (5) & attitude of press and  
            population (27) 
 5.2.9.:  Costs for infrastructure (11) & low profitability (15) 
 5.2.10.: Low profitability (15) & access to financing (16) 




No Influencing factor # % 
13 Presence of intermodal competitors  6 11.54 
2 Law in action 4 7.69 
12 Access to distribution systems 4 7.69 
15 Low profitability 4 7.69 
Table 14: Overview of the identified shifts of influencing factors (2nd round) (author’s own diagram) 
The evaluation of question 6 led to the following statement and sub-statements: 
 
5.2.3.   Rerating of experts’ statements and factors: 3rd Delphi round 
Of the 25 addressed experts, 23 returned a filled-out questionnaire which meant 
a response rate of 92%. 48% of the experts sent their replies before the 
deadline, 52% after the reminder. All returned questionnaires were valid and 
could be processed. The panel had the following constellation:  
 
 Illustration 15: Profile of the 3rd round’s panel (author’s own diagram) 
6.   In the last years, a shift of individual influencing factors could be observed – the shifts vary 
between countries.  
6.1.   In general, the following factors show the stronges shifts:   
 6.1.1.:  Presence of intermodal competition (13) 
 6.1.2.:  Access to distribution system (12) 
 6.1.3.:  Low profitability (15) 
 6.1.4.:  Law in action (2) 
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The individual questions from the second questionnaire are presented below. 
Question 2-3: rating of statements on perspective on competition on a scale 
between 1 and 5, where 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree and 
5=strongly disagree. 
The ratings of the three original and three new statements of each participant 
were filled in an Excel sheet and analysed by calculating the mean, median, 
variance, standard deviation and the percentage of agreement or disagreement. 
The following table gives an overview of the outcome:  
Statement / sub-statement % agree 
% dis-
agree 
Mean Median v2 S 
2.4. A tendering/franchising-system could 
possibly fulfil the goals better… 
45.45 27.27 2.77 3 1.08 1.04 
2.5. … however, this strongly depends on the 
characteristics of the individual lines (e.g. 
market size, degree of intermodal competition, 
etc.) 
65.22 21.74 2.48 2 1.64 1.28 
2.6. … and on the availability of funds to 
finance such a system.  
43.48 30.43 2.70 3 1.69 1.30 
3. The number of competitors and the 
degree of competition will increase only 
slightly in the next 10 years.  
100.00 0.00 1.67 2 0.22 0.47 
3.1. The consolidation and merger of 
companies is expected… 
59.09 9.09 2.45 2 0.79 0.89 
3.2. … however only a very limited number of 
companies exist which could merge.  
69.57 21.74 2.30 2 1.34 1.16 
Table 15: Outcome of experts’ perception of competition (3rd round) (author’s own diagram)  
Consensus could only be reached on statement 3, all other statements did not 
reach 75% of either agreement or disagreement. Statements 2.5. and 3.2. came 
closest to a consensual agreement, statement 2.4. and 2.6. showed the 
greatest dissent. The comparison between the second and the third round 
reveals a slight adaptation except for statement 3. where in the third round 
some participants who were neutral in the second round moved to agreement. 
 
 




Statement / sub-statement 













2.4. A tendering/franchising-system 
could possibly fulfil the goals better… 
36.00 36.00 45.45 27.27 9.45 -8.73 
3. The number of competitors and the 
degree of competition will increase 
only slightly in the next 10 years.  
72.00 4.00 100.00 0.00 28.00 -4,00 
3.1. The consolidation and merger of 
companies is expected… 
52.00 20.00 59.09 9.09 7.09 -10.91 
Table 16: Comparison of experts' rating on perception of competition between 2nd and 3rd round (author’s 
own diagram)  
The researcher decided that another round of Delphi would not result in either 
consensual agreement or disagreement. This was due to the following 
circumstances: statements 2.4. and 3.1. only revealed an agreement of 45% 
and 59%, from the second to the third round only a slight shift could be 
observed, mostly from the experts who voted neutral in the previous round. In 
the next steps, the reason for different positions needed to be investigated. 
Most experts who rated the statements neutral or disagreed gave no 
explanation on why they disagreed.  
Question 4: rating of influencing factors on a scale between 0 (no influence) and 
4 (very strong influence) and also marking whether they are positive or 
negative.  
Firstly, the ratings of all participants were entered in an Excel sheet and linked 
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No Influencing factor PESTL Mean Median v2 S 
4 Attractive train paths P/L 3.27 3 0.38 0.62 
10 Market potential and market size E 3.18 3 0.42 0.65 
13 Presence of intermodal competitors E 2.86 3 0.75 0.87 
15 Low profitability E 2.86 3 0.66 0.81 
11 Costs for infrastructure E 2.86 3 0.48 0.69 
28 Access to rolling stock T 2.82 3 0.60 0.78 
3 Access to facilities and data P/L 2.68 3 0.49 0.70 
31 Homologation process T 2.64 3 0.69 0.83 
29 Lack of technical harmonisation T 2.59 2.5 1.15 1.07 
5 Facilitation and attitude of government and politicians P/L 2.50 2.5 0.98 0.99 
25 Customers’ willingness to pay S 2.45 2 0.70 0.84 
26 Entrepreneurship S 2.43 3 0.91 0.95 
12 Access to distribution systems E 2.41 2.5 1.15 1.07 
2 Law in action P/L 2.36 2 1.05 1.02 
6 Unbundling P/L 2.27 2.5 1.56 1.25 
16 Access to financing E 2.27 2 0.74 0.86 
20 Possibility for cherry-picking E 2.23 2 1.27 1.13 
7 State of and investment in infrastructure P/L 2.18 2 0.88 0.94 
18 Cross-financing of RUs and lack of transparency E 1.91 2 1.54 1.24 
14 Existence of network effects for incumbents E 1.90 2 0.75 0.87 
21 Existence of unions S 1.86 2 0.48 0.69 
1 Law in the books P/L 1.81 2 0.73 0.85 
24 Adjustment to customer expectation S 1.73 2 0.93 0.96 
33 Availability of necessary personnel T 1.73 1.5 1.20 1.09 
34 Incumbent’s performance other 1.68 2 0.94 0.97 
30 Existence of innovation T 1.68 1 1.40 1.18 
17 Existence of cooperation or coopetition within the industry E 1.67 1 1.84 1.36 
27 Attitude of press and population S 1.64 2 0.60 0.77 
22 Customer loyalty S 1.64 2 1.05 1.02 
8 Willingness or ability to subsidise operations P/L 1.59 1.5 1.15 1.07 
19 Existence of cooperation with other transport modes E 1.52 1 0.82 0.91 
23 Sharing economy S 1.14 1 0.94 0.97 
32 Railway safety systems T 0.86 1 0.60 0.77 
9 Consumer policy  P/L 0.82 1 0.79 0.89 
Table 17: The 34 influencing factors (3rd round) (author’s own diagram) 
Comparing the second and third round revealed that the experts generally rated 
the importance of influencing factors higher than in the second round by an 
average of 0.48. The factor “Customers’ willingness to pay” showed the highest 
increase by 0.97 points, the only factor which decreased in importance was 
“Sharing economy” with -0.10 points. The variance decreased from the second 
to the third round by -0.52 points, the standard deviation decreased by -0.25 
points, which showed the experts’ ratings were coming more closely together: 
 
 











1 1 (4) Attractive train paths 0.75 -1.31 -0.68 
2 2 (10) Market potential and market size 0.78 -1.26 -0.65 
3 3 (13) Presence of intermodal competitors 0.50 -0.76 -0.36 
4 6 (15) Low profitability 0.58 -1.06 -0.50 
5 9 (11) Costs for infrastructure 0.62 -1.14 -0.58 
6 4 (28) Access to rolling stock 0.50 -0.81 -0.41 
7 8 (3) Access to facilities and data 0.44 -0.73 -0.41 
8 7 (31) Homologation process 0.36 -0.40 -0.21 
9 5 (29) Lack of technical harmonisation 0.27 -0.27 -0.12 
10 15 (5) Facilitation and attitude of government and politicians 0.78 -0.42 -0.20 
11 20 (25) Customers’ willingness to pay 0.97 -0.43 -0.22 
12 12 (26) Entrepreneurship 0.55 -1.19 -0.50 
13 10 (12) Access to distribution systems 0.41 -0.53 -0.22 
14 13 (2) Law in action 0.52 -0.28 -0.13 
15 14 (6) Unbundling 0.51 -0.86 -0.31 
16 18 (16) Access to financing 0.63 -0.93 -0.43 
17 11 (20) Possibility for cherry-picking 0.23 -0.81 -0.32 
18 19 (7) State of and investment in infrastructure 0.70 -1.05 -0.45 
19 22 (18) Cross-financing of RUs and lack of transparency 0.51 -0.22 -0.09 
20 21 (14) Existence of network effects for incumbents 0.50 -0.21 -0.11 
21 17 (21) Existence of unions 0.18 -1.18 -0.59 
22 16 (1) Law in the books 0.10 0.02 0.01 
23 29 (24) Adjustment to customer expectation 0.60 -0.18 -0.09 
24 30 (33) Availability of necessary personnel 0.65 0.24 0.12 
25 23 (34) Incumbent’s performance 0.36 -0.79 -0.35 
26 27 (30) Existence of innovation 0.48 0.52 0.24 
27 31 
(17) Existence of cooperation or coopetition within the 
industry 
0.67 0.48 0.19 
28 25 (27) Attitude of press and population 0.40 -0.63 -0.33 
29 26 (22) Customer loyalty 0.44 -0.15 -0.07 
30 28 (8) Willingness or ability to subsidise operations  0.46 0.17 0.08 
31 32 (19) Existence of cooperation with other transport modes 0.52 -0.54 -0.26 
32 24 (23) Sharing economy -0.10 -0.69 -0.31 
33 33 (32) Railway safety systems 0.02 -0.58 -0.31 
34 34 (9) Consumer policy  0.26 0.06 0.03 
Average change  0.48 -0.52 -0.25 
Table 18: Comparison of experts' rating of strength of influencing factors between 2nd and 3rd round 
(author’s own diagram) 
The testing of the rating shows that no factor achieved consensus. Analysing 
the factors grouped in the three categories, eight factors achieved consensus:  
No Influencing factor 






influence     
in % 
4 Attractive train paths 0.00 9.09 90.91 
10 Market potential and market size 0.00 13.64 86.36 
27 Attitude of press and population 4.55 81.82 13.64 
24 Adjustment to customer expectation 4.55 81.82 13.64 
21 Existence of unions 0.00 81.82 18.18 
1 Law in the books 0.00 80.95 19.05 
19 Existence of cooperation with other transport modes 9.52 80.95 9.52 
14 Existence of network effects for incumbents  0.00 76.19 23.81 
Table 19: Influencing factors with a consensus of over 75% in a cluster (3rd round) (author’s own diagram)  
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The next step investigated whether a factor was positive or negative. In this 
round, the participants could categorise a factor as negative and positive. The 
change in results from round two to three is not consistent due to the change in 
scale, but gives a good indication:  
No Influencing factor 
2nd round 3rd round 
% neg. % pos. % neg. % pos. 
29 Lack of technical harmonisation 91.67 8.33 100.00 0.00 
31 Homologation process   88.00 12.00 95.24 4.76 
18 Cross-financing of RUs and lack of transparency 100.00 0.00 94.44 5.56 
15 Low profitability 90.91 9.09 90.91 9.09 
23 Sharing economy 75.00 25.00 83.33 16.67 
21 Existence of unions 90.00 10.00 80.00 20.00 
14 Existence of network effects for incumbents 100.00 0.00 80.00 20.00 
13 Presence of intermodal competitors 78.26 21.74 77.27 22.73 
11 Costs for infrastructure 63.64 36.36 72.73 27.27 
9 Consumer policy 22.22 77.78 61.11 38.89 
32 Railway safety systems 83.33 16.67 58.82 41.18 
22 Customer loyalty 62.50 37.50 52.63 47.37 
33 Availability of necessary personnel 75.00 25.00 44.44 55.56 
34 Incumbent’s performance 37.50 62.50 42.11 57.89 
1 Law in the books 52.17 47.83 40.91 59.09 
2 Law in action 50.00 50.00 36.36 63.64 
7 State of and investment in infrastructure 29.41 70.59 33.33 66.67 
8 Willingness or ability to subsidise operations 40.00 60.00 31.58 68.42 
25 Customers’ willingness to pay 25.00 75.00 30.00 70.00 
28 Access to rolling stock 54.17 45.83 28.57 71.43 
3 Access to facilities and data 41.67 58.33 28.57 71.43 
5 Facilitation and attitude of government and politicians 40.00 60.00 26.09 73.91 
12 Access to distribution systems 50.00 50.00 25.00 75.00 
16 Access to financing 63.16 36.84 25.00 75.00 
17 
Existence of cooperation or coopetition within the 
industry 
46.15 53.85 23.53 76.47 
4 Attractive train paths 34.78 65.22 21.74 78.26 
27 Attitude of press and population 6.67 93.33 21.74 78.26 
20 Possibility for cherry-picking 15.00 85.00 20.00 80.00 
26 Entrepreneurship 5.56 94.44 11.11 88.89 
19 Existence of cooperation with other transport modes 21.43 78.57 11.11 88.89 
24 Adjustment to customer expectation 6.25 93.75 10.00 90.00 
30 Existence of innovation 30.00 70.00 5.88 94.12 
10 Market potential and market size 4.35 95.65 4.76 95.24 
6 Unbundling 25.00 75.00 0.00 100.00 








Question 5: linkages between and mutual dependency of influencing factors  
The rating of the statements and sub-statements of each participant was 
entered in an Excel sheet and analysed by calculating mean, median, variance, 
standard deviation and the percentage of agreement or disagreement. The 
following table gives an overview of the outcome:  





Mean Median v2 S 
5. Influencing factors are strongly 
interconnected and determine one 
another. It is difficult to analyse them from 
a standalone perspective. 
83.33 0.00 1.94 2 0.39 0.62 
5.1. Law in the books (1) and law in action (2) 
show the highest frequency of links to other 
influencing factors. 
59.09 13.64 2.41 2 0.79 0.89 
5.2.1.  Law in the books (1) & law in action (2) 59.09 13.64 2.55 2 0.79 0.89 
5.2.2.  Access to facilities and data (3) & access to 
distribution systems (12) 
59.09 22.73 2.45 2 1.61 1.27 
5.2.3.  Low profitability (15) & customers’ willingness 
to pay (25) 
72.73 13.64 2.18 2 1.15 1.07 
5.2.4.  Law in the books (1) & lack of technical 
harmonisation (29) 
45.45 13.64 2.64 3 0.87 0.93 
5.2.5.  Law in action (2) & attractive train paths (4) 68.18 13.64 2.32 2 1.04 1.02 
5.2.6.  Law in action (2) & facilitation and attitude of 
government and politicians (5) 
59.09 18.18 2.41 2 0.97 0.98 
5.2.7.  Law in action (2) & cross-financing of RUs 
and lack of transparency (18) 
59.09 9.09 2.32 2 0.76 0.87 
5.2.8.  Facilitation and attitude of government and 
politicians (5) & attitude of press and 
population (27) 
54.55 22.73 2.64 2 0.78 0.88 
5.2.9.  Costs for infrastructure (11) & low profitability 
(15) 
72.73 9.09 2.18 2 0.97 0.98 
5.2.10. Low profitability (15) & access to financing 
(16) 
50.00 27.27 2.68 2.5 1.22 1.10 
Table 21: Overview of linkages between influencing factors (3rd round) (author’s own diagram)  
In question 5, only one statement (5.) could reach consensus and two 
statements come close to consensus (5.2.3., 5.2.9). The high degree of neutral 
answers and the feedback of the experts imply that this very specific question 
might be too abstract and too far away from the participants’ every-day 
business and what they experience in the industry. Therefore, an additional 
round of Delphi was not expected to lead to further consensus.  
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Question 6: Shift of influencing factors in the last years 
As in question 5, the rating of the statements and sub-statements of each 
participant was entered in an Excel sheet and analysed by calculating mean, 
median, variance, standard deviation and the percentage of agreement or 
disagreement:  
Statement / sub-statement % agree 
% dis-
agree 
Mean Median v2 S 
5. In the last years, a shift of individual 
influencing factors could be observed – 
the shifts vary between countries. 
70.59 11.76 2.24 2 0.77 0.88 
5.1.1. Presence of intermodal competitors (13) 77.27 9.09 2.00 2 0.82 0.90 
5.1.2. Access to distribution systems (12) 52.17 39.13 2.70 2 1.86 1.37 
5.1.3. Low profitability (15) 45.45 31.82 2.82 3 1.15 1.07 
5.1.4. Law in action (2) 59.09 18.18 2.55 2 0.70 0.84 
Table 22: Overview of shifts of influencing factors (3rd round) (author’s own diagram) 
In comparison with question 5, only sub-statement 6.1.1. could achieve 
consensus and statement 6 reached an agreement of over 70%. The 
researcher suspects similar reasons for this as in question 5, additionally did 
some participants not vote and comment on all statements/sub-statements in 
question 6, which also indicates too great a distance from the participants’ 
experience. Therefore question 6 was also not subject to another round of 
Delphi.  
5.3.   Discussion of Delphi findings  
The Delphi study shows that open access competition has an overall positive 
effect on long-distance passenger rail. The study implies that it is a tool to 
increase efficiency in the market, modernises passenger rail, establishes a 
higher customer focus, and decreases overall transport emissions. Despite this, 
the panel estimated only a slight increase in competition in the next ten years. 
This suggests that the conditions for open access competition in Europe are still 




not ideal. No consensus could be reached within the panel on whether a 
tendering/franchising-system could fulfil the goals better.  
When analysing the 34 identified influencing factors, it becomes apparent that 
the economic and political/legal factors have the strongest overall influence, 
followed by technical and social factors. When arranged in a matrix according to 
their strength and type of influence, the following graph emerges:  
 
Illustration 16: Matrix on strength and type of influence on open access competition (author’s own 
diagram) 
With this graph, it becomes apparent that lacking technical harmonisation, 
homologation process, low profitability, intermodal competition and costs for 
infrastructure have a high negative influence on competition. These factors 
need to be reconsidered closely by national politicians as well as the EU. To 
improve the conditions for open access competitors in the market, the impact of 
those factors needs to be reduced. The graph also shows that the factors 
availability of train paths, market potential, rolling stock access and access to 
facilities and data have a high positive influence, promoting competition. To 
improve conditions for open access competition, those factors need to be 
further strengthened and reinforced. Despite having an underlying role, law in 
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action and law in the books can be found at the centre of the matrix, with law in 
action having a slightly higher influence than law in the books. The experts do 
not perceive the direct influence of these factors as high. The factors existence 
of cooperation/coopetition within the industry, cross-financing of RUs and 
unbundling had the highest variation in expert rating. This matches the varying 
opinions in the literature, where unbundling is widely discussed by experts with 
different points of view (e.g. Bouf et al. 1999, Nash 2008, Kirchner 2011). 
No consensus could be reached on the exact rating of the influencing factors’ 
strengths, but the mean gives a good indication. The panel’s rating grew closer 
together between the second and the third round; variance and standard 
deviation decreased (v² = -0.52, S = -0.25). Thus the factor of customers’ 
willingness to pay had the largest increase in importance (0.97), followed by 
market potential and market size (0.78) and facilitation and attitude of 
government and politicians towards competition (0.78). 
The literature review and experience from the industry show that the railway 
market in Europe is diversified and fragmented. Different working or researching 
backgrounds as well as different countries reveal a different picture. Therefore, 
the outcome is analysed regarding the panel’s working background and country 
of experience. Different influencing factors take different forms in different 
countries. When investigating the top ten influencing factors regarding the 
country background, the following picture emerges, showing that a small 
number of factors may be found in the top five of most countries, e.g. train 
paths’ availability, low profitability and market potential. With the outcome that 
no country shows an identical profile, the findings from the existing literature on 
different degrees of liberalisation are confirmed:  
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Table 23: TOP 10 influencing factors clustered along the panel’s country backgrounds (author’s own 
diagram) 
When investigating the top ten influencing factors regarding the working 
background, it again became apparent that most of the same factors occurred 
in the top five of each group. While the group of “research/consulting” experts 
showed the greatest deviation from the other groups, the groups “incumbent” 
and “political/association” showed the greatest similarities. Since many experts 
from the groups had working experience in both fields, a great overlap between 
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12 distribution system 
10 25 willingness to pay 29 techn. harmonisation 
16 financing 
25 willingness to pay 
26 entrepreneurship 
Table 24: TOP 10 influencing factors clustered along the panel’s working background (author’s own 
diagram) 
Regarding the correlation between factors, the outcome of the Delphi study has 
not been as clear as the previous findings. The Delphi panel agreed that all 
factors were strongly interconnected and determined one another and that it 
was difficult to analyse them from a standalone perspective. Only the 
connection of low profitability in the industry and customers’ willingness to pay 
almost reached consensus. Similar findings apply for the shift of influencing 
factors. The panel only reached consensus regarding the shift of the influencing 
factor presence of intermodal competitors, many panelists did not vote on this 
question.  
5.4.    Conclusion of Delphi findings  
The Delphi studied proved to be a good tool to structure expert opinion and 
group discussions. It showed that different positions existed among experts, 
depending on their working and country background. Despite these differences, 
a structured list of influencing factors could be worked out and mapped. This 




framework is suitable as a guideline for further analysis, e.g. the following case 
study. The findings of the Delphi study also direct the focus of the following 
analysis to the influencing factors of a political/legal and economic nature, which 
seems to have the highest overall influence. It also confirms the relevance of 
the research topic of this thesis, since open access is perceived as a tool to 
increase efficiency in the market, modernises passenger rail, establishes a 
higher customer focus, and decreases overall transport emissions. The panel’s 
estimation of low increase in open access competition expresses the need for 
further improvement of conditions to increase the likelihood of beneficial 
competition, e.g. regarding the lacking technical harmonisation, rolling stock 
homologation or costs of infrastructure, which are rated negatively. 
Regarding correlation between and shift of influencing factors over time, the 
Delphi study can give some indications, but could not fully answer the research 
questions. It becomes clear that all influencing factors closely relate to each 
other and are part of a network. Therefore, influencing factors cannot be 
analysed from a standalone perspective and need to be considered as a part of 
a system. The following case study needs to investigate correlation and shift of 
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6.  Chapter 6: Validation and characterisation of influencing factors: a   
case study  
After consideration of the case study’s strengths and weaknesses, case study 
as a research strategy is considered suitable for the next stage of the research 
process after the finalisation of the Delphi study. The existing literature (Yin 
1994, Stake 1995, Baxter & Jack 2008) names properties that lead to the 
application of case study research, which also apply to this research project:  
• “How” and “why” questions need to be answered, like “How is open 
access competition in long-distance passenger rail influenced by the 34 
identified factors and why is that so?”. 
• The collection of contextual conditions is of high importance for the 
observation of influencing factors, since they are formed and shaped by 
the environment. 
• The observed phenomenon is embedded in a complex environment and 
boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not always 
clear.  
• Multiple sources of evidence need to be mixed to observe open access 
competition and its influencing factors since no single source of 
quantitative data sets exists. The analysis of only one set of data might 
also result in misleading conclusions since many different views on the 
phenomenon observed exist. 
This chapter gives a detailed overview of the process of case study research as 
well as the findings in the form of a case report and a discussion of the 
outcome.  
 




6.1.    Setting the case study process   
As described in section 4.2.2., Rosenberg & Yates (2007) state that one 
drawback of the application of case study research is that its methodological 
flexibility may lead to uncertainty regarding suitable procedural steps to ensure 
methodological rigour. Therefore this thesis is based on the framework of case 
study research proposed by Rosenberg & Yates. The following flow chart gives 
an overview of the research process, followed by an in-depth description:  
                                                
Illustration 17: Process of the case study research of this thesis, based on Rosenberg & Yates (2007) 
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The main research question for this case study can be posed as follows: 
 ϑ1 = “How is open access competition in long-distance passenger rail 
influenced by the 34 identified factors and why is that so?” 
The aim of this case study is to provide insights and specific, practical examples 
of how factors influence open access competition in two countries, based on the 
findings of the Delphi study. It aims to draw a picture of the phenomenon in the 
market and give further evidence on correlation between influencing factors and 
a shift of influencing factors over time. Therefore, the issue question is to be 
complemented by:  
 ϑ2 = “How do the influencing factors correlate to each other?”  
ϑ3 = “Can a shift of influencing factors be observed over time?”   
The definition of the case and the context of the phenomenon plays a major role 
in the next step: The case study is set in the context of open access competition 
in European long-distance passenger rail, influenced by the current political 
setting and current practice. The context is rather complex, since the overall 
European legal framework is transferred differently into national law, different 
types of railway networks and population structures and different willingness to 
pay apply (Laperrouza & Finger 2009, Kirchner 2011). The case itself can be 
defined as follows:  
Θ = “Influencing factors on open access competition in long-distance passenger 
rail transport in practice”  
 
 




Two sub-units exist:  
Θ1 = “Open access competition in the German long-distance passenger rail 
market” 
Θ2 = “Open access competition in the Italian long-distance passenger rail 
market” 
The boundaries are set in the following table:  
 Θ1 = Germany Θ2 = Italy 
Observed competitors Locomore/Flixtrain, 
HKX/Flixtrain, InterConnex, 
MSM, derschnellzug.de 
Arenaways, DB/ÖBB, NTV 
Incumbent  DB Fv TI 
IM DB Netz RFI 
Focus time frame 2012-2018 2009-2018 
Time frame of data collection 01/2017 – 08/2018 06/2017 – 08/2018 
Table 25: Definition of case boundaries (author’s own diagram)  
Competition for the market (PSO, tendering, franchising) in long-distance 
passenger rail, as well as competition in regional and freight rail are not 
considered here. Even though intermodal competition plays a role in this 
analysis, it is only considered as one part of the framework and will not be 
analysed in-depth.  
The research approach and the design set the framework for the case study 
data collection. This case study takes the form of an instrumental case study. 
The case is studied to understand the factors influencing open access 
competition. It is designed as a holistic, multiple-case study, analysing the 
factors influencing competition in two sub-cases: Germany and Italy (Yin 1994). 
A holistic design is chosen since the global nature of influencing factors is to be 
observed and the examples from Germany and Italy are to add to the general 
understanding. A multiple-case design is especially valuable when more than 
one case is relevant for the investigation. In this case study the sub-cases serve 
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a specific purpose, following a replication logic. This case study is not designed 
to achieve statistical generalisation. It aims for a slight degree of theoretical 
generalisation, underlined by practical examples (Titscher et al. 2000).  
Based on the research approach and design, the data collection method needs 
to be set. In this case study, the press investigation forms the first step in data 
collection. Relevant press articles from railway print magazines (e.g. “Railway 
Gazette International”, “European Railway Review”) were gathered and 
organised regarding market and competitors. Relevant online-articles from 
German, Italian and international newspapers (e.g. “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, 
“Handelsblatt”, “La Repubblica”, “The Guardian”) were saved as PDF 
documents. Additionally, press releases from railway companies, ministries, 
institutions and associations were downloaded. All documents were organised 
according to their subject, e.g. the competitors, the political institution, the 
incumbent. Since many press articles incorporated the discussion of reports, 
studies and official documentation, the collection took place parallel to the press 
data collection. Most institutions and companies publish the relevant documents 
online in PDF form. The documents were downloaded and organised according 
to their origin. After some initial insights of the press and documentation 
research, semi-structured interviews with experts were scheduled. For the 
German and the Italian sub-case, three interviews each were conducted. Since 
the collection of practical examples of influencing factors is the main goal of the 
case study, experts from the railway industry were chosen who had several 
years of working experience in the industry with direct, work-related knowledge 
about competition in the market. The interviewees work or worked for 
competitors, in political institutions or as consultants. The interviews took place 
in person, via telephone or Skype, mostly taking 60 minutes. Prior to the 




interview, the interviewee received an information sheet on the research project 
and an overview of the interview questions (Appendix 6, Appendix 7). To give 
the interviews a solid structure, a data collecting form was used to ask the 
questions and fill in the data (Appendix 8). After the interviewees’ approval, the 
interviews were recorded and notes were taken during the interview. After the 
interviews, the content of the interviews was entered in an interview-protocol 
based on the notes and records, and sent to all interviewees. The interviewees 
had the chance to give feedback which was then implemented (Appendix 9).  
The next step forms the selection of the data analysis strategy and the 
reduction and processing of data. “[C]ase studies are not an undertaking that 
one can embark on in a carefree manner and one is not liberated from all 
precise methodological procedures” say Titscher et al. (2000, p. 45). A clear 
data analysis framework is required to deal with the large amount of rich data 
and prevent the researcher from getting lost (Yin 1994). For this case study, to 
capture vital part of the acquired data, a type of content analysis was employed 
for the collected data. “Content analysis is the longest established method of 
text analysis among the set of empirical methods of social investigation” 
(Titscher et al. 2000, p. 55). Different definitions and procedures of context 
analysis exist, some being narrow, some more comprehensive. In original 
terms, content analysis “referred only to those methods that concentrate on 
directly and clearly quantifiable aspects of text content” (Tischer et al. 2000, p. 
55). However, the concept of qualitative content analysis draws more on the 
structure and meaning of the analysed texts or materials (Mayring 2010). 
Mayring has developed three distinct analytical procedures of qualitative 
content analysis. This case study builds on the framework of summary content 
analysis. The underlying premise of summary content analysis is that the 
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abstraction levels of summary are predefined. Due to the gradual 
generalisation, the content becomes more abstract with each step (Mayring 
2010). Each sub-case undergoes a separate summary content analysis. In the 
first step, the analysis units are predefined according to the research questions 
ϑ1, ϑ2 and ϑ3, including the 34 influencing factors. Therefore a matrix was 
developed with clusters of the observed competitors and the main institutions 

















Law in the 
books 
… … … … … … … 
Law in 
action 
… … … … … … ... 
… … … … … … … … 
ϑ2 Correlation … … … … … … ... 
ϑ3 Shift  … … … … … … … 
Table 26: Design of the case study’s research matrix (author’s own diagram) 
In the next step, the core messages from the sources were filled into the matrix 
in form of brief keywords and sentences; each source adds to the existing 
content. Special attention was paid to practical examples that demonstrate the 
influencing factors, the correlations and shifts. If necessary, new columns were 
added during the research process to cover the case as comprehensively as 
possible. In case of the interviews, notes of the core messages were entered in 
the matrix and later once again complemented with further information from the 
recordings. In the next step, the content was further condensed and refined in 
the data collection forms. In case of the interviews, the data collection forms 
also served as interview protocols. Writing up the case study was the next step 
and a further condensation of information took place. The result of the fourth 
step was the description of the essential information of the individual sub-case. 
The final step brought the two sub-cases together and the information was 
further reduced to be discussed on a more general level in the general 




framework of this thesis. The process is shown in the following process flow 
model:  
Step  





















X  X X X X 
2a. 
extraction of core 
messages from 
sources in matrix  
X X  X X  
2b.  
making notes of core 
messages in 
interviews, again 
revised with recorded 
interview 
  X   X 
3.  
first reduction of 
content into data 
collection form / 
interview protocol 
X X X X X X 
4.  
second reduction of 




third reduction of 
content into 
discussion on general 
level 
X 
Table 27: Process flow model of the case study (author’s own diagram) 
Finally, the conclusions needed to be drawn and the case study report needed 
to be written. This step is closely related to the summary content analysis and 
both stages merge and complement each other. Writing up the case and sub-
case reports can be considered as a step in the data processing flow. To 
answer the pre-defined research questions, the report successively discusses 
the findings for each question. The most extensive part ϑ1 is discussed in steps 
and each influencing factor, which is relevant for the case, is mentioned. This is 
necessary for the synthesis with the Delphi findings in the next section.  
6.2.  A small-scale approach to challenge a strong incumbent: the 
German case 
The German railway market is one of the biggest in Europe. In the early 1990’s, 
Germany was one of the pioneers of rail market liberalisation, opening the 
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market for open access competition in 1994 (Schwilling & Bunge 2014). 
However, in the meantime only a few competitors have entered the market, 
mostly offering niche services. So far, no competitor challenged the incumbent 
on its main routes (Tomes et al. 2016). The following section presents the 
German case, revealing how open access competition developed over time and 
interacts with incumbent, politics, authorities and other players. Firstly, a 
description of the case context is given, introducing the case setting. In the main 
part, the factors influencing open access competition are described, as well as 
their correlation between each other and their shift over time. Finally, the 
findings are discussed and a conclusion is drawn. 
6.2.1.  Setting the German case in context  
In context of the German Railway Reforms, full open access was permitted from 
1994 onwards for every licenced long-distance passenger RU on the entire 
network, without limitations. Together with the separation of IM DB Netz and the 
incumbent DB Fv, this formed the basis for the existence of open access 
competition. In the following years, the necessary institutions and bodies were 
established to monitor and control the rail market. In Europe, Germany is part of 
the group of advanced liberalised countries, the general de jure and de facto 
framework conditions for open access apply (Kirchner 2011). But only a few 
entrants offer services and the dominant incumbent controls the market. The 
key market players observed in this case are described below:  
The incumbent was founded as DB Reise & Touristik AG in 1999, resulting from 
the second step of the Railway Reform. It was hived off from the long-distance 
sub-unit of DB AG to separate rail infrastructure from train operations. Part of 
DB Holding, DB Fv focuses only on providing long-distance passenger rail and 




a small number of coach services, operating more than 260 ICE trains, 250 
locomotives and 1,400 IC/EC coaches. DB Fv’s ICE and IC/EC route map is in 
Appendix 10. With its dominant position in the market, it holds a market share of 
99%. However, the company suffered from the liberalisation of the coach 
market which resulted in the market entry of many new coach providers (DB 
2016c, BNetzA 2017c, DB 2018b). 
Company profile DB Fv 2017 
CEO Birgit Bohle 
Daily trains >1,050 
Employees  >15,000 
Transported passengers 142 million 
Passenger km 40,500 million 
Revenue  4,368 million EUR 
EBIT 381 million EUR 
Table 28: Company profile of DB Fv (DB 2018a, DB 2018b) 
The first competitor, InterConnex, was founded in 2001 as a brand of Connex 
(later Transdev GmbH). At the time, Connex was a subsidiary of the French 
transportation provider CGEA (later Veolia), which used to be the biggest 
competitor of DB in the regional transport and was already an established 
player in that market. After DB Fv had discontinued the unprofitable “InterRegio” 
traffic, InterConnex seized the opportunity to provide parts of these services, 
offering services at a low-price level. InterConnex operated between 2002 and 
2014 on the lines Warnemünde-Leipzig (2002-2014), (Liberec)-Dresden-
Stralsund-(Binz) (2002-2006), and (Neuss)-Köln-Rostock (2003), with one to 
two trains daily. Its last CEO, who also managed the market withdrawal, was 
Christian Schreyer. InterConnex transported up to 400,000 passengers a year 
without reaching lasting economic success. InterConnex operated mostly with 
Bombardier multiple-unit diesel trains (“DMUs”) owned by the holding company 
as well as locomotives and coaches. After 2012, InterConnex began to struggle 
due to the liberalisation of the coach market which attracted many of 
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InterConnex’s customers, leading to fierce price competition and decreasing 
willingness to pay. This situation was further worsened by the increased prices 
for infrastructure. This finally resulted in the termination of services in 2014 
(Seguret 2009, ZDF 2014, Schlesiger 2014c, Netzwerk Bahnen 2016).  
Locomore rail GmbH & Co. KG was founded in 2007 and was the first private 
open access competitor in Germany. Locomore was founded and previously 
headed by Derek Ladewig, who had worked as a specialist for transportation 
and railways in the Bundestag. The company’s mission was to provide a new 
mobility concept which was environmentally friendly, affordable for everyone 
and engaged people in conversation. Locomore also was the main initiator of 
HKX. After leaving HKX, Locomore prepared its own market launch in 2016, 
with one daily train pair between Stuttgart and Berlin. Locomore’s route map is 
in Appendix 11. In the first 100 days of operations, Locomore transported 
70,000 passengers but filed for insolvency in May 2017. Locomore was the first 
open access competitor that was financed by crowdfunding. After rejection by 
banks and investors, the company initiated a crowdfunding campaign to allocate 
money for the first months of operation. Hector Rail was responsible for the 
traction and provided train drivers. Locomore rented the rolling stock from SRI 
Rail Invest GmbH (Schlesiger 2015, Völklein 2016, Locomore 2017a, Locomore 
2017e, Locomore 2017f). In August 2017, six months after its start, Locomore 
went bankrupt and stopped operations for some months. It was bought by 
coach provider FlixMobility and LEO. While LEO runs operations, FlixMobility 
distributes the tickets and improves profitability of the services with its high 
distribution power. In March 2018 the trains were rebranded as FlixTrain, under 
which a further expansion is planned (FlixBus 2018a, Locomore 2018).  




Hamburg-Köln-Express was founded in 2009 as a joint venture of Rail 
Development Corporation (“RDC”) Deutschland, Locomore and a British-
Canadian investor. With Ladewig leaving HKX after differences of opinion 
regarding the company’s strategy, HKX was included in the holding structure of 
RDC, alongside RDC Autozug Sylt GmbH. RDC is owned by the American 
railway investor Henry Posner III. The company’s mission was to offer 
affordable rail transport and it addressed many customers that did not travel by 
rail beforehand. HKX’s last CEO was Carsten Carstensen. The company had 
ca. 25 employees and provided one daily train pair between Cologne and 
Hamburg. HKX’s route map is in Appendix 11. In the first year of operations, 
HKX transported 350,000 passengers, but the company struggled to be 
profitable. In the beginning, HKX rented rolling stock from several companies 
(e.g. SNCB and Nord-Ostsee-Bahn) and it finally switched to RIC coaches 
provided by BahnTouristikExpress in September 2015. The service provider for 
traction was Nord-Ostsee-Bahn up to December 2015, then 
BahnTouristikExpress (Preuß 2013, Schlesiger 2014b, HKX 2016, HKX 2017b, 
RDC 2017). In October 2017, HKX stopped operations for unknown reasons, 
only operating trains over Christmas in cooperation with FlixMobility 
(Handelsblatt 2017b). From March 2018 onwards, FlixMobility started HKX’s 
operations once again under its brand FlixTrain together with HKX’s old partner 
BahnTouristikExpress (FlixBus 2018c).  
The last open access competitor that entered the market was FlixTrain in March 
2018. FlixTrain is a brand of the holding FlixMobility, which runs the long-
distance coach company FlixBus, offering coach services in Germany and 
Europe since 2013. FlixMobility transported over 100 million passengers, mainly 
by coach, since its market entry and offers more than 250,000 daily connections 
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in 28 countries. As described above, FlixTrain offers the lines previously run by 
Locomore and HKX, slowly increasing the frequency of connections. The 
company’s route map is in Appendix 11 (FlixBus 2018d, Spiegel 2018).  
In 2012, the Cologne-based company MSM Group announced it would start 
operations on the Cologne-Hannover-Berlin/Hamburg line in autumn 2012. The 
company provided charter and party trains and planned to challenge DB Fv on 
one of its main lines. MSM planned to rent coaches abroad and employ a 
service provider for the operations to keep investment low. The CEO and 
founder, Niko Maedge, planned to reach operating profitability within two to 
three years. Originally, MSM planned up to three daily train pairs with up to 14 
coaches between Cologne and Hannover, where the train was to be split with 
one section going to Hamburg and the other to Berlin. After discussion of 
available paths with DB Netz, attractive train paths could not be found for three 
train pairs and Maedge planned to start with one daily train pair. However, the 
services were never launched (Kirnich 2012, Welt 2012, Wüpper 2013, MSM 
2017). 
In 2014, derschnellzug.de GmbH was founded by Johannes Zimmer, a former 
dispatcher and train driver. Derschnellzug.de planned to operate services on 
the lines Stuttgart-Dresden, Stuttgart-Hamburg and Stuttgart-Aachen, the route 
maps are in Appendix 12. The start was originally planned for April 2015 but 
was postponed several times. The company aimed to provide comfortable 
through rail travel to destinations for which DB Fv no longer catered, e.g. 
to/from Heilbronn. Derschnellzug.de never entered the market since the 
necessary paths could not be found, the rolling stock provider needed the IC-
coaches for its own operations, and the investor withdraw the commitment of 
1.25 million EUR (Stimme 2015, derschnellzug.de 2016, Xing 2017).  




6.2.2.  Characterisation of individual factors influencing the German case  
This section outlines the influencing factors in Germany and how they shaped 
open access competition, giving examples from all observed market players. To 
give an overview, the following illustration summarises the analysed data and 
shows the strength of each identified influencing factor:  
 
Illustration 18: Overview of influencing factors in the German case (author’s own diagram)   
Table 29 below lists the key findings for all influencing factors. The factors 
identified as important for the case will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section.   














1 Law in the books  High 
• The market is liberalised since 1994 and competitors can 
access without legal barriers  
2 Law in action  High • Law in action is working well to discipline DB Fv  
3 
Access to facilities 
and data High 
• Access is given to competitors, however the handling of 




• Good access is generally given 
• But due to the high utilisation of the attractive paths, it is 





politicians   
Medium 
• No strong attitude towards competition is given 
• No political attempts have been made to increase the 
market share of competitors  
• Clear focus on the improvement of DB Fv’s quality 
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6 Unbundling High 
• Cooperation between IM and competitors is fair 
• Full separation might promote competition, however only 
a breaking-up of DB Fv would trigger a high number of 
market entries 
7 




• Safety of infrastructure is taken seriously 
• However, relatively little investment in infrastructure 
exists in European comparison 
8 
Willingness or 




• DB Fv receives no subsidies 
•  No willingness to pay subsidies for long-distance 
passenger rail is given  
9 Consumer policy Low 
• All legal requirements are implemented 











and market size High 
• The market potential is considered high 
• However, with a strong incumbent, relative low 
willingness to pay and strong intermodal competition, 




• The RACs in Germany are the highest in the EU 
• RACs are monitored by BNetzA, some cases of 
discrimination existed but have been eliminated 
12 
Access to 
distribution systems Medium 
• No general access to DB’s distributions system is given, 
competitors need to build an own system 
• New digital ticketing solutions and distribution 






• Cars holds ~80% of modal split as biggest competitor 
• The market opening in 2013 led to an increase in long-
distance coach transport and decrease of prices and 
customers’ willingness to pay 
14 
Existence of 
network effects for 
incumbents 
High 
•  The network is finely branched and polycentric 
• DB Fv has a high degree of network effects due to its 
holistic distribution system  
• Competitors cannot access DB Fv’s network effects and 
need to create an own network  
15 Low profitability High 
• DB Fv operates its network profitably 
• However, 2/3 of all RUs cannot cover costs with profits 
from their core business, especially due to high RACs 
and low ticket prices  
16 Access to financing Medium 
• Access is given, but few institutional financiers exist, 
mostly focussing on regional transport 
• Only few private investors exist, mainly having a 







• DB Fv holds cooperation with other incumbents, which 
prevented their market entry in the past 
• Competitors cooperate with other RUs too, but it has no 
major effect on the business cases 
18 
Cross-financing of 
RUs and lack of 
transparency 
Low 
• Accounting system of DB Fv and other DB subsidies are 
separated 







• It has not been a major influence until the cooperation 
between Locomore and Flixbus 
• Capital and distribution power of Flixbus made 
operations of Locomore under a new brand possible 
20 
Possibility for 
cherry-picking  Medium 
• Cherry-picking is allowed if subsidised regional transport 
is not cannibalised  






21 Existence of unions Low 
• Unions have a high effect on DB Fv 
• Union have no effect on small open access RUs 
22 Customer loyalty Low 
• No significant customer loyalty for either DB Fv nor open 
access RUs exists, due to high price sensitivity 
23 Sharing economy Low 
• Sharing industry is growing in Germany 
• Up to now, no significant effect on competition 









• DB Fv serves a great variety of customer groups 




willingness to pay High 
• Decreasing price level of mobility from 2014 onwards, 
due to increased intermodal competition  
• Competitors mostly use low-price strategies  
26 Entrepreneurship Medium 
• Market entry and the first years of operation require 
strong entrepreneurs  
• Mostly, entrepreneurs were connection to rail beforehand 
27 
Attitude of press 
and population Low 
• Press and population have a positive attitude  










Access to rolling 
stock Medium 
• Access to new rolling stock is given  
• Market for second-hand rolling stock (trains and 
coaches) is difficult  
29 
Lack of technical 
harmonisation Low 
• Harmonisation is necessary for international RUs and 




• Different types of innovation exist within RUs 





• Process has been slow and complicated in the past and 
led to delayed market entry 




• Is considered as bureaucratic, time consuming and 
complex 






• Unemployment rate is very low in Germany 
• Up to now, necessary personnel is available but might be 








• Some smaller cases of discrimination between IM and 
RUs existed in the past 
• Size and dense network of DB Fv leaves little space for 
large-scale market entry of new RUs 
• General quality of DB Fv is good, however customers are 
not always satisfied and loyalty is not very high  
Table 29: Key findings of the German case (author’s own diagram) 
6.2.2.1.  Law in the books and law in action  
Law in the books is a pre-condition for the existence of open access competition 
in Germany. The Railway Reforms were initiated in 1989 to transform 
Bundesbahn and Reichsbahn from two political authorities into one business 
enterprise, to conduct debt relief, to restructure investment in infrastructure and 
regional transport and to react to the new political framework. This also 
incorporated the EU’s demand for the introduction of competition (91/440/EEC). 
The reform resulted in changes to 130 laws and the implementation of seven 
new laws (Deutscher Bundestag 2008, Schwilling & Bunge 2014, Doll 2014a). 
Despite Germany’s status of advanced liberalisation in Europe, in the following 
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years some legal proceedings challenged the implementation of 91/440/EEC 
into German law: especially regarding DB’s holding structure and avoidance of 
cross-financing (Bund 2011, Monopolkommission 2011). In 2013, the ECJ 
decided that regulation regarding separation between infrastructure and 
operation was being implemented satisfactorily, and in 2016 that the control 
framework for accountancy of infrastructure and operations needed to be 
improved in regulation (Spiegel online 2013, Zeit online 2013a, Zeit online 
2013b, Sanchez-Bordona 2016). The following paragraphs give a brief overview 
of the main changes of law in the books. These changes will be discussed 
below.  
After several complaints about the delays and complexity of homologation, the 
regulation concerning homologation was improved: in 2012 serial approval of 
rolling stock was allowed (7. Verordnung zur Änderung eisenbahnrechtlicher 
Vorschriften); in 2015 a “rail TÜV6” was established, allowing selected private 
inspection bodies to support the Federal Railway Authority (“EBA”) in the 
process (9. Gesetz zur Änderung eisenbahnrechtlicher Vorschriften) (EBA 
2013a, Doll 2014b, BMVI 2014a). In 2012, after lengthy discussions, the 
government decided to liberalise the long-distance coach market from 
01.01.2013 onwards, by adapting the “Personenbeförderungsgesetz”. This 
resulted in additional intermodal competition for RUs (Bundesministerium für 
Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung 2012, Stern 2012). To increase competition 
in the railway sector, the “Eisenbahnregulierungsgesetz” (“ERegG”) came into 
force in 2016, implementing Directive 2012/34/EC in German law. It introduced 
ex ante approval of infrastructure fees by BNetzA, provided incentives for 
increased efficiency of infrastructure, empowered BNetzA and was supposed to 
 
6 “Technischer Überwachungsverein“, meaning Association for Technical Inspection 




lead to increased transparency. ECJ noted that Germany violated directive 
2012/34/EC since ERegG came into action one year late. ERegG is subject to 
criticism from several parties. The Monopoly Commission, for example, sees an 
excessive degree of legal uncertainty and states that a 1:1 implementation of 
EU law resulted in a step backwards in some areas (Monopolkommission 2015, 
Deutscher Bundesrat 2016, BMVI 2016b, Wüpper 2016). 
Overall, the German market is liberalised and competitors can operate on the 
network with limited direct barriers. However, regarding the degree of market 
liberalisation, critics name German law in the books a “hybrid-liberalisation”, 
since competition is possible but not proactively promoted. A need for further 
development of regulation in the coming years is seen, but experts expect no 
drastic changes because the legal development ever since the Railway 
Reforms has been relatively stable and a gradual development has taken place 
(Kirchner 2011, Participant B 2017, Participant C 2017).  
When law comes into action, it is essential that law is put into practice, which is 
the case in Germany. The institutions are set up and function satisfactorily 
(Kirchner 2011, Participant B 2017). Due to the Railway Reforms, DB AG was 
founded on 01.01.1994, being fully state-owned. The Transport Ministry 
(“BMVI") is only supposed to intervene in strategic decisions, to avoid the status 
of a “self-service shop” as it used to be before the reforms. In 1999, the reforms 
resulted in a splitting of DB in five AGs under the umbrella of a holding 
structure. The reforms also led to a separation of infrastructure and operations 
which is considered a success by the BMVI, especially since it resulted in a 
non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure and a traceable increase in 
profitability (Schwilling & Bunge 2014). However, DB’s holding structure makes 
monitoring by regulatory authorities necessary: the institutions BNetzA, EBA 
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and Monopolkommission have been successfully established (Participant A 
2017, Participant B 2017).  
Some examples show the successful and fast implementation of law in the 
books: in 2013, legal opening for the long-distance coach market was directly 
implemented, led to a direct issuing of necessary concessions and resulted in 
the fast market entry of several coach providers (Bundesamt für Güterverkehr 
2015). In 2016, the regulation 2016/545/EU on the process of paths framework 
agreements symbolised a change in paradigm and led to the termination of 
paths framework agreements by DB Netz from 01.12.2016 onwards. A process 
for future framework agreements in Germany has not yet been set up (DB Netz 
2018b). Also in 2016, the ERegG led to the foundation of a ruling chamber, 
investigating rail network access conditions and infrastructure prices ex ante. 
For the 2017/2018 timetable, DB Netz revised the path pricing system 
fundamentally according to ERegG’s guidelines (DB Netz 2016b, BNetzA 
2017a). 
Law in action is working well to discipline the incumbent. However, critics say 
that the law is not implemented and applied proactively towards competitors 
and therefore does not actively support them. The Monopoly Commission is 
seen as the only active promoter of increased open access competition from an 
institutional side (Monopolkommission 2013 & 2015, Participant A 2017, 
Participant C 2017). Moreover, the regulatory framework in Germany is 
characterised by a wide span of interpretation which makes it weaker regarding 
implementation (Monopolkommission 2015).  
 
 




6.2.2.2. Access to facilities and data as well as attractive train paths 
Access to facilities and data in Germany is considered satisfactory and no major 
issues exist (BNetzA 2017c, Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017). A survey 
of BNetzA shows that RUs consider access to facilities as good: on a scale from 
1-5, access to stations was rated 2.1, maintenance facilities and formation 
facilities was rated 2.4, access to storage sidings was rated 2.8. The trend of 
recent years shows a relatively stable development (BNetzA 2017c). In 2011, 
EC investigated DB Energie’s traction pricing system after a complaint from a 
competitor. After legal proceedings, DB announced in 2014 that it was 
abolishing the 5% discount system for big rail providers, which benefited mostly 
its subsidiaries (ECJ 2013, DB 2015a). Subsequently, competitors sued DB 
Energie in 2015 for 13.5 million EUR of compensation (Juve 2015). Highly 
frequented stations and hubs on the network are considered as overcrowded 
and difficult to access for competitors, e.g. Hamburg Hbf. and Berlin Spandau 
(Polke-Majewski 2015, EBA 2016). Critics state that some facilities also suffer 
from poor management, which affects all market participants: HKX had 
problems with the availability of sidings at Frankfurt Hbf (Participant B 2017). 
Locomore had difficulties with display and notice of information in stations. In 
addition, shunting and the quality of cleaning in Stuttgart were unsatisfying for 
Locomore (Participant C 2017). Regarding available data, sales figures and 
details to ODs are still restricted by DB Fv and not accessible for competitors. 
However, DB established an open-data platform providing e.g. timetables, 
detailed infrastructure information, mobile network information and enabling 
competitors to access necessary data more quickly (DB 2017a). All in all, 
access to facilities and data is “not decisive for the outcome of the war, but can 
cost a lot of strength”, it is not the access which is difficult for competitors, but 
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the continuous handling of issues which need a high degree of persistence 
(Participant C 2017). 
In Germany, the access to and availability of attractive train paths builds on a 
good system which is relatively free of discrimination (Participant A 2017, 
Participant B 2017, Participant C 2017, BNetzA 2017c). A survey by BNetzA 
showed that the general access to paths is considered as good in the industry: 
on a scale between 1-5, access to paths on an occasional basis is rated 2.2, 
access to regular timetable paths is rated 2.2 (BNetzA 2017c). In 2015, 12,500 
path conflicts existed, in 19 cases a legal decision procedure was necessary to 
reach a settlement (DB 2016b).  
However, one difficulty is the system’s lack of transparency: competitors do not 
receive an overview of attractive available slots (Participant B 2017). 
Additionally, the network is busy and well utilised, especially in urban centres 
(Participant B 2017). In recent years, a slight increase in path kilometres took 
place on the network, up to 1,072 million in 2017 (DB 2018a). Since the network 
is highly utilised, a shortage of paths exists (Participant C 2017). Overburdened 
and congested lines need to be disclosed by DB Netz on a regular basis. EBA 
and BNetzA observe and monitor those limitation and capacity bottlenecks, and 
aim to provide transparency for competitors. In 2015, 15 lines were defined as 
overburdened (Polke-Majewski 2015, BNetzA 2017b). A further difficulty is that 
the network is a mixed network, different forms of railway services are provided 
at the same time with different speeds and stopping patterns. This makes the 
planning of relatively fast long-distance lines more difficult (Participant B 2017). 
Also, due to the high utilisation of the network, a newcomer is structurally 
disadvantaged, since the attractive train paths are already blocked by running 
operators. A lack of opportunity to achieve long-term paths agreements of over 




five years makes it even more difficult to secure financing and enter the market 
with new rolling stock (Monopolkommission 2015, Participant C 2017). 
In the past, framework contract periods greatly shaped the applications for 
attractive train paths, which has been widely criticised (e.g. Monopolkommission 
2011, Warnecke 2014, Participant C 2017). Every five years, RUs applied for 
paths which were guaranteed for five years, originally initiated to provide 
competitors with paths security. However, the system was considered as 
inflexible and seen as a means to hinder competition with a too small lead time 
to set up operations and buy rolling stock (Monopolkommission 2011, 
Warnecke 2014). This led to a termination of the system in 2016 (DB Netz 
2018b). Currently, paths can only be blocked one year in advance, and a new 
process is not yet established (Participant B 2017). The following examples 
show how competitors applied for paths and dealt with paths availability:  
When InterConnex started operations, it originally planned to offer more lines of 
the old DB “InterRegio”-network. However, after negotiations with DB Netz, 
InterConnex withdrew the request for four daily train pairs between Düsseldorf-
Heidelberg, since the paths offered included long waiting times and were 
unattractive (Eurailpress 2002). In general, HKX described the cooperation with 
DB Netz as good, but some conflicts have occurred (Preuß 2013): before HKX 
started operations, it thought about applying for paths framework agreements. 
This was risky since under this timeframe, it would have needed to start 
operations within 1.5 years’ time or would have suffered high cancellation 
penalties (Participant C 2017). Between 2007 and 2010 Locomore tried to 
negotiate a long-term paths contract for HKX for nationwide paths, but it failed 
and market entry was smaller than originally planned (Warnecke 2014). On the 
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Cologne-Frankfurt line, difficulties occurred with finding attractive train paths 
due to overcrowding. A meeting between HKX, DB Netz and a regional RU was 
able to solve some problems, but some slots remained critical which finally led 
to the termination of the line (HKX 2015, Eurailpress 2015). MSM planned to 
offer three daily train pairs on the line Cologne-Berlin/Hamburg via Hanover. DB 
Netz, however, could not find attractive train paths on this highly-used route. No 
solution minimising travel time and optimising rolling stock utilisation could be 
found. However, DB Netz states that it invested more than 1,000 working hours 
to check MSM’s request (Welt 2012, Wüpper 2013). Derschnellzug.de also had 
problems to find attractive train paths: it planned to use partly private 
infrastructure (Grötzingen-Heilbronn), but this infrastructure was not certified for 
long-distance passenger transportation (Stimme 2015, derschnellzug.de 2015). 
After the experience with HKX between 2007 and 2010, Locomore successfully 
applied for a framework paths agreement and secured its paths for a period 
between 2016 and 2020 (Schlesiger 2015, Participant B 2017).  
Generally, good access to paths exists in Germany, but due to high utilisation, it 
is rather complex and tough negotiation with DB Netz is necessary (Participant 
C 2017). HKX, Locomore and InterConnex had a high degree of experience in 
applying for paths, which made them more successful than other competitors in 
the first place, also regarding path framework contracts (Participant C 2017). All 
in all, examples from the market show that the access to attractive train paths 
has a significant influence on competition, also since it was an entry barrier that 
some RUs did not manage to address. It is difficult to say if a full vertical 
separation would result in improved conditions for open access competition: on 
the one hand, cases of discrimination could be prevented, more transparency 
and an easier access to attractive paths during peak times would be given. On 




the other hand, due to its size, DB Fv would still be the dominant customer with 
a high market power. Due to the mixed system and the current infrastructure 
bottlenecks, paths conflicts and congestions could not be excluded, which is the 
main problem in the German case.    
6.2.2.3. Facilitation and attitude of government and politicians 
Examples from other countries show that a positive attitude of the government 
and politicians towards competition enhances market liberalisation. However, 
no clear focus of government and politicians on rail and especially on 
competition in long-distance passenger rail can be observed, they did not 
actively try to increase the market share. Although the centre-right government 
wanted to create a rail network with fair access conditions for all operators, it 
put emphasis on continuity in long-distance passenger rail within the last 
decade, with a focus on quality and service improvement of the incumbent 
(Bundesregierung 2005, 2013, Monopolkommission 2015, Participant A 2017). 
An example of this passivity was the market withdrawal of InterConnex in 2014: 
CEO Schreyer wrote an open letter to the Transport Minister and asked for 
support shortly before the end of operations, but never received an answer 
(ZDF 2014, Smith 2015). Despite the passivity, no negative actions from 
political or governmental side against competition can be observed, either. To 
promote competition, a “big bang” would be needed regarding regulation. But 
this is not expected and no lobby for such a change exists (SPD 2016, 
Participant C 2017). 
6.2.2.4. Unbundling  
In Germany, unbundling in the form of vertical as well as horizontal separation 
exists to some degree: rail infrastructure and operations are vertically separated 
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and operated by different companies. Regional, long-distance and freight 
transport is also horizontally separated. However, the holding company DB 
incorporates all companies under its umbrella, with Chinese walls set in place to 
prevent discriminatory behaviour (Schwilling & Bunge 2014). Government and 
BMVI pleaded in favour of the holding structure for years, believing that 
competition is possible. They want to work on a further improvement of the 
system instead of full separation (Bund 2011, Zeit online 2013). The Monopoly 
Commission is the only official body that attacks the existing holding structure, 
stating that competition is only possible with full separation 
(Monopolkommission 2009, Doll 2013, Monopolkommission 2015). The EC 
disapproves of an integrated holding structure. However, after substantial 
lobbying by DB, the ECJ dismissed the case in 2013 and guaranteed the 
continued existence of the holding structure. Subsequently, several discussions 
and legal proceedings took place between the EC and Germany with terms to 
cross-subsidisation and an untransparent accounting system made possible by 
the holding structure (Bund 2011, Spiegel online 2013, Focus 2016). 
Existing open access competition shows that the cooperation between the new 
entrants and the IM is fair (Preuß 2013, BNetzA 2016). Participant A (2017) 
states that in an ideal world, RU and IM would be separated and promote 
competition, but the current holding structure of DB results in no serious 
discrimination against competitors and enables the existence of open access 
providers. Full unbundling of DB Fv and DB Netz is a means to promote open 
access competition further, but it would not be enough: real liberalisation would 
require the breaking-up of DB Fv into several parts that compete against each 
other (Participant B 2017, Participant C 2017).  
 




6.2.2.5. State of and investment in infrastructure 
The state of and investment in infrastructure is taken seriously in Germany, 
especially regarding safety. However, despite having the longest rail network in 
Europe, Germany invests relatively little money in rail infrastructure compared 
to other European countries: a study shows that in 2015, only 56 EUR per 
inhabitant were invested in the rail network, while Sweden invested 177 EUR 
and Austria 192 EUR (Allianz pro Schiene 2016a). This trend could also be 
observed in the previous years which led to underinvestment. The government 
traditionally prioritised investments in roads (Zeit online 2014). An analysis of 
the Plan for Federal Traffic Routes confirms the prioritisation of road over rail: 
between 1991 and 2000 103 billion EUR were invested, 51.6% in road and 
42.3% in rail. Between 2001 and 2015 149 billion EUR were invested, 52.1% in 
roads and 42.9% in rail. The plan provides a significantly increased budget of 
264 billion EUR between 2016 and 2030 of which 49.4% will be invested in 
roads and 41.3% in rail. Electrification and an improvement of capacity is a 
particular bottleneck which is to be improved in the coming years. The figures 
show a steady investment in rail, but the extension of the road network receives 
more funds (Verkehrsministerium Baden Württemberg 2003, BMVI 2016a). A 
survey of BNetzA showed that the conservation state of the network is 
considered as satisfactory (3.0 on a scale of 1-5), as are the development 
conditions (3.0) (BNetzA 2017c). But delays and disruptions due to technical 
failures in the network occur, for both incumbent and competitors (Participant B 
2017). The enhanced investment in rail infrastructure has a positive effect on 
the entire network for all players. But negative effects also occur due to an 
increase in construction work: InterConnex, for example, suffered a massive 
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reduction in sales during construction work and line closures (Participant A 
2017, Participant B 2017).  
All in all, an intact network is considered a basic condition for competition and 
has the same influence on the competitor as it does on the incumbent. 
Competition is only possible when enough capacity exists, as the experience of 
InterConnex, HKX, MSM and derschnellzug.de reveals that path allocation, 
especially in big transport hubs, is difficult in Germany (Participant A 2017, 
Participant B 2017).  
6.2.2.6.  Market potential and market size 
Market potential and market size of long-distance passenger rail in Germany is 
relatively high, a positive market environment for rail exists. However, it varies 
considerably between regions and travel days. In 2016, the modal split of rail 
passenger transport was 8.6%, with a total amount of 40 billion passenger-km 
(BNetzA 2017c, Eurostat 2019b). The rail market is fully dependent on the 
economic situation of the national economy, which has been stable in the past 
decade. In 2016, DB Fv registered a passenger record with over 139 million 
transported passengers, despite the intermodal competition, which increased to 
142 million in 2017. The sales figures (in billion EUR) in the long-distance 
passenger rail market in recent years are 2013: 4.0, 2014: 4.0, 2015: 3.9, 2016: 
4.2. and 2017: 4.3 (DB 2017b, DB 2018a). Due to the low market share of 
competitors of under 1%, the sales figures are mainly generated by DB Fv. The 
average length of passenger journeys was 284 km in 2016 (BNetzA 2017c).  
Often the market size and estimated market potential of lines lead to the idea of 
market entry (Participant A 2017): the higher the estimated market potential, the 
lower the risk for failed market entry will be and the more attractive market entry 




becomes. Competitors usually enter on the line with the highest estimated 
potential (Participant C 2017). When InterConnex started operations, it filled a 
gap that DB had left. From DB’s point of view, not enough market potential was 
given to cover the costs (Monopolkommission 2009, Kuhr 2014, Participant A 
2017). After market entry, InterConnex transported around 200,000 
passengers/year, up to 2012 InterConnex transported around 400,000 
passengers/year (Handelsblatt 2005, Fröhlich 2012, Schlesiger 2014c). HKX 
entered on the Cologne-Hamburg route since it saw market potential, while DB 
Fv did not serve the line with a high priority on quality (Participant A 2017). In 
the first year, HKX transported 350,000 passengers (Preuß 2013, HKX 2013). 
However, with the increased intermodal competition, it reduced its daily 
connections to the weekends and holidays since the market potential was 
higher on those days (Schlesiger 2014b, HKX 2014a). When Locomore entered 
the Stuttgart-Berlin route, it also believed in sufficient market potential and 
market size. To run profitably, an occupancy rate of 50% needed to be 
achieved, with 1,000 tickets sold each day. In the first 100 days of operation, 
70,000 passengers were transported, with 1,000 or more passengers per day 
on Fridays and Sundays (Zeit online 2017, Locomore 2017d, Locomore 2017e). 
FlixTrain plans to transport more than 500,000 passengers in its first 10 months 
of operations and is very optimistic about an occupancy rate of 70% (Spiegel 
2018).  
Market size and market potential play a big role in open access competition, 
since “only when people want to travel does competition make sense” 
(Participant B 2017). The market potential is considered high. Despite the 
intermodal competition, DB Fv registers passenger records, it addresses a wide 
variety of customers. Competitors feel the effects of intermodal competitors 
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more strongly, since they target a similar customer group as the coaches, 
mainly the low-budget travellers. Due to their nature, coaches are more flexible 
and can test and adapt more quickly to market potential than RUs (Participant A 
2017). A major negative influence on open access competition is DB Fv’s high 
market penetration, which leaves little potential unexploited (BNetzA 2016). 
However, when the incumbent is already running a high frequency of trains on a 
route with high market potential, the risk of expulsion is not as big as when the 
competitors enters a route which is not served by the incumbent and the 
incumbent decides to re-enter this route (Participant C 2017).  
6.2.2.7. Costs for infrastructure  
The costs for infrastructure are a big cost driver in every RU’s business case, 
especially in Germany: compared to other EU countries, Germany has the 
highest costs for infrastructure, followed by countries like Belgium and France, 
where charges for dedicated high-speed lines are also included (EC 2016c). 
This is the case since DB Netz charges direct costs for the train operation, as 
well as a share of total costs (Ramsey Pricing) and additional elements (e.g. 
noise protection). In Germany, an average of 25% of all costs of RUs are 
infrastructure costs. Of these costs, 88% are for paths, 8% for stations and 4% 
for other facilities (BNetzA 2016, DB Netz 2017b). 
DB Netz was the first IM in Europe to introduce a train paths pricing system in 
1994. The system was changed into a module-based system in 2001, charging 
different prices for long-distance, freight and regional transport. The prices 
consist of three components: a usage-based fee, performance related fees, and 
other components. Each RU can pre-calculate the prices on DB Netz’s 
homepage (DB Netz 2018a). In 2016, the average price per path km was 4.57 




EUR, but long-distance passenger RU paid an average of 6.33 EUR (BNetzA 
2017c). With each stop at a station, the RU needs to pay a station fee to DB 
Station & Service. An average figure of 5.29 EUR is charged, but this varies 
greatly between rural areas and cities (BNetzA 2017c). The high fees result in 
the fact that in some parts of the network, it is not possible to provide profitable 
passenger rail transport. For DB Fv it is possible to achieve a positive business 
case due to surpluses from other parts of the network (BNetzA 2016).  
Examples from open access competitors show that the infrastructure costs play 
a role for their profitability and that some cases of discrimination existed in the 
past: when InterConnex left the market in 2014, it blamed the high costs for 
infrastructure as well as ruinous competition from coaches. For one route, it 
paid 1,700 EUR which resulted in a cost level of 11 EUR per customer, bearing 
in mind that InterConnex ran on cheaper, secondary lines (ZDF 2014, 
Participant A 2017). After HKX announced its market entry, DB Station & 
Service changed the pricing scheme in 2010. Originally, trains below 180 m 
were charged at a discounted level, in the new system only trains below 170 m 
were granted the discount. With HKX’s trains being 178 m long, this led to a 
cost increase of 62.9% for HKX and 3.3% for DB Fv. HKX initiated a lawsuit 
against DB and won and DB Station & Service had to re-calculate the station 
prices (Schlesiger 2012, BNetzA 2015). When expanding the line to Frankfurt in 
2015, HKX did not use the fast rail paths between Frankfurt and Cologne and 
ran on cheaper and slower paths to save costs (Participant A 2017).  
The new ERegG from 2016 leads to two main changes in the pricing of 
infrastructure, which affects competition: DB Netz’s pricing system needs to be 
approved ex ante by BNetzA. This guarantees greater transparency and fairer 
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pricing for competitors. Additionally, prices for regional paths are not to increase 
by more than 1.8% each year. This may lead to an extra financial burden for 
long-distance passenger RUs, since freight rail is also to be protected (Doll 
2016b, Allianz pro Schiene 2016b, Handelsblatt 2016b). The ERegG resulted in 
a new path pricing system which DB Netz introduced in December 2017 (DB 
Netz 2016a). Even though the Transport Minister saw no risk for open access 
competition through the ERegG, several parties complained about this aspect 
(Handelsblatt 2016b, Allianz pro Schiene 2016b). DB Netz plans to increase the 
infrastructure fees by between 2.0 and 2.8% per annum until 2020, despite 
steadily increased profits. However, a new and cheaper pricing category was 
also introduced, which enables RUs to run services which do not connect the 
main metropolises at a reduced price level (DB Netz 2016c, DB Netz 2017a, DB 
Netz 2018c). 
The high RACs have a negative influence on open access competition, this 
factor might not be the “killer” of competition, but it harms the passenger rail 
sector in general (Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017, Participant C 2017). 
Examples show that most competitors use cheaper, slower paths (Participant 
A). It also reveals that the higher the prices for infrastructure, the less likely 
competition becomes (Participant B 2017). 
6.2.2.8. Access to distribution systems 
Free access to distribution systems does not exist in Germany: the market for 
rail ticketing is dominated by the incumbents’ sales subsidiary DB Vertrieb. It 
provides a variety of sales channels with a high coverage rate, in rural and 
urban areas: sales offices in stations, ticket machines, online sales, mobile 
ticketing, travel agencies, hotline and on board the trains (DB Vertrieb 2018). 




DB’s online and mobile information and ticketing system is highly accepted by 
users and has over a million clicks every day. By now, more than 40% of DB 
passenger transport tickets are sold online or via mobile ticketing (Heuzeroth 
2010, DB 2018a).  
Despite several requests, DB did not open its distribution system to open 
access competitors in general (Doll 2014c, Monopolkommission 2015). When 
InterConnex started operations in 2002, DB refused to sell its tickets and did not 
show InterConnex’s timetable information in its national timetable system. 
InterConnex filed a lawsuit against DB and won: timetable information of all 
competitors had to be added to DB’s information media (Handelsblatt 2003, 
Participant A 2017). HKX was interested in entering DB’s distribution channels 
and was rejected. In 2015, it rebranded into a regional transport provider and 
renegotiated with DB. In 2015, it entered a ticketing cooperation, with a cross-
acceptance of specific tickets. However, the cooperation ended in summer 2016 
due to missed objectives and problems with the reservation included on HKX’s 
trains. The sales cooperation with DB did not result in the significantly higher 
profits HKX expected (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016, Participant A 2017, 
Participant B 2017). Within five years, FlixMobility sold coach tickets to more 
than 100 million passengers over its distribution platform. From August 2017 
onwards, it also sold Locomore tickets, around 70,000 in the first four months, 
which is considered a success. FlixMobility states that customers ask for 
intermodal tickets and also use a combination of rail and coach. Between March 
and December 2018, it plans to sell 500,000 train tickets (Spiegel 2017, FAZ 
2017, FlixBus 2018b, Spiegel 2018).  
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Critics state that DB used its strong market position to discriminate against 
competitors in recent years, especially regarding regional transport competitors: 
the Federal Cartel Office opened a lawsuit against DB in 2014. It resulted in a 
proposal from DB to adapt the system, enabling regional RUs to sell DB Fv’s 
tickets at a balanced sales provision. Consequently, the lawsuit was closed 
(Monopolkommission 2015, NEE-Bahnen 2015, DB 2015a). In the past it was 
almost impossible to sell tickets of open access competitors at DB stations: it 
was difficult and expensive to rent a sales office inside the stations and most 
rental contracts prohibited the shops, e.g. kiosks, from selling tickets. This 
changed with the implementation of the ERegG in 2016 (Monopolkommission 
2015, Deutscher Bundesrat 2016).  
The access to distribution systems is important for open access providers, but 
the importance has declined in recent years. This is due to new technological 
possibilities via online and mobile ticketing platforms and independent ticketing 
providers (e.g. Trainline, Go Euro). The existing examples show that alternative 
distribution channels can be established relatively easily. DB states that online 
channels and mobile solutions are the future in ticket distribution (Heuzeroth 
2010, DB 2016b). The importance of access to DB’s distribution system is also 
dependent on the OD: point-to-point tickets depend less on the incumbents’ 
distribution. The more interchanges customers needed to reach their 
destination, the more unlikely it became that customers chose the competitor 
due to the variety of separate tickets (Participant A 2017). Examples show the 
access to DB’s distribution system would be an advantage for open access 
competitors and would most likely result in higher passenger figures (Doll 
2014d, Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017, Participant C 2017). The 
opening of the distribution monopoly of DB is not planned, however, it is 




expected that the EU will force a change or an opening soon 
(Monopolkommission 2015, Participant C 2017). In addition, the example of 
FlixMobility reveals how effective and successful a cooperation with big 
distribution partners and intermodal competitors can be, through avoiding the 
previously existing entry barriers.  
6.2.2.9. Presence of intermodal competitors  
The presence of intermodal competition in Germany plays a big role for RUs. 
The main intermodal competitor is motorised private transport, it holds 79.9% of 
the modal split. It is followed by air (5.3%) and coach/bus transport (6.8%) 
(Umweltbundesamt 2018). In 2017, 46 million cars are registered, this means 
0.55 cars for each inhabitant, which is high in international comparison 
(Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt 2018). 24 million passengers used inner-German flights 
in 2017 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018a). 23 million passengers used coaches 
in 2017 on more than 300 lines, this is 16% of long-distance rail’s total amount 
(FlixBus 2018d, Statistisches Bundesamt 2018b). 
Competition between airlines and railways can be observed for several years in 
Germany, especially on distances around 300-500 km. DB adapted its pricing 
system and introduced yield management to be more competitive against 
airlines (Heuermann & Delfmann 2009). The market entry of low-cost airlines 
further reinforced air-rail competition since it influenced rail ticket pricing (DB 
2016a, Participant A 2017). The entry of Germanwings on the Hamburg–
Cologne/Düsseldorf route influenced HKX’s planned timetable and business 
plan (Schwenn 2014). The entry of low-cost airlines, e.g. on the Frankfurt-Berlin 
route, make business for open access providers like Locomore more difficult 
(Participant C 2017).  
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Coach providers have several competitive advantages over long-distance rail: 
production costs for coaches are lower, the flexibility in route planning is higher, 
no fixed infrastructure costs exist, and rolling stock is cheaper and faster to 
access (Schlesiger 2014c, Monopolkommission 2015). While the coach market 
expanded rapidly, prices have fallen dramatically since 2013: an average 
regular fare costs ca. 9 cents/km while special offers costs less than 4 cents/km 
(Grimaldi et al. 2017). Thus, the existence of coach competition puts high 
pressure on the open access providers, regarding numbers of passengers and 
ticket prices (BNetzA 2016, Participant B 2017, Participant C 2017): when 
InterConnex exited the market in 2014, CEO Schreyer stated that the main 
reason was coaches offering cheaper prices. On an economic level 
InterConnex could no longer compete (ZDF 2014, Schlesiger 2014c, Participant 
A 2017). HKX has similar problems, due to the high number of coaches 
between Cologne and Hamburg, HKX had to compete with the low prices and a 
decreasing number of passengers. HKX reduced the number of connections to 
run only at weekends with higher demand (Döring 2014, Schlesiger 2014b). The 
effects on HKX were not only primary but also secondary, since DB Fv also 
started to adapt its strategy toward the new coach-competition and changed its 
pricing structure by offering more discounted tickets and special prices 
(Participant A 2017). Slowly but surely, market consolidation on the coach 
market can be observed, leading to increased prices: after five years of 
operations, one dominant company, FlixBus, holds a market share of over 90% 
(Schwenn 2016, Doll 2017). There is a strong lobby which sees the competition 
between long-distance rail and coaches as unfair due to the absence of charges 
for road infrastructure (Spiegel online 2015, Participant C 2017). A toll fee is 
expected to be introduced for coaches in the coming years (Handelsblatt 




2017a). However, intermodal competition can also be an opportunity for open 
access providers: Locomore was taken over by FlixMobility and LEO and 
started operations again in August 2017, after its insolvency in May. The first 
months of operations show that Locomore could be saved by the bus company, 
as well as the operations on HKX’s lines (Handelsblatt 2017b).  
The examples show that intermodal competition influences open access 
competition in Germany. The fast and effective market entry of coaches played 
a particularly big role in recent years, influencing the overall price of mobility 
and was especially attractive to price-sensitive customers (Participant A 2017, 
Participant C 2017). This resulted in the market withdrawal of InterConnex and 
HKX. DB Fv was also forced to react and lowered its prices. All in all, new 
competitors are able to deal with competition from motorised private transport, 
its modal split has been relatively constant in recent years and it is the main 
competitor (Participant B 2017). It was the market entry of airlines and 
especially coaches that had a major impact for the existence of competitors, 
especially regarding their profitability, and might have frightened other 
prospective operators (Schlesiger 2014c, Monopolkommission 2015). But it is 
also an opportunity as FlixMobility in cooperation with LEO shows in the case of 
Locomore and HKX.  
6.2.2.10. Existence of network effects 
Long-distance passenger rail in Germany is considered as a fixed, interlinked 
system and a finely branched network: the more changes passengers have to 
make to reach their destinations, the more likely network effects are. The 
incumbent operates on the entire network with a relatively high overall 
frequency which provides it with network effects (Monopolkommission 2013, 
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Participant A 2017). DB Fv’s network effects result from DB’s distribution 
system, which is closed to competitors, as well as its customer loyalty tools, 
such as the “Bahncard”. “Bahncard” offers a discount system in stages, over 
five million DB customers possess such a card (DB 2018a).  
The incumbent’s network effects affect HKX and Locomore directly. Both 
operators’ tickets were generally not sold by DB’s distribution system which 
forced customers to buy several tickets for their journey if they needed to 
change trains en route (Preuß 2013, Locomore 2017a). It can be observed that 
HKX-customers had fewer changes than average rail customers, since they 
mostly travelled point-to-point (Participant A 2017). DB Fv’s network effects led 
to further risks for open access operators: they theoretically enable DB Fv to 
fight tough price wars against competitors on some lines, cross-financing the 
losses with network benefits from other lines (Participant B 2017). This has not 
happened in the past, but this theoretical option may discourage possible 
investors and reduces the likelihood of accessing financing (Participant A 2017). 
By building a new network, open access competitors can theoretically also profit 
from network effects. The case of Locomore and FlixTrain shows that by 
including the company in FlixBus’s distribution platform, an independent 
network was created. FlixMobility states that customers combine both 
transportation modes to reach more destinations (Spiegel 2017).  
In recent years, a slight change regarding the power of network effects can be 
observed: due to technological possibilities, people, especially younger 
generations, plan their trips differently and compare prices via search engines. 
Increased price-sensitivity also leads to a higher acceptance of inconvenience 
and complexity, also regarding tickets. This might lead to the scenario where 
network effects play a lesser role in the future (Participant A 2017). Overall, DB 




Fv has substantial network effects, even if these are difficult to quantify 
(Monopolkommission 2013). DB Fv’s network effects influence open access 
competitors, but they are not “deal-breakers”. However, they lower profitability 
and make existence in the long run more difficult (Participant C 2017). They are 
also a market entry barrier since they reduce the entrants’ profitability and might 
deter investors (Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017). The examples also 
show that access to other networks can be an opportunity for open access 
providers.  
6.2.2.11. Generally low profitability 
Generally low profitability in the long-distance passenger rail market can be 
observed in Germany. By targeting price-sensitive customers, competitors 
suffer high cost pressure to be profitable. The main cost drivers for every RU 
are path access charges, energy costs, station costs, rolling stock charges, 
personnel and overhead costs (Everis 2010). A study by BNetzA shows that 
only a third of all RUs in Germany, mostly big RUs, could cover their costs by 
profits from the core businesses in 2015. DB Fv operates its network profitably, 
some of its lines earn solid profits, others need to be cross-subsidised by these 
profits. BNetzA observes a declining return on sales rate ever since the market 
entry of coaches in 2013 and estimates an average return on sales rate of 4.4% 
in 2016, which is especially influenced by DB Fv’s high market share of 99%. 
The average revenue rate was 10.2 EUR Cent per passenger-km (DB 2016c, 
BNetzA 2017c).  
Examples from the market show that due to the low-price level and the high 
cost level, profitability is rarely achieved by open access operators: during its 
whole period of operations, InterConnex struggled for profitability and barely 
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reached break-even (Doll 2014c, Participant A 2017). Shortly before market 
exit, InterConnex paid high infrastructure costs at a low average ticket price, 
which led to substantial losses (Schlesiger 2014c, ZDF 2014). This resulted in 
its market exit (Doll 2014c). HKX also struggled with profitability ever since the 
start of operations. Originally, HKX planned to reach break-even within two to 
four years, which was not possible. In 2013 it made a loss of up to 4 million 
EUR (Döring 2014, Breitinger 2016a). After five months of operations, 
Locomore filed for insolvency in May 2017. The number of passengers and the 
average ticket price were not enough to cover the operating costs of 10 million 
EUR per year. Originally, Locomore planned to make the business profitable 
within three months and planned a positive EBITA of 44,000 EUR in the first 
year (Rail Business 2015, Locomore 2017e). In the first 100 days, it transported 
70,000 passengers, with average operational costs of 25,000 EUR for a one-
way trip between Stuttgart and Berlin (Locomore 2017f, Böll 2017).  
The examples show how difficult it is to earn money with open access 
competition: the high cost structure and the low rate of return remain a great 
challenge and have a highly negative influence on competition (Participant A 
2017, Böll 2017). RUs cannot compete with other industries regarding 
profitability, “you do not run trains for high returns” (Participant B 2017). 
Consequently, “the generally low profitability of the industry often led to bloody 
noses when talking to possible investors” (Participant A 2017). It is expected 
that higher profitability would lead to easier financing and more competition in 
the market (Participant B 2017). Examples shows that the operators were 
mostly not motivated by profitability, but had a great degree of idealism and 
passion for rail (Participant B 2017, Participant C 2017). 
 




6.2.2.12. Access to financing 
Access to financing in the German railway industry is provided for all railway 
companies. Investment in the rail market is relatively attractive due to its dense 
network and its central location in Europe. However, a difference between types 
of transport and ownership of companies can be observed. DB is fully state-
owned and therefore backed up by government funds. DB is rated Aa1 at 
Moody’s and AA- at S&P global ratings, which allows it to access capital easily 
and on good conditions (Monopolkommission 2015, DB 2018a).  
For private open access competitors, access to financing is more difficult. The 
rail investor Henry Posner III. was HKX’s main investor. By 2013, 16 million 
EUR had already been invested in the company. With a passion for the railway 
industry, Posner actively shaped HKX’s strategy and had a long-term-interest in 
HKX. He describes himself as a “patient investor” (Kirnich 2013, Schlesiger 
2014d, NDR 2016). Locomore had substantial problems to obtain financing from 
banks and institutional investors (Neuhaus 2016). It decided to focus on private 
investors and started a crowdfunding campaign: more than 700,000 EUR was 
collected before the start of operations (Locomore 2017b, Participant C 2017). 
ROSCO SRI also invested in the refurbishment of coaches (Scherer 2016, 
Participant C 2017). Derschnellzug.de stated that it had found an anonymous 
main investor who planned to invest 1.25 million EUR. However, due to the 
uncertainty of rolling stock and paths’ availability, the investor withdrew and 
market entry was cancelled (derschnellzug.de 2016). 
Experience shows that investors are interested in supporting open access 
competition in Germany at first. However, when they investigate the market 
further, they withdraw their finance. This is due to low profitability, potential 
PhD Thesis Lisa Feuerstein 
187 
 
danger of discrimination by the incumbent in a vertically integrated holding 
structure, and its high market power, and the long-term character of the 
investment, especially if new rolling stock is acquired (Participant A 2017, 
Participant C 2017). Another obstacle is that few institutional financiers exist, 
with most of them being “spoiled” by regional transport: long-term contracts 
exist which provide more security with steady payment of subsidies (Participant 
C 2017). Consequently, the acquiring of financing is possible, but it remains a 
tricky task for open access competitors and it requires creativity. Financing 
plays a major role for market entry and the lack of willing investors clearly 
complicates competition and prevents market entry (Monopolkommission 2015, 
Participant C 2017, Participant B 2017). 
6.2.2.13. Cooperation with other transport modes  
Cooperation with other transport modes can also take different forms in 
Germany: most common are cooperation with airlines, coach providers, car and 
bike sharing systems. DB is trying to build an intermodal mobility network, also 
cooperating with different intermodal partners (DB 2018a). For example, DB 
cooperates with ca. 60 airlines to bring airline customers to airports, providing 
“Rail&Fly” tickets (DB 2018c). After its start of operations, HKX planned to 
cooperate with coach providers after market liberalisation to expand its network, 
but such a cooperation never took place, except for the short ticketing 
cooperation with FlixMobility (Preuß 2013, Handelsblatt 2017b). The 
cooperation between LEO and FlixMobility proved to be more beneficial for 
open access competition: with LEO providing the railway experience and being 
the operator and FlixMobility providing the market experience and the 
distribution platform. This cooperation saved Locomore after its insolvency and 
attracted more customers than before (Handelsblatt 2017b, Locomore 2018). 




Participant A (2017) states that cooperation with other transport modes only 
makes sense if an individual network could be created in addition to the existing 
network. For most competitors, like HKX in its beginnings, cooperation with 
intermodal players provided little benefits and was associated with much time-
consuming work (Participant B 2017). However, the case of FlixMobility shows 
that an effect exists and that under the right conditions, it can be the factor 
which leads to success.  
6.2.2.14. Possibility for cherry-picking 
The possibility for cherry-picking in Germany exists if subsidised regional 
transport is not cannibalised (Schwilling & Bunge 2013). From a commercial 
viewpoint, cherry-picking is attractive for operators since several highly 
frequented and profitable lines exist, e.g. between Frankfurt-Berlin, Berlin-
Hamburg, Munich-Hamburg, Stuttgart-Frankfurt and Cologne-Frankfurt. The 
question is where cherry-picking begins and what is considered as a “cherry” 
(Participant A 2017). Cherry-picking can exist to different degrees: some 
competitors run a high frequency service and hold high market shares, others 
only run a limited number of trains per day on “cherry-lines” (Participant B 2017, 
Participant C 2017). Planned and existing offers already focus on such “cherry-
lines”: Locomore ran between Stuttgart-Frankfurt-Berlin, MSM planned to run 
between Cologne-Frankfurt-Berlin and Cologne-Frankfurt-Hamburg and HKX 
operated the Cologne-Hamburg line. However, up to now, no competitor does 
real cherry-picking: InterConnex only ran on secondary lines and HKX and 
Locomore provided a small number of daily trains without a high market share 
(Participant B 2017). Overall, open access competition would not be possible in 
a market like Germany without cherry-picking. The conditions for cherry-picking 
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exist which enabled some competitors to start (Participant A 2017, Participant B 
2017). It also gives them the prospect of upscaling their services in the future. 
However, cherry-picking mostly implies a problem of capacity since the 
destinations are often characterised by a high frequency of connections 
(Participant C 2017). 
6.2.2.15. Customers’ willingness to pay  
Most German rail passengers, especially in leisure travel, are price-sensitive 
and have a relatively low willingness to pay (DB 2015b, Participant A 2017, 
Participant C 2017, DB 2018b). BNetzA observes a decreasing price level of 
mobility from 2014 onwards, after the liberalisation of the coach market. It also 
finds that ticket prices are a crucial use factor for rail (BNetzA 2017c). DB Fv 
has an image of being rather expensive, open access competitors use the 
customers’ low willingness to pay as a competitive advantage (Participant A 
2017): InterConnex offered prices 50% below the level of DB Fv’s standard 
price (Monopolkommission 2009). HKX and Locomore used the same pricing 
level, expecting to attract more rail passengers due to their low prices. 
FlixTrain’s prices may also be found in the same pricing range. Like DB Fv, all 
RUs varied or vary prices depending on the expected occupancy (Przybilla 
2012, Schlesiger 2015, Breitinger 2016b). Add-ons like upgrades to business 
class or an unoccupied seat next to the customer’s booked seat as seen at HKX 
proved as difficult to sell (Participant A 2017). Especially before the 
liberalisation of the coach market, the low-price strategy worked well for open 
access competitors (Participant A 2017). However, with the market entry of low-
cost coach providers in 2013/2014, customers’ willingness to pay was further 
reduced. Participant C (2017) states that “price sensitivity kills customer loyalty” 
and observes that if another provider offers a cheaper price, a high percentage 




of customers will switch. The reduced willingness to pay also influenced DB Fv, 
which did not increase fares in 2014 and 2015, despite increased cost pressure 
(DB 2016c). It lowered fares and increased the number of discounted tickets. 
This made it even harder for open access competitors to compete against the 
incumbent and the coach operators (Participant A 2017). The customer groups 
with a higher willingness to pay, often business travellers, set expectations 
which in most cases only the incumbent could fulfil: for example, they require 
high flexibility which most open access providers cannot offer due to low 
frequency and low network coverage. HKX and Locomore also ran on slower 
paths and could not provide the same travel time as DB Fv can (Handelsblatt 
2016a). This leads to the fact that DB Fv covers a wider group with very 
different willingness to pay and thus has a competitive advantage over the low-
cost competitors (Participant B 2017).  
Since willingness to pay directly affects the number of passengers and the 
earnings per ticket, it plays a major role for open access competition 
(Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017). Before the market entry of coaches, 
the low willingness to pay was a competitive advantage for open access 
providers over the relatively expensive incumbent. Since the emergence of 
cheap intermodal coach competitors and a price reduction in the incumbent’s 
tickets, the customers’ low willingness to pay makes it difficult for competitors to 
stay successful in the market. However, since the consolidation of the coach 








The German case shows that entrepreneurship and the persistence of some 
investors and entrepreneurs plays a big role in the existence of open access 
competition. “You have to be crazy in order to offer open access competition,” 
states Participant A (2017). To enter the market and stay in the market, it is 
necessary that the managers have a clear vision and are persistent and driven 
because it is a stony path to success (Participant A 2017, Participant C 2017). A 
central player in German open access competition is Derek Ladewig, who 
founded Locomore in 2007. Previously, he worked in mobility and 
transportation, inter alia for local public transport and the Bundestag. He also 
initiated HKX together with the investor, Posner, in 2009. He is determined to 
compete in the market, has a passion for railways and is prepared to take high 
risks (Neuhaus 2016, Locomore 2017a, Locomore 2017c). The American 
investor and entrepreneur Henry Posner III is CEO of RDC and started his 
business in the 1970s in freight rail. HKX is one of his German subsidiaries, and 
his company also runs a shuttle to the island of Sylt. Posner has an emotional 
connection to rail transport and is a patient investor. Despite the difficult 
economic situation of HKX, he stayed in the market for a long time, and was 
determined to make his investments successful (Schlesiger 2014a, NDR 2016). 
The two entrepreneurs who planned to enter the market with MSM and 
derschnellzug.de, Niko Maedge and Johannes Zimmer, also have a background 
in rail and enthusiasm for the product (Wüpper 2013, Maxwill 2015, Xing 2017).  
It becomes apparent that the entrepreneurs and investors involved mostly have 
a background in rail, are often strong advocates for rail transport products and 
show a fascination for rail. This is necessary since the industry is complex and 
an understanding of railways is necessary to enter the market (Participant B 




2017). The entrepreneurs are to some degree idealists who were prepared to 
take great risks in an otherwise risk-averse market (Participant B 2017, 
Participant C 2017). Therefore this factor influences open access competition in 
Germany.  
6.2.2.17. Access to rolling stock 
The procurement and leasing of long-distance rolling stock in Germany is 
considered difficult. This has several reasons: firstly, no real market for second-
hand coaches and trainsets exists. Secondly, leasing of trainsets and coaches 
is equally hard due to non-availability of suitable vehicles (Participant A 2017, 
Participant B 2017, HKX 2013). Thirdly, the procurement of first-hand rolling 
stock is possible in theory, but heavily dependent on financing (Participant A 
2017, Participant C 2017). The procurement and leasing of locomotives is not 
considered problematical, as the market for locomotives has been liberalised for 
15 years (Participant B 2017, Participant C 2017). For years, former DB CEO 
Mehdorn followed a restrictive rolling stock sales strategy which led to a lack of 
suitable second-hand vehicles on the market (Breitinger 2016a, Participant C 
2017). Today, DB’s strategy has changed, but due to DB Fv’s own shortage of 
rolling stock, only a limited number of vehicles are being sold (Busse & Kuhr 
2013, DB 2017c).  
Despite the difficulties, all open access providers used and use second-hand 
rolling stock (Participant A 2017): in 2002, InterConnex started by using second-
hand DMUs equipped for regional transport from a Transdev subsidiary. For 
later expansion, it bought 25 second-hand coaches, originally owned by DB 
(Participant A 2017). In 2009, HKX bought old ÖBB-coaches that were originally 
procured by the Reichsbahn in the 1970s. Originally, HKX planned to start 
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operations in 2010, but the coaches needed technical alterations and 
comprehensive refurbishment, which, among other factors, lead to a delay in 
market entry (HKX 2014b, Schlesiger 2014d, Participant A 2017). HKX decided 
to lease second-hand coaches from several partners like Nord-Ostsee-Bahn 
and BahnTouristikExpress (HKX 2015). Derschnellzug.de also planned to rent 
coaches, however, due to the leasing company’s need to use the coaches for 
its own services, no agreement could be achieved (derschnellzug.de 2016). In 
2016, Locomore leased its coaches from SRI investment corporation. SRI 
bought the old DB-coaches in the Netherlands which were fully refurbished in 
Romania. Due to delays, it had to rent some non-refurbished coaches to run the 
services after market entry (Briginshaw 2016, Breitinger 2016a). In comparison 
to the open access competitors, DB Fv procures new rolling stock, which ties up 
great amounts of capital (40.8 million EUR for ICE 4 trains, 17 million EUR for 
Intercity trains) (Handelsblatt 2013, Focus 2016, Doll 2016a). Locomore 
considered buying new rolling stock from Siemens, but the plan failed due to 
insufficient financing (Participant C 2017).  
Overall, the access to rolling stock has a high influence on the existence of 
competition (Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017), it is even considered as 
the main influencing factor by Participant C (2017). The history of open access 
competitors shows that the search for suitable rolling stock took a long time and 
was difficult. The prices for procuring new and second-hand rolling stock were 
considered as particularly frightening for investors (Participant A 2017). A 
chance for new competitors could therefore occur if current operators in 
Germany or central Europe leave the market and sell the rolling stock at 
moderate prices (Participant A 2017).  
 




6.2.2.18. Homologation process 
In theory, a homologation decision or vehicle authorisation must be made by the 
EBA within four months of the submission of all required documents (EBA 
2016). In practice, however, the vehicle authorisation in Germany is considered 
as one of the most complicated in Europe. It is often described as slow with too 
little staff to examine and process application and rules that are too strict. Also, 
no satisfying communication existed between the EBA and RUs in the past. The 
status was even considered as a “homologation crisis”, since it posed problems 
for market entry and was considered a serious bottleneck for incumbent and 
competitors (Monopolkommission 2011, Siedenbiedel 2013, Doll 2014b, 
Participant A 2017). After several complaints, the regulation was improved: in 
2012 serial approval of rolling stock was allowed; in 2013 a memorandum of 
understanding was signed which allowed selected private inspection bodies to 
support the EBA which allowed it to focus on the core parts; in 2015 the “rail 
TÜV”, came into action (EBA 2013b, Doll 2014b, BMVI 2014b). In 2009, HKX 
bought second-hand rolling stock from ÖBB and planned to start operations in 
2010. However, since the technical changes were too comprehensive and 
problems with the partner occurred, an attempt to homologate the coaches 
during this time failed (Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017). In 2014, the 
modernised coaches were finally homologated within the new “rail TÜV” 
process and HKX was satisfied with the cooperation of the EBA (Schlesiger 
2014d, HKX 2014b, Participant C 2017).  
The vehicle authorisation has improved significantly since 2012 (Participant A 
2017, Participant B 2017). However, the “homologation crisis” had long-term 
consequences and still frightens investors (Participant A 2017). It is not the 
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process itself that is considered critical for market entry, but the effort 
associated with homologation/authorisation and the preparation for it 
(Participant B 2017). It only plays an indirect role in Germany and it poses equal 
challenges to both incumbent and competitors (Participant C 2017). 
6.2.2.19. Incumbent’s performance 
Due to its size and market power, the performance of the incumbent plays a big 
role in Germany. DB Fv was only founded in 1994, but it has a longer history: 
when Reichsbahn and Bundesbahn were merged in 1994, their assets, image 
and staff were taken over, with some of them still working for the company 
(Schwilling & Bunge 2013). DB Fv is a large company which serves the existing 
market with more than 99% market share, operating a dense network with a 
high frequency of trains (Monopolkommission 2015). In 2017, DB Fv 
transported 142 million passengers and obtained a total of 40 billion passenger 
kilometres (DB 2018a). This makes it difficult for competitors to enter the market 
on a large scale. InterConnex’s CEO Schreyer says that profitable operations 
were not possible on other lines of the network, since DB’s network was too 
dense (Smith 2015). Some consider DB Fv as “too big to compete with”, since 
the sheer size of the company deters investors, regardless of actual 
discrimination (Participant C 2017). In 2015, DB Fv further announced 
expansion into rural areas by connecting more cities and offering a higher 
frequency. Thus, it plans to operate 160 million train kilometres in 2030 on 135 
million train kilometres today (DB Fv 2016). DB Fv has a strong market position 
and is among the leading RUs in Europe. The company adapts relatively well to 
changes: regarding intermodal competition it adapted its pricing system to be 
more competitive against air transport, and it further adapted its pricing level 
and special offers to compete with coaches (Heuermann & Delfmann 2009, 




Participant B 2017). It also covers a relatively wide portfolio of customers which 
is a competitive advantage over open access providers since they mostly attract 
price-sensitive customers (DB 2016b, Participant B 2017). Still, DB Fv has a 
slightly negative image for being late and overpriced, which is not the case for 
competitors (Przybilla 2012, Maxwill 2015, Zimmermann 2016). This results in 
relatively low customer loyalty and a possible switching of customers to 
competitors (Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017).  
Despite DB Fv’s size, the history shows no significant discrimination of DB Fv 
against competitors (Participant A 2017): when InterConnex entered the market 
in 2002, DB refused to include the competitor in the timetable information 
system. After a court decision, it was forced to do so and implemented 
InterConnex’s connections (Handelsblatt 2003, Participant A 2017). In 2012, 
when HKX entered the market, DB Fv decided to set refurbished IC-coaches on 
the Hamburg-Rhine/Ruhr-Stuttgart line to provide better quality and to 
differentiate itself from the competitor (Wäschenbach 2012, Rünker 2012). In 
2015, when HKX expended its lines to Frankfurt, more discounted DB Fv tickets 
were available on the internet (Pieren 2015). But when InterConnex, HKX and 
Locomore started operations, no price war could be observed, as had been the 
case in the Czech Republic and Austria (Participant A 2017, Participant C 
2017). Participant C (2017) states that as long as competitors in the market are 
on a small scale, little is done against them. The case of coach competitors, 
however, shows that as soon as competition endangers DB Fv, it is able to 
react to competitive threats. 
As shown above, at the level of DB holding, more incidents and law suits 
appeared: e.g. the increased station prices of DB Station & Service on the 
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Hamburg-Cologne line when HKX entered the market, the traction pricing 
discount system of DB Energy, and the unbalanced distribution conditions 
between DB Vertrieb and private regional RUs. All in all, it becomes apparent 
that DB Fv as part of DB holding has the power to discriminate against 
competitors, but has rarely used it in the past and is considered a fair market 
player (Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017). However, the sheer potential to 
discriminate against entrants has an effect on competition, e.g. by deterring 
potential investors (Participant A 2017, Participant C 2017). The image of being 
unpunctual, providing bad quality and being too expensive helped competitors 
in the past to gain more customers since the customers’ willingness to switch 
was high (Participant A 2017, Participant B 2017). The biggest influence on 
open access competition is the size and the strong market penetration which 
DB Fv possesses: this makes it hard for competitors to find free attractive train 
paths and profitable lines (Participant C 2017). 
6.2.3.  Characterising the correlation of factors influencing the German 
case  
In the German case, the most significant correlation of influencing factors 
regarding open access competition is “intermodal competition” with “customers’ 
willingness to pay” and “low profitability in the industry”. With the liberalisation of 
the coach market, fierce competition and the resulting, extensive offer of low-
price tickets, the customers’ overall willingness to pay for mobility services fell 
drastically. This forced incumbent and competitors to reduce their prices and 
lowered their profitability with the consequence that InterConnex left the market, 
Locomore went bankrupt, and HKX is run by FlixMobility.  




Another strong correlation applies between “availability of financing” and 
“availability of rolling stock”, in connection with “availability of attractive train 
paths”. The guaranteed access to available train paths over a longer period is in 
most cases the pre-condition to attract investors and obtain access to the 
necessary financing in Germany. Without the existence of sufficient funds, no 
rolling stock can be bought since leasing of rolling stock is not easily possible.  
The influencing factors “law in the books”, “law in action” and “incumbent’s 
performance” are also connected. After the Bahnreform in 1994, the applicable 
law in the books was implemented relatively quickly and the necessary 
institutions were established to prevent discrimination against market 
competitors. This led to the situation that DB Fv and DB holding in general 
caused no major discrimination against competitors as seen in other countries. 
The few cases were processed by institutions and taken to court.  
The relatively high “costs for infrastructure” in Germany are also connected to 
the “low profitability in the industry”. This leads to a high cost basis, which the 
operators have to consider in economic terms. Consequently, the economic risk 
of entering the market is higher.  
6.2.4.   Characterising the shift of factors influencing the German case 
The most significant shift in influencing factors is “intermodal competition”. 
Before coach market liberalisation in 2013, apart from cars, intermodal 
competition only had a modest influence on open access competition. With the 
entry of several new competitors that introduced services on many lines 
nationwide, the factor influenced open access competition negatively. The case 
of InterConnex and HKX proves this, it even had an influence on the profitability 
of the incumbent. The takeover of Locomore and HKX demonstrates the market 
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power of the coach competitors and also opens possibilities for future 
competitors to cooperate with these market players.  
With the introduction of coach competition, “customers’ willingness to pay” also 
changed. Within a few years, average ticket prices fell, especially for the small 
competitors which needed to compete with the coach competitors directly. This 
factor had a slightly positive influence before the liberalisation of the coach 
market, since the competitors offered cheaper prices than the incumbent and 
could therefore attract price-sensitive customers. With the market opening, the 
price-sensitive customers used coach services and the open access 
competitors struggled with profitability to meet the customers’ price 
expectations. Therefore, this factor influenced open access competitors 
negatively.  
“Homologation” also changed over the years and the influence of this factor on 
open access competition improved. In the past, it was difficult and time-
consuming to homologate new or refurbished rolling stock. With the new law in 
the books and in action, the homologation process sped up and it is now easier 
for competitors to homologate rolling stock. Therefore, the influencing factor 
shifted from the negative side to neutral and seems not to be a major entry 
barrier.  
The factor “access to distribution system” also changed over recent years. DB 
Vertrieb still does not allow any operator in the long-distance passenger rail to 
enter its distribution system. However, technological possibilities and the wide 
spread of smartphones made it easier for competitors to create their own 
distribution system. The advantage of those new distribution channels is that 
they are often cheaper than the system which the incumbent provides. The 




case of FlixMobility also shows the impact a partnership or a merger with a 
company which has a functioning distribution system can have. Therefore this 
influencing factor shifted from negative to slightly positive.  
6.3.  Competition between equal and unequal players: the Italian case 
The Italian case is of high interest, since big changes took place in the last 15 
years, especially with the opening of the high-speed lines. With the separation 
of infrastructure and operations in 2000, the starting point for market 
liberalisation was set and open access competition has been allowed since 
2003 for purely commercial services. At the beginning, companies trying to 
establish niche services entered the market. In 2012 the first European high-
speed rail competitor started operations (Bergantino 2015). The following 
section presents the Italian case, revealing how open access competition 
developed over time and which interactions exist with the incumbent, politicians, 
authorities and other players. Firstly, a description of the case context is given 
to introduce the case. In the main part, the influencing factors on Italian 
competition are described, as well as their mutual correlation and their shift over 
time. 
6.3.1.  Setting the Italian case in context  
While implementing EU regulations into national law, full open access was 
permitted from 2003 onwards for all licenced long-distance passenger rail 
operators, but only for purely commercial services such as on the high-speed 
network. This formed the basis for the existence of open access competition in 
Italy, together with the separation of IM RFI and the incumbent TI in 2000. 
However, it took several years to establish the necessary institutions and bodies 
to monitor and control the rail market. With the market entry of NTV, a shift 
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within the country took place and conditions for competitors were improved. The 
key market players in the Italian case are described below:  
The incumbent Trenitalia S.p.A was founded in 2000 with the implementation of 
the EU regulation into national law, together with the separation of rail 
infrastructure and operations. TI is part of FSI holding and focuses on providing 
regional, long-distance passenger and freight rail. It operates more than 150 
electric trains in the long-distance passenger sector, as well as more than 1,000 
locomotives and 5,000 coaches in overall passenger rail use (FSI 2018b). In 
conventional long-distance rail, TI has a market share of almost 100%, however 
it lost a market share of around 35% in the high-speed sector after the entry of 
NTV (Desmaris 2016, FSI 2017a, NTV 2018b). 
Company profile TI 2017 
CEO Orazio Iacono 
Daily trains 387* 
Employees  > 27,000 
Passenger km 16,303 million** 
Revenue  2,506 million EUR** 
EBIT 224 million EUR** 
* only high-speed and subsidised intercity connections 
** only for long-distance passenger connections  
Table 30: Company profile of TI (FSI 2018a, FSI 2018b) 
In December 2009, a cooperation between DB Fv and ÖBB Pv started 
operations on the Munich-Verona/Milan/Venice route, offering up to five daily 
train pairs. Previously, the line was run by a cooperation between DB/ÖBB and 
TI. After December 2009, the Italian company LeNord acted as service operator 
on Italian territory. The rolling stock consisted of ÖBB Pv’s railjet coaches (Doll 
& Tauber 2010, Warnecke & Götz 2012).  
TI’s first national competitor, Arenaways, was founded in 2006 by Guiseppe 
Arena, a former employee of TI. The company started by offering tourist charter 
trains and freight business. Later, it was the first company to enter the long-




distance passenger rail market in competition to TI (Bayer 2013). Arenaways 
operated two daily train pairs on the Turin-Milan line between November 2010 
and July 2011, when the company declared bankruptcy (Speciale 2011, 
Warnecke & Götz 2012). While an overall estimated 32,000 people travel daily 
between Turin and Milan, Arenaways transported an average of 50-60 
passengers (Speciale 2011). Arenaways operated with locomotives and new 
coaches which involved investment of 50 million EUR (Warnecke & Götz 2012).  
NTV was founded in 2006 by four influential Italian industrialists (Bayer 2013). 
In 2012, it started high-speed operations on the Rome-Milan, Rome-Turin and 
Rome-Venice lines with several daily train pairs (Warnecke 2014). NTV 
gradually expanded its business and increased the number of daily connections 
and lines (Bergantino 2015). NTV is expected to have a market share of 35% of 
the overall high-speed market (NTV 2018b). In 2015, NTV reached break-even 
for the first time, in the first two years NTV had made losses of 156 million EUR 
(Day 2014, Giuricin 2016). In 2017, NTV transported 12.8 million passengers 
with an EBITDA of 156 million EUR (NTV 2018a).  
6.3.2.  Characterisation of individual factors influencing the Italian case  
This section outlines the influencing factors in Italy and how they shaped open 
access competition since 2003, giving many examples from all market players 
observed. To give an overview, the following illustration summarises the 
analysed data and shows the strength of each identified influencing factor: 




Illustration 19: Overview of influencing factors in the Italian case (author’s own diagram)   
Table 31 below lists the key findings for all influencing factors. The factors 
identified as important for the case will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section.   
 















Existing EU and 
national law in the 
books  
High 
• Open access arrangements exist since 2003 
• Competitors can access without legal barriers when 
subsidised lines are not cannibalised  
2 
Existing law in 
action  High 
• Setting-up of independent bodies and institutions took 
over 10 years, which made discrimination possible 
• With independent regulator in place since 2012, great 
improvements took place for competitors 
3 
Access to facilities 
as well as data High 
• Gaps in regulation made discrimination possible  
• Improvement of access to facilities over time, especially 
with implementation of the Autoritá di Regolazione dei 
Trasporti (“ART”)   
4 
Access to and 
availability of 
attractive train paths 
High 
• Cases of discrimination existed in the past, especially 
with regards to denial of cabotage  
• Today, the high-speed network is easily accessed, 





politicians   
Medium 
• Attitude towards competition was ambivalent and mostly 
pessimistic 
• However, lobbying is possible with the right network and 
helps especially the national competitors   
6 Unbundling High 
• With the necessary institutions not yet in place, the 
incumbent discriminated against competitors  
• Improvements since the ART is fully set up 
7 




• The investment is below average in EU comparison 
• However, large sums were invested into the new high-
speed infrastructure, which triggered NTV’s market entry 
 
 






ability to subsidise 
operations in the 
country 
Medium 
• 40% of TI’s revenues come from subsidised services 
• Competition on the subsidised network is only possible 
in niches 
• On the high-speed network, subsidies have no influence 
9 Consumer policy Low 
• All legal requirements are implemented 











and market size High 
• High variations exist due to Italy’s polycentric structure 
• TI dominates the market, but additional potential exists 
on the high-speed network 




• RACs are in a medium range in the EU 
• RACs on the high-speed network were reduced by over 






• No general access to TI’s distribution system is given 
• To succeed, the setting up of a new distribution system 






• Cars are the biggest intermodal competitor in Italy, 
followed by air and coach transport 
• High-speed competition led to a switch from car and 
plane to train  
• Coach market liberalisation in 2014 had only little effect  
14 
Existence of 
network effects for 
incumbents 
Medium 
•  Network effects greatly vary: no significant effects in 
high-speed rail, higher effects in conventional rail  
• NTV generates network effects by adding bus 
connections, DB/ÖBB by partnering with TI   
15 
Generally low 
profitability of the 
industry 
High 
• Difficult to earn profits, for TI and competitors likewise  
• The strength of the factor is related to the financial 
resources of the competitor: NTV was saved due to an 
internal restructuring of debts, Arenaways went bankrupt  
16 Access to financing Medium 
• As a state-owned company, the access to financing is 
relatively easy for the incumbent 
• For entrants it is difficult to acquire financing, it is only 







• Cooperation within the industry plays a role, but it 
depends on the individual case how big the influence is 
• DB/ÖBB’s is dependent on the cooperation with TI 
18 
Cross-financing of 
RUs in the market 
and a lack of 
transparency 
Low 
• The accounting systems of RFI and TI are separated, 
and the cross-subsidising of public funds is prohibited 
• Cross-subsidising cannot be entirely ruled out, but no 







• TI and competitors cooperate with intermodal partners 
• The factor is expected to improve the business case, 




the market  
Medium 
• Cherry-picking is allowed on the high-speed network 
• It is difficult on the PSO network as the case of the 
forbidden intermediate stops of Arenaways shows  
• It highly influences the profitability of the competitors 








(strong) unions Low 
• Italy has more trade unionists than any other EU country 
• Due to the high number of strikes in Italy, unions have 
an influence on long-distance passenger rail 
• Equal conditions apply and no discrimination takes place 
22 Customer loyalty Low 
• Customer loyalty is relatively low in Italy, which is a 
chance for competition  
• TI as well as competitors provide loyalty programs 
23 Sharing economy Low 
• The sharing economy is developing fast in Italy 
• However, especially in high-speed rail it has no 
influence now but might change in the future  








• Adjustments to customer expectations plays a role, 
however premium prices cannot be charged  
• The adjustment of TI to changed customer expectations 
had a great influence on NTV and its profitability 
25 
Customers’ 
willingness to pay Medium 
• Customers’ willingness to pay is not especially high, but 
customer groups with higher willingness to pay exist 
• NTV’s strategy to offer premium quality for higher prices 
failed and resulted in lower overall prices    
26 Entrepreneurship Medium 
• Entrepreneurship plays an important role, especially 
before and during market entry 
• Entrepreneurs often have an emotional connection to 
rail and are prepared to take high risks  
27 




• The population wishes for diversification and 
improvement of quality, therefore an open and positive 
attitude towards competition exists 










Access to rolling 
stock Medium 
• Access to new rolling stock was given to all competitors 
with the necessary financial resources 
• Access to second-hand rolling stock is hardly given  
29 
Lack of technical 
harmonisation 
within the EU 
Low 
• Lacking harmonisation mainly influences cross-border 




• Innovation, e.g. in service and ticketing can make a 




• Italian National Railway Safety Agency (“ANSF”) awards 
homologations and the process is considered complex 
• Recent improvements took place due to clearer 




• The safety system is based on EU requirements, ANSF 
is responsible for national railway safety 
• It is considered complex and complicated, however no 






• Due to the currently high unemployment rate of young 









• TI has the power to discriminate against competitors and 
did so in the past, causing the bankruptcy of Arenaways 
• After NTV’s announcement to enter the market, TI 
changed to a modern and attractive transport provider 
Table 31: Key findings of the Italian case (author’s own diagram) 
6.3.2.1.  Law in the books and law in action   
Initially, the Railway Reforms in Italy started at a slow pace in the 1980s and it 
took many years to create law in the books that promoted open access 
competition. In 1998, however, a big step was taken with the vertical legal 
separation of the IM RFI and the RU TI, united under FSI holding, thereby 
satisfying the EU demand for market opening, starting with Directive 
91/440/EEC. In 2000, the development gained speed which resulted in law 
388/2000. With this law, Italian law in the books went further than the EU 




requirements. Decreto Legislativo n. 188/2003, implementing Directive 
2001/12/CE, 2001/13/CE and 2001/14/CE into Italian law, strengthened 
liberalisation further. “According to the degree, any authorised rail company can 
have access to the national RFI rail network and operate both open-access or 
contracted services” (Beria & Grimaldi 2017, p. 144 f.). International open 
access passenger services, including cabotage, are fully permitted since 2012 
(Bayer 2013, OECD 2013, Desmaris 2016, Beria & Grimaldi 2017).  
Despite the liberal law in the books, the government retained regulatory 
responsibility for railway companies. The Italian regulatory body was an office of 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (“MIT”), fulfilling Directive 14/2001. 
In 2012, an independent regulator, the ART, was set up by article 36 of Law 
27/2012, modifying Law 2001/2011. This was an important step since the 
authority was entrusted with the tasks of regulating rail’s infrastructure access 
conditions, imposing sanctions, carrying out investigations and audits, and 
defining the scope and obligations of PSOs and contract designs (OECD 2013). 
Regarding competition, the independence and strength of authorities and 
institutions plays a big role. Therefore this factor has a strong influence on open 
access competition (Participant F 2017). Despite being one of the pioneers 
providing legal possibilities for open access, the European directives were 
implemented slowly and with delays: despite showing an average delay of 
implementation into national law in European comparison, Italy and France 
show the highest number of infringements for non-conformity and incorrect 
application. This has resulted in negative consequences for competitors so far 
(OECD 2013, EC 2014b). What remains difficult is the incompleteness of the 
current regulatory framework with clear advantages for the incumbent TI, 
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especially the lack of clear identification of PSO, which makes it difficult for 
competitors to enter (OECD 2013, Participant D 2017). The case of Arenaways 
shows that when institutions and authorities are not designed strongly enough 
in law, they cannot protect competition (Participant F 2017). 
The formal liberalisation and the adaptation of European directives in law in 
action in Italy took a long time and was delayed compared to other European 
countries. The law in the books showed some gaps which made it possible for 
FSI to discriminate against operators, especially in the first years of competition 
(OECD 2013, Participant E 2017). One reason for that was that an office at the 
MIT, the Italian Railway Service Regulatory Office (“URSF”), had the role of 
independent regulator, but lacked de facto independence and power. Decisions 
were often made consensually and in a less competition-oriented way. Even if 
the ART was set up legally in 2012, it only started operating in January 2014 
and took over the main tasks of URSF (ART 2014, Participant D 2017, 
Desmaris & Croccolo 2018). Faiola (2013b) stated that “[p]art of the problem 
[…] is that Italy opened its train market well before establishing a fully 
independent transit regulator – something that only happened this summer”. 
The lacking strength of the independent regulator caused discrimination against 
competitors. Based on false and misleading statements of RFI and TI, URSF 
forbade cabotage on the Milan-Turin line by Arenaways. It also forbade 
cabotage by DB/ÖBB on the Italian network for some time. This resulted in 
economic difficulties for both competitors, and Arenaways went bankrupt. Italy’s 
Competition and Market Guarantee Authority (“Agcom”) investigated the case 
and found RFI and TI guilty of discrimination against Arenaways. This shows 
that Agcom has great power to intervene in case of complaints, which also 
happened after the market entry of NTV (Doll & Taber 2010, Chiandoni 2012, 




Beria et al. 2012). The issuing of Arenaways’ and NTV’s licences was also 
delayed which complicated the competitors’ timelines (Bayer 2013).  
Gaps in the existing law in the books make it difficult for law in action to act, 
since procedures and official statements are not always clear. For example, 
capacity management is not regulated and TI can actively use this gap to delay 
competition as examples described below will show. “The Italian experience 
shows that the implementation of vertical separation requires considerable 
political will for it to be effective and start generating any benefits” (OECD 2013, 
p. 28). However, law in action has come a long way since the start of market 
liberalisation and many improvements took place in recent years, especially 
after the market entry of the first competitors (Participant D 2017). For 
Arenaways, it was too early to enter the market, law in action was not ready for 
competition (Participant E 2017). However, with NTV running for several years 
now, law in action has become better, stronger and more effective. This shows 
the importance of a rapid and comprehensive implementation of law in the 
books.  
6.3.2.2.  Access to facilities and data as well as attractive train paths  
Access to facilities and necessary data exists in Italy, and is also monitored by 
the ART. However, access to stations cannot fully be controlled. Especially in 
the early days before the setting up of ART, FSI used the existing gaps in the 
regulation to discriminate against competitors: in the early period of operations, 
DB/ÖBB was not allowed to stop at Milan and Bologna central stations. The 
usage of storage facilities was also unclear for a long time. After the start of the 
company’s operations, facilities like energy, clearing, etc. were optimised and 
the quality of the service improved over the years (Doll & Tauber 2010, 
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Participant D 2017). Like DB/ÖBB, NTV was not allowed to stop in some central 
stations, such as Rome or Milan, and had to stop at secondary stations that 
made the service less attractive. This resulted in financial losses, since 
especially commuters and business travellers did not use the services due to 
the journey taking longer. In addition, access to NTV’s customer centre in Rome 
Ostiense was blocked by a wall, two weeks before the start of operations, built 
by a FSI subsidiary with the reason to provide safety. When NTV wanted to 
start operations on the Milan-Rimini-Ancona line, NTV could not stop in Rimini 
station, since the station was not suited to this type of train. RFI refused to 
adapt the station, NTV wanted to adapt the platform itself but this was not 
allowed. Consequently, the start was delayed (Faiola 2013a, Day 2014, 
Participant D 2017, Participant F 2017). The examples show that access to 
facilities, especially stations, was difficult in the past and influenced open 
access competition negatively. Additional difficulties existed in the early days of 
competition, since gaps in the law existed which left leeway for FSI and resulted 
in uncertainties in the business relations between competitors and FSI. Since 
then and with practice in dealing with competition, the situation improved 
(Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017, Participant F 2017). Regarding data, no 
significant problem for open access competitors exists; however, no open 
access to all data is provided and, if provided, the information is mainly in 
Italian. 
In Italy, access to and availability of attractive train paths exists and today is 
relatively free of discrimination. The process is based on an agreement with RFI 
and RFI accommodates paths with each company individually. Especially on 
the unmixed high-speed infrastructure, where most of the competition takes 
place, capacity exists for incumbent and competitor (RFI 2016, Participant E 




2017). In conventional long-distance passenger rail, attractive train paths 
cannot be accessed as easily, since regional and subsidised long-distance 
passenger rail lines are highly frequented at attractive times. A drawback of the 
Italian system is that it is not transparent and no general overview of vacant 
train slots exists (RFI 2016). What has been beneficial for competitors in the 
past is that it is possible to sign framework agreements with the IM to secure 
train paths for a longer period. The general length of the framework agreements 
is five years, but in special cases it can be longer or shorter (RFI 2016). NTV 
negotiated a long-term framework agreement with RFI to provide security for 
the business plan and for its investors (Participant C 2017).  
The following examples show that especially in the first years of competition, 
discrimination-free access to attractive train paths did not always exist: one 
example is provided by dealings with DB/ÖBB, as described above. The 
company applied for fast train paths with ideal connections into the Italian 
network, which was rejected by RFI since TI wanted to use the paths, but never 
did. The paths that DB/ÖBB were granted, missed the connections into the 
network by some minutes at each stop. For some months, no intermediate 
stops were allowed on the line, since TI claimed that subsidised regional 
transport was harmed. A complaint to the EC in Brussels finally resolved the 
matter and intermediate stops were possible (Doll & Tauber 2010, Warnecke & 
Götz 2012, Participant D 2017). Another example of discrimination affected 
Arenaways, which finally resulted in law suits: Arenaways’ application for paths 
was delayed for a total of 18 months by RFI, resulting in delayed market entry. 
The company also received slow paths, it is possible to run the OD in 1:35 hour, 
but it took Arenaways 2 hours. RFI was fined 100,000 EUR by Agcom. URSF 
also banned Arenaways from having intermediate stops on the line, because 
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operations would harm the subsidised traffic of TI on the line. TI was fined 
200,000 EUR by Agcom since it gave false and misleading information to URSF 
(Chiandoni 2012, Warnecke & Götz 2012, EC 2012, Boitani & Ramella 2012). 
Before the start of NTV’s operations, the infrastructure usage conditions 
changed at the beginning of 2011, so that NTV received its safety certificates in 
August instead of November, as originally agreed (Warnecke & Götz 2012). At 
the beginning of its history, it was also difficult for NTV to negotiate attractive 
train paths, especially in combination with attractive stations. RFI stated that this 
was due to overcrowding. After an investigation by Agcom in 2013, RFI pledged 
to make it easier for NTV to negotiate attractive time slots (Faiola 2013b, 
Bergantino et al. 2015).  
Overall, it can be said that good access to attractive train paths exists now, but 
it was not so easy in the first years of competition, despite the possibility of 
negotiating long-term framework agreements (Participant D 2017, Participant F 
2017). It is a factor influencing open access competition and a risk especially for 
new, inexperienced competitors, since the process is complicated and time-
consuming (Participant E 2017). For Arenaways, the difficulty in accessing 
attractive train paths was the main factor in its insolvency. 
6.3.2.3.  Facilitation and attitude of government and politicians   
The attitude of government and Italian politicians towards competition has been 
ambivalent and mostly pessimistic. However, no universal attitude or opinion 
exists (Day 2014, Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). With the 
implementation of the Railway Packages which was necessary back in the 
2000s, the government chose a conservative approach and implemented a 
minimum standard, leaving gaps. Since TI was part of FSI and therefore 




government owned, it was favoured (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). In 
the early days of competition, NTV in particular publicly complained about the 
scepticism and lack of support from the Italian government. The scepticism was 
also caused by the participation of SNCF in NTV. Since then, the economic 
situation and the government have changed and politicians are more open 
towards competition (Bayer 2013, Participant D 2017). What was helpful for 
NTV was the executives’ good networking with politicians: they used this factor 
to raise objections when NTV felt disadvantaged. This made the reduction of 
high-speed infrastructure fees possible. It was not possible for Arenaways 
which did not have such a prominent position and a high level political network 
(Participant F 2017). All in all, the attitude of government and politicians towards 
competition has no significant influence, but it can play an important role in 
individual cases and situations, as shown by NTV (Participant F 2017). 
However, Italian companies like NTV are more protected than competitors from 
other countries (Participant E 2017). 
6.3.2.4.  Unbundling 
In Italy, unbundling exists in the form of vertical separation to some degree: rail 
infrastructure and operations are vertically separated and operated by different 
companies, united under one holding. Chinese walls are in place to prevent 
discriminatory behaviour. Compared to Germany, no horizontal separation 
exists since TI offers long-distance, regional passenger and freight trains 
(OECD 2013). As the examples show, competition was discriminated against in 
the past due to the organisational closeness of RFI and TI, especially when the 
ART was not fully in place (Faiola 2013b). In early days, the situation for RFI 
and TI was new and no clear separation existed, e.g. in terms of path priority. 
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This has improved over time, too (Participant D 2017). Some years ago, the 
Italian government considered the full privatisation of TI. In the process of 
unbundling, however, problems occurred, especially with the mixing of asset 
ownership and future access to funds. Currently, the discussion of full 
privatisation has been put off, but the government is still considering the 
privatisation of the profitable high-speed network (Participant E 2017). This 
factor clearly influenced open access competition negatively in the past, the 
best example is Arenaways, which went bankrupt as a direct consequence of 
discrimination. Currently, especially due to setting up the ART, the situation has 
improved significantly for competitors (Participant D 2017, Participant F 2017). 
6.3.2.5.  State of and investment in infrastructure 
Between 2008 and 2015, Italy invested an average of 87 EUR per inhabitant in 
the rail infrastructure, with peaks in 2009 (104 EUR) and 2011 (112 EUR), 
which puts Italy below average in a European comparison (Allianz pro Schiene 
2016a). EC ranks the overall quality of railway infrastructure 15th of 26, slightly 
below the European average (EC 2017e). Analysing the Italian investment in 
infrastructure between 2004 and 2014, it becomes apparent that in most years, 
Italy invests more into rail than in road infrastructure. But for the whole period, 
71 billion EUR were invested in rail and 81 billion EUR were invested in road 
infrastructure (OECD 2017). Back in the 1990s, the Italian government decided 
to invest over 50 billion EUR into rail infrastructure, especially in the high-speed 
sector. The first high-speed lines were launched in 1992 between Rome and 
Florence, the “new generation” high-speed lines were launched after 2005, e.g. 
Rome-Naples and Milan-Bologna. Milan-Turin and Bologna-Florence were 
completed in 2009 and since 2010, the backbone of the Italian high-speed rail 




network has operated. Additional lines are planned (Cascetta & Coppola 2014, 
Desmaris 2016, Beria et al. 2016b, Participant E 2017).  
For open access competition, the fast and attractive infrastructure between 
main metropolises allows entrants access to a big market. Since the traffic is 
“unmixed”, no slow regional and freight transport blocks capacity and reduces 
speed (Participant D 2017). NTV entered the market by using the new high-
speed network, building its concept around fast connections and customers in 
the big urban centres. This factor had a major influence on NTV. The increased 
speed and capacity might even have been a precondition for NTV to be 
successful. For Arenaways and DB/ÖBB, the state of and investment in 
infrastructure did not play a submental role (Participant D 2017, Participant E 
2017, Participant F 2017). The planned investments in the conventional rail 
network in the next few years, however, might benefit additional competitors 
(Participant E 2017).  
6.3.2.6.  Willingness or ability to subsidise operations  
The Italian state is willing to subsidise long-distance passenger rail. With an 
overall revenue of 5,139 million EUR in 2017, almost 40% of TI’s revenues are 
subsidies (FSI 2018b). This clearly shows that a general willingness and ability 
to subsidise operations exists, despite the difficult economic situation in Italy. 
Currently, the subsidised Intercity network of TI includes around 108 daily 
trains, reaches more than 200 cities and carries ca. 12 million travellers each 
year. From 2017 until 2026, a new service contract had been awarded to TI, 
involving an investment of 300 million EUR into modernisation and new rolling 
stock. TI will receive around 350 million EUR in subsidies per annum to operate 
the Intercity network. The new contract has a stronger quality focus than the old 
PhD Thesis Lisa Feuerstein 
215 
 
one and TI is supposed to increase passenger figures (FSI 2017c, Participant E 
2017, Barrow 2017). The willingness and ability to pay subsidies influence 
competition differently: due to the high frequency of trains and possibility to offer 
cheap tickets due to subsidies, it is almost impossible for new RUs to challenge 
TI on the Intercity network, especially since RFI can forbid it due to 
cannibalisation, as seen in the past (Participant E 2017). Arenaways tried to 
compete with subsidised traffic and failed (Participant F 2017). After struggling 
in the past, DB/ÖBB found its niche. The high-speed network, however, 
receives no subsidies and therefore, NTV officially has no disadvantage against 
TI with cross-financing being formally prohibited (Beria et al. 2012, Participant D 
2017). Therefore it can be stated that the payment of subsidies has no major 
influence on open access competition in the high-speed sector, but it clearly 
prevents competition in the Intercity sector (Participant D 2017, Participant E 
2017, Participant F 2017). 
6.3.2.7.  Market potential and market size  
The market potential for long-distance passenger rail in Italy is high and a 
positive market environment exists, especially in the high-speed sector. Still, 
there is a variation between different regions in Italy, especially due to its 
polycentric structure with big metropolises. The modal split for rail, at 6.1%, was 
relatively low in European comparison, a total amount of 51,120 million 
passenger-kms was undertaken by rail (EC 2016b, Participant D 2017, EC 
2017f, Eurostat 2019b). Despite the weak economic situation in Italy, a shift 
from other transport modes towards rail could be observed, especially in the 
high-speed sector after NTV entered the market (Desmaris 2016).  




The Italian market is clearly dominated by the incumbent. In conventional long-
distance passenger rail, it holds almost 100% of the market share, with its only 
competitor being DB/ÖBB. In the high-speed sector, TI holds around 65% while 
NTV holds around 35%. However, while TI lost market share when NTV entered 
the market, it did not lose passenger-km, since the overall demand increased 
(Desmaris 2016, Beria & Grimaldi 2017, NTV 2018b). In 2017, TI had 16,303 
million passenger-km in long-distance passenger rail, with a total revenue of 
2,506 million EUR and an EBIT of 224 million EUR (FSI 2018b).  
Arenaways wanted to focus on providing better quality on the Turin-Milan line, 
by addressing the most densely populated and richest regions in Italy. An 
average of 32,000 people commuted overall each day between the two cities, a 
distance of 150 km and many were not satisfied with TI’s service during this 
time. Despite the vast suburban commuter market, only 50-60 passengers used 
Arenaways daily, despite a capacity of 400. This was due to the prohibition of 
cabotage, which highly affected the business case (Speciale 2011). The 
economic situation of NTV is more successful and the market penetration has 
been fast: in 2012 NTV transported 2.1 million passengers in eight months of 
operations. In 2017, NTV transported a total of 12.8 million passengers at a 
load factor of 77.4%. This led to a total revenue of 415 million EUR (Bergantino 
et al. 2015, Beria & Grimaldi 2017, NTV 2018c). However, due to the high 
investments and the high operating costs, NTV had negative operating results 
for the years between 2010 and 2015, which the company turned into a positive 
net income in the following years (ART 2017).  
For the Italian open access competition, the market size seems to be one of the 
core influencing factors. NTV was convinced of the new potential due to the 
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new infrastructure which connected rich markets, DB/ÖBB was convinced of the 
tourist potential (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). Participant F (2017) 
states that “either you go for a rich OD or you don’t consider entering the 
market”. NTV managed to do this, DB/ÖBB found its niche and since 
Arenaways failed to address the right market, it had to exit. 
6.3.2.8.  Costs for infrastructure  
Compared to other EU countries, the average cost of infrastructure in Italy is in 
the medium range, behind Germany, Belgium and France. The fees for freight 
and passenger transport charges are at an equal level (EC 2016c). Since 2001, 
RFI is the licenced national IM, the fees are approved by the ART. In December 
2015, the ART defined criteria and guidelines for a new access charge system 
of RFI, which led to the access charge now being based on relevant and 
efficient costs. The new system ensures greater flexibility for the IM, it is 
modularly based on the service, geography, capacity and typology of the 
network, and includes variable components (Bergantino 2016). The access 
charges are calculated using an algorithm, consisting of a two-part formula: a) a 
fixed track access charge for each section/node of the train path, and b) a 
variable usage charge which depends on the number of km and minutes of 
occupancy of the nodes. The fixed track access charge is dependent on 
network categories, like “supplementary network section”, “mainline network 
section” and “node” and is defined for each line individually. The fixed track 
access charge for high-speed/high capacity (“HS/HC”) lines is 0 EUR, only 
variable costs occur (RFI 2017b). “Over the previous decade, the access 
charges for HSR in Italy averaged EUR 13.4 per train/km against EUR 3.4 
train/km for conventional trains” (Desmaris 2016, p. 16). Each RU can pre-
calculate the prices on RFI’s homepage (RFI 2018). NTV complained about the 




defined criteria. It claims that fixed costs cannot be considered as direct and 
therefore, according to EU law, cannot be included (Bergantino 2016).  
Examples from competitors show that costs for infrastructure play a role in their 
profitability. When NTV struggled with profitability and had a massive crisis in 
2014/2015, the management used its political contacts and lobbied for lower 
infrastructure charges on high-speed lines. Initially, the average costs were 
fixed at 12.81 EUR/km. This was first reduced by 15% and finally in 2014 the 
access charge was further reduced by an additional 20% to 8.2 EUR/km. This 
led to savings of 10 million EUR for NTV and 22 million EUR for TI (Cambini & 
Perrotti 2015, Giuricin 2016, Bergantino 2016). In the next years, an increase in 
access charges is planned, which might especially harm DB/ÖBB. The 
company is taking legal action against RFI since it is convinced that this is 
unfair and would lead falling profitability (Participant D 2017). The example of 
NTV and DB/ÖBB shows that costs for infrastructure can be a strong factor 
influencing open access competition. The factor is not only an entry barrier, but 
also an influence during operations. In NTV’s case, it influenced profitability to a 
high degree. However, the influence is always dependent on the line 
(Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017, Participant F 2017). 
6.3.2.9.  Access to distribution systems  
In rail ticket distribution, the Italian market is dominated by the incumbent’s 
sales system which provides a variety of sales channels with a high coverage 
rate in rural and urban areas: TI’s tickets can be purchased from 300 ticket 
offices and more than 1,900 ticket machines, TI also has call centers and 
cooperates with travel agencies. Besides the traditional ways, TI also offers 
online and mobile tickets. In 2016, more than 40% of all tickets were purchased 
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via online or mobile channels (Trenitalia 2016). TI’s distribution system is not 
open for competitors, but DB/ÖBB have a ticketing cooperation with TI 
(Participant D 2017). Arenaways could not enter TI’s distribution system and 
offered its tickets online, via ticket machines, on board the trains and at special 
sales points. NTV has no access to TI’s distribution system and set up its own 
distribution system. Tickets can be bought at stations in ticket offices, lounges 
and from vending machines (NTV 2017a). Tickets can also be bought via NTV’s 
call centre, online and by using NTV’s app (NTV 2018e).  
The example shows that all competitors managed to set up individual 
distribution systems. However, difficulties occurred: while running joint trains 
together with TI, DB/ÖBB and TI had a ticketing cooperation, and the ticket for 
these services were therefore sold via TI’s distribution system. When DB/ÖBB 
became a competitor, TI no longer sold the company’s tickets which resulted in 
economic difficulties. After negotiations between both companies, TI started to 
sell the trains again from August 2011 onwards (DB ML AG 2011, Participant D 
2017). NTV states that RFI discriminated against NTV by strictly limiting its floor 
space for ticket machines in Venice and Bologna. While TI had ticket machines 
in prominent points in the stations, this was not possible for NTV in the early 
days (Participant E 2017).  
The existence of a well-functioning distribution system is essential for 
competitors to start. Some years ago, without the advanced technology 
digitalisation brought about, the situation was different and new entrants were 
far more dependent on access to TI’s distribution system, as DB/ÖBB’s 
example proves. Access to TI’s distribution system would still improve open 
access competitors’ positions, but NTV shows that a new distribution platform 
can be built which finds acceptance with customers. This, however, creates 




extra initial costs for RUs, which not every company can cover (Participant D 
2017, Participant E 2017). 
6.3.2.10.  Existence of network effects 
The generation of network effects is a means to fill the trains and thus make 
them more profitable for the operators. Due to its interlinked network and its 
wide but closed distribution network, TI benefits from network effects like most 
incumbents (Participant E 2017, Participant F 2017). However, due to the high 
number of big metropolis, a big market for point-to-point connections exists 
(Participant D 2017). When DB/ÖBB was not integrated into TI’s distribution 
system and had no convenient connections into TI’s network, the business case 
was negative. It was necessary for DB/ÖBB to be part of TI’s system and to 
profit from network effects. This brought about a new cooperation with TI 
(Participant D 2017). For Arenaways, the point-to-point connections were not 
profitable and no integration in TI’s system existed. This contributed to 
Arenaways’ low customer numbers. NTV also did not profit from TI’s network 
effects, but it found ways to deal with the problem: firstly, NTV connects major 
metropolis with a big point-to-point market, where low network effects are 
generated. Additional, NTV set up Italobus to create its own network by feeding 
the lines with rural customers (NTV 2017c, Participant E 2017). Also, as in 
Florence, NTV offers integrated tickets with local public transport which allows 
customers to use local buses (Participant F 2017). The examples show two 
different pictures: the niche provider DB/ÖBB is dependent on TI’s network 
effects and therefore chose to cooperate with TI, otherwise profitable operations 
would not be possible. NTV started to build its own network, where needed, but 
focuses on the servicing of strong point-to-point connections where network 
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effects are not crucial (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). However, the 
integration into the regional network might be beneficial for NTV (Participant F 
2017). All in all, the influence of network effects on open access competition 
has a minimal to strong effect, depending on the planned offering of the 
competitor. 
6.3.2.11.  Generally low profitability  
The generally low profitability in the industry also influences the Italian market. 
While TI receives subsidies for conventional long-distance transport, it operates 
its high-speed network at its own risk. TI is therefore obliged to run services 
profitably. During the whole period of operations, DB/ÖBB struggled with 
profitability, it was not possible to operate on a profitable level while TI did not 
sell tickets for the trains. However, since the operator is owned by incumbents, 
it had a financial backup during these years (Participant D 2017). The example 
of Arenaways also shows how hard it is to achieve profitability: the company 
struggled from the first day of operations. It never reached profitability and went 
bankrupt within a few months of operations at the end of July 2011. One reason 
for that was the ban on cabotage between Milan and Turin and consequently 
not enough passengers, while the cost structure remained the same (Speciale 
2011, Warnecke & Götz 2012). Even NTV with its solvent shareholders 
struggled with low profitability, especially at the start. In the first two years’ 
losses of 156 million EUR were made. In 2014, an additional 62 million EUR 
losses were made (Day 2014, NTV 2015). When entering the market, NTV 
aimed for a cost leadership approach, but no significant cost leadership could 
be achieved apart from labour costs, smaller trains and a less complex 
company structure. Furthermore, NTV could not implement its differentiation 
strategy by offering a premium product with better quality at higher prices, 




consequently, the expected yields could not be achieved (Beria & Grimaldi 
2017). This led NTV into a difficult economic situation: in 2015, NTV had debts 
of 681 million EUR. Those were rescheduled, including an equity increase of 60 
million EUR. Consequently, NTV reached break-even for the first time and the 
EBITDA was positive with 57 million EUR, the EBITDA also increased in 2017 
to 156 million EUR. The reduction of infrastructure fees also played a major role 
in NTV’s profitability. However, NTV defines the low profitability of the Italian 
market as its main risk and focuses on the most profitable routes which results 
in a similar offer to TI (NTV 2015, Milano today 2015, Giuricin 2016, NTV 
2018a, Beria & Grimaldi 2017, Participant E 2017). After 2015, due to the 
competitive pressure, TI reports a fall in economic performance of the high-
speed rail services due to a reduction in yield (FSI 2017b). 
The examples show how hard it is to earn profits in the Italian railway industry 
and that low profitability influences competition. However, depending on the 
financial resources of the RU, the influence varies: due to a shortage of funds, 
Arenaways went bankrupt while NTV with strong and solvent investors 
managed an internal restructuring (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). Still, 
the high cost structure, especially for rolling stock in case of NTV, and the low 
rate of return is a challenge to all competitors. This also acts as an entry barrier 
for new competitors (Participant F 2017). 
6.3.2.12.  Access to financing 
Since TI is state-owned, access to financing is relatively easy. The same 
applies to the competitor DB/ÖBB, which can access financial support within its 
state-owned holding companies (Participant D 2017). The case is different for 
private providers: for NTV’s market entry, more than one billion EUR were 
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necessary and later invested. After coming up with the idea of entering the high-
speed rail market, the founders of NTV started early to acquire the necessary 
capital. In 2008, NTV already had a financial agreement of approximately 
700 million EUR. Some capital came directly from the founders, at market entry 
Montezemolo and Punzo held 35% of NTV’s shares. 20% of shares were held 
by Intesa Sanpaolo, a bank which joined in as a shareholder at the beginning. 
An additional 20% were held by SNCF, the French incumbent, which provided 
further reliability for additional investors. The remaining shares were owned by 
Assicurazioni Generali (15%), Bombassei (5%), Serganoli (5%) and Sciarrone 
(1.5%) (Bayer 2013, Chiandoni 2015, NTV 2017a). The example shows how 
important it was for NTV that prominent businesspersons with good connections 
to the financial sector started the company (Participant E 2017). In its internal 
crisis, NTV underwent a debt restructuring and an additional 60 million EUR of 
equity capital were injected in 2015. In June 2017 another restructuring took 
place, where the shareholders entered and others left (NTV 2017a). This led to 
the following ownership structure: founding members hold 39% of shares, 
19.7% is held by Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A, 15% by Allegro S.A.R.L., 13.2% by 
PII1 S.A.R.L, 6% by MAIS S.p.A., 5% by Nuova Fourb S.R.L. and finally 2.1% 
by PARTIND S.R.L (NTV 2017b). In 2018, the American infrastructure investor 
Global Infrastructure Partners III purchased the entire share capital of NTV for 
1.9 billion EUR (NTV 2018d, Arosio 2018). After setting up his successful rail 
freight company, Arena sold it to DB in 2004. Arena also acquired additional 
funds of up to 50 million EUR, especially for the procurement of rolling stock 
(Warnecke & Götz 2012, Boitani & Ramella 2012).  
The examples show that for the existing competitors, it was possible to access 
financing. However, this might not be representative for all possible new 




entrants since in the Italian market it is relatively easy to find investors, but once 
the investors are found the bureaucratic barriers are relatively high (Participant 
D 2017). 
6.3.2.13.  Cooperation and coopetition within the industry   
TI is part of a cooperation network with other railway companies from 
neighbouring countries like ÖBB, SBB and DB. In most cases, TI is and was 
responsible for running trains on Italian territory. This prevented other foreign 
incumbents from operating in competition to TI. However, the example of 
DB/ÖBB shows that this can change: when the cooperation between DB/ÖBB 
was terminated, this contract could no longer protect Italian territory and 
DB/ÖBB decided to enter the market with LeNord. However, to some degree, 
the companies depend on cooperation and after some years of renegotiation, TI 
is selling DB/ÖBB’s tickets and has synchronised its timetable (Participant D 
2017). Without cooperation with TI, DB/ÖBB’s trains were not visible to Italian 
customers; this changed after the renewal of the partnership and TI even does 
marketing for these trains on board its trains (Participant F 2017). NTV is in a 
different situation: when starting the company, NTV was in partnership with 
SNCF which bought 20% of the company’s shares. However, despite the 
capital, NTV did not take much advantage of a possible cooperation with SNCF. 
In 2015, SNCF did not agree to a recapitalisation and as a consequence 
drastically reduced its shareholding and later exited (Giuricin 2016, Participant 
E 2017). The examples show that cooperation within the industry plays a role 
and can make a difference by providing more revenue or reducing costs. Due to 
low profitability, cooperation might be necessary to some degree to remain in 
the market (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017).  
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6.3.2.14.  Possibility for cherry-picking  
Due to the geographic structure in Italy, cherry-picking and some clear “cherry-
lines” exist, connecting big cities and economic and tourist hubs. The 
development of high-speed lines further enhances this advantage. 
Consequently, the high-speed network is run commercially by TI and does not 
receive subsidies. Cherry-picking is allowed in Italy, if subsidised long-distance 
or regional transport is not cannibalised. However, cherry-picking is not only 
dependent on the line, it also depends on the choice of paths and the time of 
slots (Participant F 2017). Examples of cherry-lines in Italy are Rome-Milan 
which is one of the busiest lines in Europe, but also Turin-Milan which connects 
the richest and most densely populated regions in Italy (Speciale 2011, 
Bergantino et al. 2015). Cherry-picking can exist in different degrees: some 
competitors run with high frequency and hold high market shares, others only 
run a limited number of trains per day on “cherry-lines” (Participant B 2017, 
Paricipant C 2017). The examples of NTV and Arenaways provide evidence: 
NTV entered the most profitable lines in Italy with a high frequency and 
accomplished a high market share. Arenaways entered on a cherry-line with a 
limited number of trains and tried to establish a basis for further business 
(Speciale 2011, Bergantino et al. 2015). However, TI prevented cherry-picking 
and Arenaways could not exploit the whole potential of this line (Participant F 
2017). Despite being fined, TI tried a similar strategy as NTV a few years later 
by not allowing access to strategically important stations. The possibility of 
cherry-picking is an important precondition to operate open access competition 
in Italy. The example of NTV shows that the successful operating of cherry-lines 
can make a difference and is the reason why NTV is still in business 
(Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). 




6.3.2.15.  Adjustment to customer expectation  
The adjustment to customer expectation plays an important role in the strategy 
of open access competitors: at the beginning of the 2000s, TI was in a bad 
condition and customer satisfaction was low. Competitors saw this as a chance 
to win customers by adapting to their expectations (Doll & Tauber 2010, 
Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). Arenaways ordered new and modern 
rolling stock and wanted to offer a superior service and higher reliability than TI. 
NTV used a similar strategy, also ordering rolling stock at premium quality with 
leather seats, monitors, cinema cars, and a business sector. Moreover, NTV 
planned to offer a yield-based and simple pricing and ticketing system. On 
timetables and ODs, NTV also adapted to customer wishes and expectations 
(Faiola 2013b, Cascetta & Coppola 2015, NTV 2017a). But TI did not stand still 
and started a restructuring and re-branding: new rolling stock was bought, the 
frequency of trains was increased, the sales system was updated, average 
prices were reduced, delays and cancellations were cut (Cascetta & Coppola 
2015, Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017, Beria & Grimaldi 2017). Thus TI 
managed to become attractive, and maintain and increase its customer base, 
despite competition. For Arenaways and NTV, the improved service was a 
means not only to attract TI’s customers, but also to charge a premium price. 
With TI becoming a modern and attractive RU, this premium could not be 
charged and both companies could not reach their estimated yields (Participant 
E 2017). The examples show that an adjustment to customer expectation plays 
a major role in Italy, both for competitors and for the incumbent. TI’s quick and 
successful adaptation blocked NTV’s product differentiation strategy and 
triggered an adaptation of ticket prices (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017, 
Participant F 2017). 
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6.3.2.16.  Customers’ willingness to pay  
Due to the poor economic situation in Italy, the general willingness to pay is not 
overly high, but different customer groups exist: especially between the big 
metropolis, business travellers are prepared to pay high prices for fast city to 
city connections (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). Between 2009 and 
2011, the pricing level of long-distance rail tickets increased slightly. This also 
shows that the existence of the small operators DB/ÖBB and Arenaways made 
no difference to the customers’ willingness to pay (Cascetta & Coppola 2015). 
The situation changed after 2011 with the entry of NTV: a two-year decrease of 
34% between 2011 and 2013 could be observed. To gain a high percentage of 
market share, both NTV and TI introduced a new pricing scheme almost in 
parallel in 2012 with three levels of fares, relating to different types of flexibility 
(Cascetta & Coppola 2015, Participant D 2017). However, no clear evidence of 
predatory pricing behaviour by TI can be observed. But the pricing strategies of 
NTV and TI to attract more customers, seem to be related (Bergantino et al. 
2015, Participant E 2017). Since the passenger figures of both TI and NTV 
increased in the years after market entry, the strategy proved to be successful 
(NTV 2018a).  
While no drastic change in customers’ willingness to pay can be observed in the 
Italian market, this factor still influences open access competition. It shows that 
it is important to have good yield management system and the right pricing 
strategy for different customer groups (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017, 
Participant F 2017). It is interesting that no competitor entered the market with a 
low-cost approach. Liberalisation of the coach market also had no fundamental 
effect on the customers’ willingness to pay on the competitive routes 
(Participant E 2017). 




6.3.2.17.  Entrepreneurship  
Entrepreneurship plays an important role for the existence of open access 
competition in Italy, especially at the initiation and planning stages. The 
examples of NTV and Arenaways prove this. NTV was founded by former 
Ferrari president Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, the owner of leather-
manufacturer Tod’s, Diego Della Vale, and the businessman Gianni Punzo, who 
liked the idea of running high-speed trains. The founders were strong and 
successful entrepreneurs with a valuable network within the industry and high 
ambitions. This enabled access to financing initially for the procurement of 
rolling stock (Bayer 2013, Faiola 2013b, Participant E 2017). The NTV founders 
have a beneficial political and business network which allowed them to make 
“noise” in case of irregularities which helped NTV to improve profitability and 
stay in business (Participant F 2017). Arenaways was founded by Guiseppe 
Arena who is known as the pioneer of private rail in Italy. Arena used to work for 
TI, but he left the company in 1992 to found his own rail company. After offering 
tourist charter trains and setting up a successful freight rail business which he 
sold to DB, he planned to enter the long-distance passenger rail market. 
Compared to NTV, Arena’s access to financing was lower, but he had 
substantial experience in the railway industry (Bayer 2013, Participant D 2017). 
In case of NTV and Arenaways, a fascination and an emotional connection to 
rail existed, Arena and the NTV founders wanted to offer a product with better 
quality than TI. Arena had gained valuable experience in the industry while the 
NTV founders entered the market with support from experts, among others 
SNCF (Bayer 2013). In both cases, the entrepreneurs were prepared to take 
high risks.  
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6.3.2.18.  Access to rolling stock  
The general situation for leasing and procuring of long-distance rolling stock in 
Italy is as difficult as in the rest of Europe. Despite the difficulties, all observed 
open access providers managed to obtain rolling stock (Participant D 2017, 
Participant E 2017). DB/ÖBB’s operations were run with given second-hand 
rolling stock on a conventional level (Participant E 2017). Arenaways leased 
locomotives and bought two new trainsets from Astra Vagoane Calatori in 
Romania at a total cost of 50 million EUR. The rolling stock ran for 
approximately eight months before the company became insolvent. In 2017, 
some of the coaches were auctioned (Railway Gazette 2010a, Warnecke & 
Götz 2012, SAERP 2013, Vuotto 2017, Participant E 2017). In November 2007, 
NTV ordered 25 new high-speed AGVs from Alstom, one of the most advanced 
trains on the market at that time with premium interior design. The costs for the 
trains were around 600 million EUR. By April 2013, all trainsets were delivered. 
In 2015, NTV ordered additional trains from Alstom, at an investment of          
250 million EUR. This allows NTV to further increase its network and frequency 
(Warnecke & Götz 2012, Beria & Grimaldi 2017, NTV 2017a). TI has been 
buying new rolling stock and also updating its fleet in recent years. Since 2000, 
TI has extensively refurbished old trains and bought new rolling stock. In the 
long-distance passenger sector, it runs with AGV ETR 1000 trains 
(Frecciarossa 1000, bought for ca. 31 million EUR per train), ETR 500 
(Frecciarossa), ETR 600 (Frecciargento), ETR 470 (Frecciabianca), as well as 
locomotives and coaches on slower long-distance trains with longer travel time 
(Railway Gazette 2010b, Beria et al. 2012, Bergantino et al. 2015, FSI 2018b).  
The access to rolling stock is an important influencing factor on open access 
competition, as it can be a clear barrier to entry (Participant F 2017). The 




example of NTV shows that access to rolling stock for new entrants can be 
relatively easy if the necessary amount of money is available (Participant D 
2017, Participant E 2017). 
6.3.2.19.  Homologation process  
Homologation in Italy is known to be a long and complex process which binds 
the time and resources of open access competitors (Participant D 2017, 
Participant E 2017). The Italian National Railway Safety Agency (“ANSF”) is in 
charge of the authorisation and validation of homologations (ANSF 2018). 
Decreto ANSF n.1/2016 points out the preconditions for homologation, 
implementing EU law (ANSF 2017). DB/ÖBB experienced the difficulties of 
homologation in Italy and had problems with the homologation process for its 
locomotives. It took a long time and homologation is still only valid for speeds 
up to 200 km/h. Especially at the beginning of operations, decisions and 
requests from the authority appeared random and without clear guidelines 
(Participant D 2017). Arenaways originally planned its start of operations in 
September 2010, but due to delays in the homologation process of the new 
rolling stock, the start had to be delayed. NTV’s first homologation process was 
also delayed due to the absence of possibilities to do test runs on RFI’s tracks, 
Montezemolo accused FSI of delaying the process to damage NTV (Cillis 
2010). All in all, competitors received their homologations. Over the years, the 
system has improved due to clearer guidelines and less uncertainties than in 
the past. But the factor influences open access competition by adding costs and 
possibly prolonging the timeline (Participant D 2017, Participant E 2017). This is 
especially the case when buying second-hand rolling stock (Participant F 2017). 
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6.3.2.20. Incumbent’s performance  
Even though the incumbent TI was officially founded in 2000, the company is far 
older. In 1905 FSI was founded as a state-owned railway company that 
provided infrastructure and operated trains. It grew exponentially in the following 
years and played an important role for the development of the country and 
during wars (FSI 2018c). However, at the beginning of the 2000s, TI was in a 
bad condition: the rolling stock was run-down, trains were often delayed or 
cancelled, innovation was lacking, customer service was unsatisfactory and 
consequently TI’s image in Italy was bad (Doll & Tauber 2010, Participant D 
2017). This, combined with the new possibilities provided by market 
liberalisation led, competitors to enter the market.  
In the past, TI had two strategies to defend itself against competition: it started 
by delaying and discriminating against its competitors as described above 
(prohibiting intermediate stops, no access to central stations, no possibility to 
establish sales points in stations, delaying of path requests etc.). Then it fully 
transformed its company strategy and adapted to customer wishes (Participant 
D 2017, Participant E 2017): new rolling stock was bought and introduced in the 
market, re-branding of services took place, frequency of trains was increased, a 
new sales system was set up, average fares were reduced, a new frequent 
traveller programme was launched, delays and train cancellations were reduced 
and higher reliability was achieved (Faiola 2013a, Participant D 2017, 
Participant E 2017, Beria & Grimaldi 2017). This led to a much improved image 
of TI, especially in the high-speed sector (Participant F 2017). In 2017, TI has a 
market share of 65% in high-speed rail and >99% in the remaining long-
distance passenger rail market (Desmaris 2016, NTV 2018b). The company 
operated 16,303 million passenger-km in long-distance passenger rail (FSI 




2018b). TI’s punctuality with a delay of <15 minutes was 97.9% in 2017, it 
reports 94.4% customer satisfaction (FSI 2018a). Arenaways’ and NTV’s 
strategy was to attack a weak incumbent and to seize a huge market of 
unsatisfied and disappointed customers who were willing to pay more for 
superior quality. TI’s enormous transformation robbed NTV of its potential 
product differentiation and consequently, the expected higher prices could not 
be charged which led to economic difficulties for NTV (Beria & Grimaldi 2017, 
Participant E 2017). It turned out that TI had the better feeling for the market 
and therefore the better adaptation to customer wants, with plans to invest and 
improve quality in the coming years (Bogo 2016, Participant F 2017).  
Bearing all this in mind, it becomes apparent that TI, as part of FSI, has the 
power to discriminate against competitors and has used its power in the past. 
The company was to largely responsible for the insolvency of Arenaways and 
also for the economic difficulties of DB/ÖBB. Due to its internal change, it grew 
from a weak incumbent to a professional and modern company which is a 
serious competitor for new entrants (Chiandoni 2012, Participant E 2017, 
Participant D 2017, Participant F 2017). All in all, competition has boosted 
quality and lowered prices at TI, but also provided choice, which is a huge 
benefit for Italian customers (Faiola 2013b). 
6.3.3.  Characterising the correlation of factors influencing the Italian 
case 
The most significant and influential correlation between factors may be found 
between “law in the books”, “law in action”, “unbundling” and “the incumbent’s 
performance”. Despite a de jure opening of the market, for years the institutional 
landscape was too weak to prevent discrimination by the IM and the incumbent. 
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This situation caused the early insolvency of Arenaways. The lawsuit against TI 
and RFI resembled a turning point and the setting up of the ART clearly 
improved the situation for existing and future competitors.  
Another correlation exists between the “adjustment to customer expectation”, 
“market size” and “low profitability of the industry”. While Arenaways failed with 
its customer-oriented strategy, TI and NTV gained a high increase in passenger 
figures in recent years in the high-speed sector, leading NTV to break even in 
2015. However, the increased profitability for NTV and TI did not occur due to 
increased ticket prices and yields, but due to an increase in passengers and 
passenger-kms.  
A correlation between the “costs of infrastructure” and the “low profitability of the 
industry” can also be shown in the Italian case regarding NTV. When the 
company struggled for profitability, the cost of high-speed infrastructure was 
reduced and, together with an internal debt restructuring, led to an improvement 
of the economic situation of NTV. 
The negative example of Arenaways and partly of DB/ÖBB shows the 
correlation between “access to attractive train paths” and “low profitability in the 
industry”. Due to the inferior paths with no intermediate stops, Arenaways went 
bankrupt within a few months. At the same time, DB/ÖBB struggled 
economically due to similar conditions. Now, with better paths, connections into 
the Italian network and intermediate stops, the situation changed for DB/ÖBB.  
The availability of “rolling stock” in Italy is clearly dependent on the “access to 
financing”. Arenaways and NTV could buy suitable and high-quality first-hand 
rolling stock from a small and a large rolling stock provider. A precondition for 
this was the existence of investors and loans.  




The examples provided show the most significant correlation, as in the German 
case, however more correlation and connections exist. Successful long-
distance passenger rail relies on a functioning network of different influencing 
factors.  
6.3.4.  Characterising the shift of factors influencing the Italian case 
The clearest and most important shift in terms of open access competition is the 
improvement of “law in action” and with it “unbundling”. In the early days of 
open access competition, competitors had to suffer discrimination, especially 
regarding path availability and access to stations. The lawsuit against TI and 
RFI triggered a chain of improvements: the initial uncertainty of handling 
competition and competitors was replaced by routine and more professional 
handling. Existing gaps in regulation are not exploited by RFI and TI as severely 
as before. The setting up of the ART led to an independent handling of 
uncertainties and disputes and gave clearer guidelines. All this led to 
considerably improved conditions for competition.  
The digital revolution and new distributional possibilities also changed the 
influencing factor “access to distribution system”. New technological solutions 
and a higher percentage of online and mobile ticketing made it possible for NTV 
to set up its own distribution system with a high coverage rate, as well as 
classical distribution channels in railway stations. Therefore this influencing 
factor weakened over time.  
The “incumbent’s performance” changed a great deal over time and also led to 
a shift of influence. Before the market entry of NTV, TI was a weak incumbent 
with relatively low customer satisfaction. This influenced open access 
competition positively. Nevertheless, especially in the early days of competition, 
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TI engaged in discrimination against competitors. In a few years’ time, TI 
managed to change its strategy and adapt to customer wishes by providing 
better quality and more reliable products, it is a strong market player, which 
influences open access competition negatively. On the other hand, 
discrimination by TI was reduced and it is a fairer competitor now, which 
influences open access competition positively.  
The factor “costs for infrastructure” also changed over the years, especially 
regarding the high-speed lines. Before open access competition existed in the 
market, the average cost for a path-km was 12.81 EUR/km, it fell in recent 
years by more than 35%. Therefore its influence is less negative than before, 
since it promoted open access competition and helped NTV. 
With the liberalisation of the coach market in 2007, the shift of the factor 
“intermodal competition” began. The speed of change is not as fast as in 
Germany and neither is the strength of influence, but competitive pressure from 
coaches is nevertheless increasing, especially for conventional rail services. 
More and more companies are entering the market and more lines are being 
operated. This makes it more difficult for new open access operators to enter 
the conventional long-distance passenger rail market in Italy.  
6.4.    Discussion of the case study findings 
When comparing the German and the Italian case, it becomes apparent that 
many similarities exist: e.g. the time of liberalisation in the books, the basic 
degree of unbundling and the problems with homologation processes. Yet, 
some differences exist too: e.g. the degree of intermodal competition, the speed 
of implementation of law in action and the willingness to pay subsidies. In the 




following section, the two cases will be compared and discussed, to gain 
knowledge from the similarities and differences shown.  
The history of open access competition in Germany is characterised by an early 
liberalisation of the market in the books in 1994, combined with a relatively fast 
and wide-ranging implementation in action which led to strong institutions. The 
degree of unbundling, combining the independent IM and the RU under one 
holding company, shows few cases of discrimination against competitors, with a 
close monitoring and sanctioning of misconduct by the respective institution, 
e.g. in setting station or energy prices. Since the early days of liberalisation, 
government and politicians have not actively promoted further open access 
competition and were more interested in optimising the status quo, and the 
monopoly commission remains the only institution which takes a more critical 
line. The first competitor, InterConnex, entered the market in 2001. HKX 
followed in 2012 and Locomore in 2015, both operated by FlixMobility since 
2017/2018. Two more private competitors announced market entry but failed to 
enter. Access to necessary facilities and attractive train paths is provided and 
seen as fair, but the dominant position of the incumbent DB Fv makes it difficult 
to find attractive gaps in the network and potential has not yet been utilised. 
Also, DB Fv has substantial network effects, caused by the size and range of 
the network. Consequently, while receiving no subsidies at all, DB Fv set up a 
dense network of trains in the whole of Germany, making no drastic product 
differentiation between conventional lines and high-speed lines. Therefore, DB 
Fv can serve a high proportion of the existing market. While cherry-picking is 
possible, it still needs a good strategic fit to find sufficient market potential and 
be able to compete with the strong incumbent. With the liberalisation of the 
coach market and the entry of many coach providers on various lines, offering 
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cheap tickets, customers’ willingness to pay has decreased. The low willingness 
to pay resulted in an overall reduction in ticket prices in Germany, also affecting 
the profitability of the incumbent and the open access providers HKX, Locomore 
and InterConnex. This effect is further reinforced by the relatively high costs for 
infrastructure. Access to funds to finance the costly market entry and starting 
period, which is necessary to establish the new rail products, is difficult in 
Germany. This also results in the difficulty of accessing new rolling stock, due to 
its high costs. A large market for second-hand passenger transport rolling stock 
does not yet exist in Germany, which results in competitors buying and 
refurbishing rolling stock abroad. The absence of technical harmonisation did 
not play a big role in this case. While the homologation process was lengthy 
and complicated in the past, it has improved over recent years and is 
manageable for open access providers. As with the recruiting and training of 
necessary personnell, the existence of unions has not yet been an obstacle. 
What proved to be difficult is that the open access providers, except for HKX for 
a brief period, have no access to DB Fv’s distribution system and therefore 
need to establish their own systems. After the acquisition of Locomore and HKX 
by LEO and FlixMobility, the situation for the company became easier and more 
customers used Locomore. The open access providers in Germany and most of 
their investors were connected to the railway industry prior to market entry. All 
entrepreneurs were prepared to take a high risk and remained persistent during 
the difficulties of setting up operations and running in the market. The German 
case clearly shows that fair open access competition is possible and that 
market potential exists, especially when the open access providers can win 
costumers from other modes of transportation. Nevertheless, DB Fv is a strong 
incumbent with a high market coverage, which might deter possible investors. It 




requires a good strategic fit to attract customers other than by providing 
discount prices.  
The Italian history of open access competition begins with the liberalisation of 
the market in the books in 2003. The first competitors to enter the market were 
DB/ÖBB in 2009, followed by Arenaways in 2010 and NTV in 2012. The first 
two competitors show that the implementation of law into action took a long time 
and left scope for discrimination. The degree of unbundling and combining the 
independent IM and the RU under one holding company, proved to be 
problematic for the early competitors, due to cases of discrimination, e.g. the 
granting of intermediate stops on lines, the access to attractive train paths, 
access to stations, and permission to sell tickets in stations. Proper institutions 
were not yet set up and closely related to the ministry and the incumbent. 
However, since the early days of liberalisation, the implementation of law into 
action has improved a great deal, also with the setting up of the ART, and the 
number of cases of discrimination is reduced. For a long time, the government 
and politicians have not been active in promoting further open access 
competition, but, with the market entry of NTV in 2012 they actively supported 
open access competition in some cases, e.g. regarding infrastructure costs. In 
Italy, especially investment in the high-speed network opened new possibilities 
for competition and attracted NTV to enter the market. Access to necessary 
facilities and attractive train paths exists and is seen as fair, but cases of 
discrimination against competitors existed in the past, e.g. by the denial of 
intermediate stops, the slow process of gaining access to stations or the denial 
of attractive stations in city centres due to the absence of capacity. The Italian 
network is divided into two clusters: the conventional network where the 
incumbent provides subsidised trains, and the high-speed network where TI 
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runs at its own commercial risk. Open access is allowed on the high-speed 
network and capacity for paths and stations exists. Cherry-picking is possible 
and an important precondition for competition. In the conventional network, 
however, the PSO-services of TI are run in a dense network, so the entry of 
competitors would be difficult. TI is the domineering RU in Italy and managed to 
drastically change its strategy, especially in the high-speed sector, after NTV 
announced its market entry. It improved rolling stock quality, punctuality and 
service, thereby adapting to customer expectations and making NTV’s planned 
competitive advantage in offering superior services and quality insufficient. Not 
many customers were ready to pay premium prices for luxury services. But 
head-to-head competition takes place in the high-speed sector, providing big 
advantages for customers and shifting then from other transport modes to rail. 
Especially the major advantages of the high-speed sector regarding time and 
comfort made high-speed rail invulnerable to the market liberalisation of coach 
services. Due to head-to-head competition, ticket prices in Italy fell, attracting 
more customers. Despite the high number of customers, this resulted in 
difficulties of profitability for the companies. A lack of profitability was also the 
reason for the insolvency of Arenaways, caused by the ban on intermediate 
stops. Infrastructure costs in Italy are not very high compared to other countries, 
except for high-speed lines. But over time and after complaints by NTV, the 
price was reduced significantly. The examples of Arenaways and NTV show 
that access to financing exists in Italy, but it is closely linked to the existence of 
strong entrepreneurs with good networks within the industry and mostly with 
experience in the railway industry. This also made accessing of new rolling 
stock possible, while no big second-hand passenger transport rolling stock 
market exists in Italy. While the homologation process was lengthy and 




complicated in the past, it has improved over recent years and is manageable 
for open access providers. The recruiting and training of necessary personnel 
has not yet been an obstacle, but the existence of unions led to tough 
negotiations and strikes for NTV. The lack of access to TI’s distribution system 
was difficult for the smaller open access providers, but since NTV managed to 
set up its own distribution system, it managed to avoid negative effects. All in 
all, the Italian case shows that successful open access competition is possible 
and that a large market exists, especially when the open access providers can 
attract customers from other modes of transportation. Italy has come a long way 
since market liberalisation and managed to set up a sound institutional system, 
learning from past mistakes. However, the incumbent is still a tough competitor, 
especially after its 180°-turnaround before 2012. 
When comparing the German and the Italian case, some similarities become 
apparent: in both cases, the dependency on the incumbents’ distribution 
systems varies between small and big players in the country in question. 
Arenaways, InterConnex, partly DB/ÖBB and HKX and Locomore in pre-
acquisition times had problems to reach all potential customers with their 
distribution systems and could not exploit the advantages of network effects. 
When DB/ÖBB were included in TI’s distribution system and when Locomore 
was distributed by the powerful system of FlixMobility, the economic situation of 
both competitors changed. The situation is different for NTV, it made a bigger 
market entry and managed to set up its own professional distribution system, 
also including local distribution centres. Its approach was big enough to address 
most possible customers. Due to the focus on point-to-point connections, the 
inclusion into TI’s network seems to be of lesser importance. In Italy and 
Germany, competitors which cannot get access to the incumbents’ distribution 
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system need to either find a successful and big distribution partner or build a big 
enough distribution platform which is expensive. Similarities also occur 
regarding the incumbents’ performance: DB Fv and TI are both strong 
competitors in the market, running a solid and dense network for years, having 
lots of experience and access to government funds. Both companies managed 
to change and adapt better to customer wishes in the past years, TI in a faster 
and more radical manner. This provides less scope for competitors’ attacks, if 
customers are satisfied with the incumbents in the first place. Both cases also 
show that adjustment to customer expectation is necessary, but no big market 
for luxury segments and premium offers exist. Customers in both countries can 
be attracted by low prices and show a relatively low willingness to pay for 
premium offers. This makes low-cost products very attractive. It also leads to 
the next similarity, the struggle of all open access competitors in both countries 
to become profitable. Locomore and Arenaways went bankrupt after only a 
couple of months, InterConnex withdrew from the market due to economic 
difficulties and NTV struggled hard in the first three years of operations. This 
shows that it is not easy in both countries to make profits by providing open 
access competition and that it takes time in the market before profits can be 
made. Regarding homologation, both cases show similarities too. The long and 
bureaucratic processes were a source of delays and a risk for open access 
providers. In both cases, this changed over recent years and the newest rolling 
stock homologations of NTV and Locomore show that it has become easier. 
The fact that access to paths is not transparent is similar in both cases. Open 
access competitors cannot know in advance, how likely they are to obtain 
attractive train paths and where possible slots may be found. This is a burden 
for open access providers in both countries.  




After looking at the similarities, some interesting differences may also be found 
between the two cases: what becomes apparent in the first place is the differing 
speed of implementation of law into action. Germany was quicker and more 
thorough in putting law into action, e.g. by setting up strong institutions more 
quickly. This took longer in Italy and led to more discrimination in the early days 
of competition. While both countries use the same scheme of unbundling, the 
holding structure led to bigger problems in Italy than in Germany, e.g. regarding 
intermediate stops or access to stations. Different rolling stock strategies were 
used by competitors from both countries: while German competitors used 
second-hand rolling stock and had problems with the technology or availability 
at the start, the Italian competitors mainly deploy new rolling stock. Also 
different is the active role that politicians played in the support of NTV in Italy: 
no German politicians or government actively intervened in the open access rail 
competition. What also differs is the investment in rail infrastructure: over the 
last decade, Italy set up an unmixed high-speed network which is ideal for the 
existence of open access competition. This was one of the main factors that 
attracted NTV. This situation cannot be compared to the German network. The 
structure of the railway market also differs between the German and the Italian 
case: while similar conditions apply to the whole German network, different 
conditions apply to the Italian conventional and high-speed network. While it is 
relatively easy to enter the high-speed network and conditions for open access 
competition are good, entry into the conventional network is not easy. Also, it 
shows that network effects in Italy do not play such a big role as in Germany, 
due to its polycentric structure. Some lines in Italy connect big centres in a short 
time, leading to more point-to-point travellers than in Germany. This is beneficial 
for NTV since it does not rely on the incumbent’s network. Another major 
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difference is the reaction of the rail market to the liberalisation of the coach 
market: in the German case, open access competitors as well as the incumbent 
suffered economically from the market entry of coach providers. Consequently, 
the customers’ willingness to pay declined and had an effect of the companies’ 
profitability. This was not the case in Italy: while conventional passenger rail 
was affected a little, it had almost no effect on the high-speed sector, regarding 
passenger figures and prices.  
The discussion and comparison of both cases reveals that the general set of 
influencing factors which formed the basis for this case study could be applied 
to both cases and revealed many similarities and differences. This shows that 
some factors seem to be an underlying basis of the railway industry in total and 
European standards (e.g. homologation, law in the books, access to distribution 
systems) while others seem to be country-specific and rely on the market, the 
market players and national governments. All in all, the two cases show that 
successful open access competition is possible, but it is not easy and many 
influencing factors need to be considered and obstacles solved.  
6.5.    Conclusion of the case study findings 
The previous discussion clearly shows that the set of factors from the Delphi 
study occurs in both cases and gives a good indication of influence on open 
access competition. It can be concluded that factors of a political/legal and 
economic nature have the greatest influence on open access competition, both 
in Italy and Germany. Access to attractive train paths and facilities and market 
potential and size are the main influencing factors, all having a positive 
influence on the existence of competition. Intermodal competitors, especially 
coach providers, have a very high influence in the German case and less 




influence in the Italian case. Low profitability of the industry and costs for 
infrastructure have a strongly negative effect on open access competition in 
both cases. The existence of law in the books and even more the 
implementation of law in action played an important role for the existence of 
open access competition in both cases. The weakest influencing factors, which 
played a minor role in the existence of open access competition in both cases, 
are consumer policy, railway safety, the sharing economy, customer loyalty, 
attitudes of the press and population towards competition, and the existence of 
innovation. The influence of the absence of technical harmonisation also proved 
surprisingly weak. 
The greatest shift of influencing factors over time affected the homologation 
process due to the improvements, the existence of intermodal competitors due 
to the liberalisation of the coach market, the incumbents’ performance due to 
the gradual (Germany) or disruptive adaptation to customer wishes (Italy) and 
also regarding fairness (Italy), and the access to distribution systems due to the 
new technological possibilities. Especially in Italy, law in action shifted a great 
deal since the proper implementation of independent and strong institutions 
started parallel to the entry of first competitors. The infrastructure prices for 
high-speed lines also show a shift due to the reduction. In Germany, a shift of 
customers’ willingness to pay is observed and due to the cheaper ticket options 
provided by coach companies, customers were not willing to pay the normal rail 
fares and rail had to adapt. Another shift can be observed regarding the 
existence of cooperation with other transport modes, shown by the cases of 
Locomore, HKX and FlixMobility.  
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The strongest interrelations between the factors are clearly political/legal 
factors, which form a basis for other factors: law in the books and law in action 
lay the foundation for liberalisation and access to attractive train paths, facilities, 
the functioning of unbundling within a holding structure and the incumbents’ 
performances. The time gap in the implementation of law into action in Italy 
shows this well, in comparison to the German case. Further interrelations can 
be found regarding the low profitability in the industry, which is clearly 
connected to customers’ low willingness to pay and their expectations, to the 
high costs for infrastructure and the high costs of rolling stock (especially if 
rolling stock is bought new) as well as the access to distribution systems and 
the high costs of setting up a functioning distribution system if a sufficient 















7.    Chapter 7: Discussion 
After the in-depth presentation of the research outcome of the literature 
research, Delphi study and case study, this chapter assembles all findings and 
analyses and discusses them from an overall perspective. In so doing, the 
research findings are once again validated and triangulated. This results in an 
overall picture, from which the core findings are drawn and on which the 
recommendations for politicians and companies are made (see chapter 8). 
Firstly, issues of validity, reliability and generalisability are discussed. Then, 
strength and type of influencing factors are re-evaluated, filled into a scheme, 
and discussed. Finally, the correlation and shift of factors is discussed.  
7.1.  Discussion of issues of validity, reliability and generalisability 
“The first concern of most qualitative researchers is with the factual accuracy of 
their account”, states Maxwell (1992, p. 285). A great effort was therefore 
directed towards achieving descriptive validity in this thesis: all filled-out 
questionnaires were mapped, the analysed written sources of the case study 
were copied and saved, and the interviews were recorded and filled into a data 
collection form, which was verified by the interviewees. To guarantee 
interpretive validity, coding was used in the free-text-fields of the Delphi study 
and the number of mentions of factors and issues by the participants was 
decisive for the interpretation of findings. For the case study, a qualitative 
content analysis was used to guarantee the validity of the concentration and 
interpretation of the rich data. To achieve evaluative validity, Mitroff & Turoff’s 
philosophical research approach of “Inquiring Systems” was used for this 
research. The combination of Singerian and Lockean IS guarantees that the 
evaluation of data takes into consideration that the knowledge of the 
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participants is dependent on their situation and their experience and must be 
scrutinised against their backgrounds. It further considers that input prepresents 
the personal opinion of participants and that the validity is always challenged by 
the degree of consensus.  
The concept of reliability is mainly applicable to quantitative research and 
therefore, reliability in this research context is equalled with consistency of data. 
To ensure consistency of data for this thesis, a triangulation of different types 
and sources of data was used. The Delphi study draws on a group of 30 
experts, which were recruited according to pre-defined criteria. The case study 
used a variety of qualitative and quantitative data from different official sources 
as well as expert interviews. The comparison of the Delphi findings and the 
case study findings show that the framework of influencing factors could be 
confirmed (see section 7.2.).    
Generalisation “plays a different role in qualitative research than it does in 
quantitative and experimental research” (Maxwell 1992, p. 293). This thesis is 
not designed for systematic generalisation, the findings can only be generalised 
to a certain degree. Since the research scope is limited to open access 
competition in the EU, the findings can only be generalised on EU level and 
only give an indication of influencing factors in the long-distance passenger rail 
industry. The described EU regulation defines the number and the strength of 
influencing factors, as shown in 7.3. The combination of research methodology 
in this thesis shows that a generalisation on EU level is possible. The Delphi 
findings mainly focus on five countries, however, the literature review and the 
case study show that the developed framework of influencing factors proved to 
be valid on general EU level. What is expected to vary to some degree is the 
exact ranking of factors and their type, as shown in 7.2. As in most case study 




research, these case study findings are only generalisable to a small degree. 
Within the framework of this thesis, the observed cases served as a deep dive 
which filled the developed list of influencing factors with practical examples. 
Some examples might give an indication of general cause-and-effect 
relationships. However, an overall generalisation is not possible. 
7.2.    Discussion of influencing factors  
To merge all findings and discuss them holistically, this section starts by 
bringing the data from the different research parts together in one table. The 
basis is set by the Delphi framework with the influencing factors collected and 
rated. The findings from the German and the Italian case show conformity or 
deviation and further indications from other countries are also taken into 
consideration. Since it is difficult to quantify the variances, symbols are used 
whereas “=” means conformance, “▼“ negative deviation, and ”▲“ positive 
deviation from the Delphi framework. Regarding the type of influence, “++” 
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(4) Access to and availability of attractive train 
paths ++ 1 = = = 
(10) Market potential and market size of the 
OD, the line or the network ++ 2 = = = 
(13) Presence of intermodal competitors -- 
3 
= ▼ ▼ 
(15) Generally low profitability of the industry -- = ▼ = 
(11) Costs for infrastructure - = = = 
(28) Access to rolling stock + 4 = ▼ = 
(3) Access to facilities as well as data + 5 = = = 
(31) Homologation process -- 6 ▼ ▼ ▼ 
(29) Lack of technical harmonisation within the 
EU 
-- 7 ▼ ▼ ▼ 
(5) Facilitation and attitude of government and 
politicians 
+ 8 ▼ = = 
(25) Customers’ willingness to pay + 9 ▲ = ▲ 
(26) Entrepreneurship ++ 10 ▲ ▲ ▲ 
(12) Access to distribution systems + 11 ▲ ▲ ▲ 
(2) Existing law in action + 12 = ▲ ▲ 
(6) Unbundling ++ 
13 
= ▲ = 
(16) Access to financing + = = = 
(20) Possibility for cherry-picking in the market ++ 14 = ▲ = 
(7) State of and investment in infrastructure + 15 = ▲ = 
(18) Cross-financing of RUs in the market and 
a lack of transparency 
-- 16 ▼ = = 
(14) Existence of network effects for 
incumbents 
-- 17 ▲ ▼ = 
(21) Existence of (strong) unions -- 18 ▼ ▼ ▼ 
(1) Existing EU and national law in the books + 19 ▲ ▲ ▲ 
(24) Adjustment to customer expectation ++ 
20 
= = = 
(33) Availability of necessary personnel + = = = 
(34) Incumbent’s performance + 
21 
▲ ▲ ▲ 
(30) Existence of innovation ++ = = = 
(17) Existence of cooperation or coopetition 
within the industry ++ 22 = = = 
(27) Attitude of press and population towards 
competition ++ 23 
= = = 
(22) Customer loyalty - = = = 
(8) Willingness or ability to subsidise 
operations in the country 
+ 24 ▼ ▲ ▲ 
(19) Existence of cooperation with other 
transport modes 
++ 25 ▲ ▲ ▲ 
(23) Sharing economy -- 26 = = = 
(32) Railway safety systems - 27 = = = 
(9) Consumer policy  - 28 = = = 
Table 32: Holistic examination of influencing factors (author’s own diagram) 
In the following, the influencing factors are discussed, focussing on the 
conformity and deviation between the Delphi rating and the case findings:   




Access to and availability of attractive train paths is the strongest influencing 
factor and therefore the most important, which all cases confirm. The Italian 
case in particular reveals how important attractive train paths are and that the 
absence of this factor leaves the competitors with no chance to survive. 
Sometimes, as in Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic, it is a struggle to 
get attractive slots on the most frequented lines due to absence of capacity and 
high capacity utilisation by the incumbents. Also, transparency regarding free 
capacity in the network is mostly absent. However, access to attractive train 
paths generally exists in the countries investigated, which influences 
competition positively, forming the basis for current and future services.  
Market potential and market size clearly are important pre-conditions for the 
existence of competition and therefore play an important role. This can be 
observed in the Delphi study and all cases. The examples of NTV, RegioJet, 
LEO, WESTbahn, and Locomore in particular show that most competitors enter 
on cherry-lines, where high market potential exists which demonstrates the 
high, positive rating. Also, the shift from intermodal competitors to rail and the 
increasing rail passenger figures in the countries observed form a positive basis 
for competition.  
The presence of intermodal competitors has high influence on open access 
competition. Motorised private transport is the biggest competitor preventing 
people from using public transport. It is therefore considered highly negative by 
the Delphi panel. Coach competitors in particular have influenced competition 
negatively in recent years. However, the observed cases show that the degree 
of influence varies strongly between countries: while the liberalisation of coach 
transportation has affected competitors in Germany and Austria strongly, it has 
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no significant effect on the high-speed services of NTV. However, in Germany 
and the Czech Republic, cooperation between both transport modes also 
proved beneficial for competition, in the cases of RegioJet, Locomore and HKX. 
This thesis shows that intermodal competition generally is a threat to open 
access providers, but to be successful, RUs need to think about new ways of 
cooperation to skim the market potential of more people shifting from cars to 
public transport. The analysis also shows that due to the differing cost structure 
(e.g. rolling stock, infrastructure fees), and higher flexibility of operations, no 
level playing field between coaches, cars and rail exists.  
Open access competitors in the market show that the generally low profitability 
of long-distance passenger rail. Small RUs like Locomore and Arenaways prove 
this, but also bigger providers like NTV and LEO struggle for profitability. 
Therefore this factor has a strongly negative influence on competition, since it 
also hinders potential competitors from entering the market. While conformity 
exists between the Delphi rating and most cases, the Italian case shows a 
deviation: the examples of NTV show that profitable operation is possible. It 
usually takes some years’ time to reach break-even, this requires enough funds 
to survive the first few years. However, the analysis also shows that big 
incumbents also rely on state subsidies or investments to operate trains at high-
quality level, especially in regions with lower market potential.  
Costs for infrastructure is closely connected to the previous factor. With an 
average of 25-30% of total costs, this influences competition strongly and 
negatively. While a general conformity between the Delphi rating and the cases 
exists on the strength of the factor, differences between the countries under 
investigation occur: prices in the Czech Republic are lower than in Germany 
and access charges for the Italian high-speed network have been reduced over 




recent years. The example of NTV proves how positive the effect of reduced 
infrastructure costs can be, both for the incumbent and customers. This factor 
also presents a competitive disadvantage to intermodal competitors, e.g. 
coaches.  
Access to rolling stock is a basic condition to operate services and therefore 
has a high influence on competition, mostly a positive one. Conformity exists 
between the Delphi rating and the cases, however in the Italian case the 
influence of rolling stock is slightly lower than in the other cases. In the 
countries under investigation, access to new rolling stock is possible without 
problems, as soon as sufficient funds exist. Big manufacturers are willing to sell 
to all RUs. A problem is that the market for second-hand rolling stock is limited 
in most countries, which is an entry barrier for those operators that cannot 
afford new rolling stock in the first stage, like HKX, Locomore and RegioJet. In 
the existing literature, access to rolling stock is mostly described more 
negatively than appears to be the case, but the access to financing plays a big 
role.  
Access to facilities and data is closely related to access to paths. It therefore 
plays an important role and is rated as positive, conformity exists between the 
Delphi rating and the cases. With a further implementation of law into action and 
with more experience and increased professionalism of incumbents and 
authorities, less discrimination occurs with regard to facilities as the Italian and 
German cases show. Access to data, especially commercial or ticketing data, is 
still not provided in most countries but seems not to be a deal-breaker for 
competitors. Since this influencing factor is so closely connected to path 
access, it should be considered as one factor for future studies.  
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The homologation process and the lack of technical harmonisation within the 
EU are of medium importance, both are rated highly negative. However, a 
deviation exists between the case study findings, the analysis of the other 
countries and the Delphi findings. The high rating of the Delphi panel could not 
be confirmed. On the one hand, this is due to the great improvement of the 
homologation process in all countries under investigation. On the other hand, 
the absence of technical harmonisation plays mainly a role for international 
services, where open access competition remains rare. RUs like Locomore, 
HKX and RegioJet show that import and refurbishment of second-hand rolling 
stock in Europe is possible. Overall, the two factors play a role of medium 
importance for competition, still providing some complexity for rolling stock 
procurement and market entry. The planned improvements with regards to 
vehicle authorisation in the 4th Railway Package can further improve the 
situation.  
The facilitation and attitude of government and politicians towards competition 
plays a role for competition and is positive. A positive attitude towards 
competition can be seen in all countries which forms the basis for competition. 
Most countries reveal no negative intervention by government and politicians; 
however, the positive attitude scarcely results in proactive support for 
competitors, as seen in the example of NTV in Italy. This is also due to the fact 
that incumbents are still state-owned and serve the countries’ purposes. The 
German case shows a slight deviation, since no noteworthy intervention could 
be observed, and the influence of this factors is therefore slightly lower.   
Customers’ willingness to pay has a strong influence on competition, especially 
since it is connected so closely to market potential. In Germany and other cases 
like the Czech Republic or Austria, the importance of this factor is even higher 




than indicated in the Delphi rating. Overall, this factor is perceived as a positive 
influence. In Italy and Sweden, customers are shifting from other transport 
modes, e.g. car and air to rail, and are willing to pay an adequate price, 
especially in the profitable business sector. However, the German example 
shows that when customers are price-sensitive and the RU’s strategy is to offer 
low-price tickets, the RUs are highly vulnerable to intermodal competition, 
especially coaches. Therefore, it can also have a negative influence as the 
examples of InterConnex and HKX show.  
Entrepreneurship is a factor which becomes apparent only at second glance. It 
is rated medium important and plays a highly positive role for competitors. The 
observed cases show a deviation from the Delphi rating: the examples of 
Locomore, HKX, RegioJet and WESTbahn show how important a strong and 
determined entrepreneur is to overcome entry barriers in the first place. NTV’s 
example shows how important the entrepreneurs’ networks are to access 
financing and to do lobbying, something that Arenaways could not achieve. A 
strong entrepreneur seems to compensate for the role of the state backing up 
the incumbent. Also, most entrepreneurs behind competitors have experience 
in, or an emotional connection to rail transportation, which makes them more 
passionate towards the product.  
Access to distribution systems plays an important role and has a positive 
influence on competition. With regards to this factor, a clear deviation exists: the 
case study shows that it is even more important than the expert panel’s rating 
and digitalisation made it easier for competitors to distribute tickets. However, 
while more and more tickets are sold online, some stationary distribution is still 
important for customers, which competitors like NTV, LEO, MTR and 
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WESTbahn implemented in their distribution strategy. It also shows that setting 
up a new distribution system is costly and cannot be afforded by all new 
entrants. The particular examples of DB/ÖBB in Italy and Locomore and HKX in 
Germany show how important a big distribution partner can be for profitability. 
Overall, much more potential exists regarding partnerships with distribution 
platforms, incumbents, intermodal players, and competitors.  
Existing law in action and in the books plays an important role for open access 
competition. While the Delphi rating places this factors in the middle range and 
the lower middle range, the case study indicates that the importance is greater 
than rated by the Delphi panel. The insolvency of Arenaways compared to the 
success of NTV in Italy gives a clear indication: a sound implementation of 
regulations, combined with strong and independent authorities promote 
competition. However, the two influencing factors might not be perceived as so 
important by the industry, since they are the pre-condition for many other 
factors and trigger competition indirectly, as described in detail in section 7.3.  
Unbundling has a strongly positive influence on competition and is of medium 
importance. Conformity exists except for the Italian case. The Italian example 
reveals in particular how important a clear and monitored separation between 
IM and RU is, regarding Arenaways’ insolvency and the market entry of NTV. 
Experience from the Czech Republic supports this. Separation in combination 
with a strong and independent authority promotes competition greatly. It also 
influences the incumbents’ performance and prevents discrimination, also 
encouraging more RUs to enter the market.  
The access to financing plays a role for competition and is rated as positive. 
Despite the existing conformity between the Delphi rating and the case study 




findings, the access to financing varies between countries and competitiors, as 
the examples show: while it was possible for NTV to access funds in Italy and 
LEO in the Czech Republic, it proved to be more difficult for Locomore, HKX 
and other potential entrants in Germany. Locomore finally used a crowdfunding 
approach to gain funds, which failed due to the relatively small amount of 
money for the railway industry. The analysis also shows that no level playing 
field exists between incumbents and competitors, since incumbents can mostly 
access government funds at good conditions.  
The possibility for cherry-picking proves to be of medium-high influence and is 
highly positive for competitors. In the Italian case, this factor shows a deviation: 
the possibility for cherry-picking proved to be of higher importance as in other 
countries. Most providers like NTV, LEO, RegioJet and FlixMobility make use of 
cherry-lines and compete with the incumbents on their most profitable lines. 
Since those lines are mostly not subsidised by the state, competition cannot be 
hindered. It also shows that this factor is closely connected to market potential, 
since the high passenger figures lower the risk for market entry.  
The state of, and investment in infrastructure has a medium and positive 
influence on competition. Again, this factor shows a great variation between 
countries: while high investment in high-speed infrastructure played a significant 
role in the market entry of NTV and helped WESTbahn. It is only of medium 
influence in other countries like Germany and the Czech Republic, where the 
infrastructure is intact. Therefore, especially the Italian case shows a positive 
deviation from the Delphi rating and is considered as more important for Italian 
competition. The importance of this factor is increased when bigger market 
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potential can be accessed by incumbent and competitors due to improved 
infrastructure conditions.  
Cross-financing of RUs and a lack of transparency is a highly negative influence 
and has medium strength, due also to strict regulation. The examples show that 
in some countries, it seems to play no role, e.g. in Germany. Therefore, a 
deviation between the Delphi rating and the German case exits. In other 
countries, cross-financing, especially of PSO-money supports incumbents in 
price wars, e.g. in the Czech Republic and in Austria. Therefore, it can be a 
danger for competitors and strong regulatory authorities are important.  
The existence of network effects for incumbents affects competitors negatively 
and has a medium influence. The examples show that how strong the influence 
of network effects is, always depends on the individual services. Therefore, a 
deviation between the Delphi and the case study findings exists: in Germany, 
the network effects of FlixBus help the rail products of Locomore and later 
FlixMobility to weaken the influence of the incumbents’ network effects. In Italy, 
the city-to-city connections of NTV are not fundamentally dependent on network 
effects. For other smaller competitors, e.g. HKX or Arenaways, it was a major 
negative influence.  
The existence of unions was rated as medium important and negative by the 
Delphi panel. The investigation of the German and Italian cases and examples 
from other countries, however, showed a deviation: the importance of unions 
seems to have only a low influence on competition. While unions played no role 
at all in the German case, and played a small role in the Italian case, the 
influence was manageable and a level playing field with the incumbent exists. 




When considering Austria, Sweden and the Czech Republic, no significant 
interference with competition can be observed.  
Adjustment to customer expectation has a medium and positive influence on 
competition. This is indicated by the Delphi panel and the case study and 
conformity exists. It is interesting that some competitors perceived it differently 
before market entry: NTV and LEO planned a product differentiation strategy by 
offering better quality and small-sized premium areas, Locomore tried to attract 
customers by offering e.g. social seating. The examples show, however, that a 
basic quality and good prices seem to attract the customers more and no large 
premium could be charged by offering these extras. In the end, the companies 
were forced to adapt to this expectation.  
The availability of necessary personnel is a medium influence, rated as mainly 
positive. The examples in all countries under investigation show that the 
necessary personnel exist, and a conformity is given between Delphi rating and 
case study findings. However, in some cases, e.g. train drivers, it becomes 
more difficult to find appropriate personnel than it was in the past. This is 
especially the case in countries with a low unemployment rate, e.g. in Germany. 
It is likely that this factor might change into a stronger, negative factor in the 
next decade due to demographic change and the growing shortage of skilled 
workers available in this field. 
The incumbent’s performance is rated as medium-low important and positive for 
open access competition. This factor shows a great deviation between the 
Delphi rating and the case study findings: in the observed cases, some degree 
of discrimination took place, especially in Italy, which was of high importance for 
the open access competitors. Further, the incumbent’s performance is very 
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influencial: a good performance and a high market coverage leave little market 
potential for open access providers. This is one reason to explain the low 
market share of competition in Germany.  
The existence of innovation is rated as very positive, but the factor’s influence is 
not yet very great. Conformity exists between the Delphi and the case study 
findings. Examples show that competitors make use of IT innovations, 
especially in the field of distribution, where the greatest positive effect can be 
seen. Product innovations are used by some competitors, but they have no 
significant effect on the number of customers, e.g. InterConnex’s childcare 
programme or Locomore’s social seating. It will be interesting to observe these 
factors in the next few years, due to the great potential that lies especially in 
digitalisation.  
The existence of cooperation or coopetition within the railway industry is rated 
as weak, but very positive. This is confirmed by the case study findings, too. 
Some cooperation between open access operators can be observed, e.g. HKX 
with regional transport providers, DB-ÖBB with TI or RegioJet’s attempt to 
cooperate with DB Fv on the Berlin-Prague line. Most of them were profitable 
for the competitor, but this factor has not been a great game-changer in the 
past. Especially on international lines, incumbents often have cooperation 
agreements with other incumbents and jointly run those lines. For them, this 
minimises the risk for open access competition by neighbouring incumbents and 
might block market potential for private open access providers on international 
lines. 
Despite a variety of customer loyalty programmes of most competitors and 
incumbents, customer loyalty and the attitude of press and population towards 




competition only have a weak and negative influence. Despite having a positive 
attitude towards competition, customers in the railway industry do not seem to 
be very loyal if they are provided with different options, and low prices can 
incentivise them to switch between companies. This can be observed in all 
countries under investigation and in the Delphi rating. Despite the negative 
rating of customer loyalty, this factor can also be beneficial for competitors, 
since it implies that customers are not loyal to the incumbents either. 
Willingness or ability to subsidise operations varies greatly between the 
countries under investigation. In Germany, no willingness to subsidise long-
distance passenger rail exist and therefore positive conditions and freedom are 
provided for competitors. In Italy, a high degree of the non-high-speed long-
distance network is still subsidised, which makes it almost impossible for 
competitors to compete on these lines. The Austrian and Czech examples 
confirm this. Still, the unwillingness to subsidise profitable lines provides 
competitors with a fair chance to compete against the incumbents. The factor is 
therefore considered as slightly positive, but rather weak in total comparison. 
The existence of cooperation with other transport modes is rated as a low but 
very positive influence on competition. However, compared to the Delphi rating, 
the cases of Locomore, WESTbahn and RegioJet indicate that the influence is 
much greater than perceived by the panel: a cooperation with FlixMobilty and 
LEO saved the insolvent Locomore and the sound coach network of 
StudentAgency enabled RegioJet to start operations in the first place. For 
others, small partnerships e.g. with regional providers like HKX, did not improve 
the business case significantly. In future, competitors should closely consider 
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intermodal partners to optimise the business, also with regard to distribution and 
network effects.  
The sharing economy, railway safety systems and consumer policy have no 
great influence on competition. While the provision of rail safety and consumer 
policy is a basis to operate in the market, no significant effect on competition 
can be identified. The sharing economy is rated as weak but very negative by 
the Delphi panel, but evidence from Germany and Italy shows that the sharing 
economy is still too weak to harm competition.  
Bearing all this in mind, these findings result in the following Force Field 
Analysis. The Force Field Analysis was originally developed by Kurt Lewin in 
1963 as a tool to show driving and restraining forces which result in some form 
of state of equilibrium in a social context. Lewin describes how a person or a 
group finds itself in a state of tension, which is dependent on the number of 
driving and restraining forces (Döring & Glasl 2008). This model is transferred 
into the context of this research project, revealing the negative and positive 
influencing factors on open access competition in the form of arrows. The 
strength of factors is shown by the length of the arrow. The darker coloured 
arrows show a more positive/more negative influence. The overall sum of forces 
describes the balance of the system.  





Illustration 20: Force Field Analysis of influencing factors (adapted from Döring & Glasl 2008) 
The Force Field Analysis reveals that the positive, driving factors outnumber the 
negative, restraining factors that influence competition. This indicates that the 
overall setting of open access competition in the countries under investigation is 
positive. Two-thirds of identified factors also encourage competition while one 
third still holds back competition. However, the analysis needs to be considered 
under the premise that mean values on a European level are used. This means 
that in the different country cases, the force field might look slightly different. For 
example, in the German case the existence of unions is not as negative as 
shown above. In the Italian case, the existence of intermodal competitors would 
not be rated as strong. The state of and investment in infrastructure in the high-
speed sector would also be more positive and stronger.  
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Overall, the discussion of the influencing factors draws a positive picture of the 
conditions for open access competition, also showing some need for 
improvement. It once again becomes apparent that differences occur between 
the European countries and that the factors need to be considered individually, 
depending on the country of operation. 
7.3.    Discussion of correlations of influencing factors  
As described in chapter 2, the network industry is a complex industry with many 
natural interdependencies, caused by the reliance on the infrastructure, 
specialised technology and the need for basic regulation to avoid discrimination. 
Consequently, most factors identified somehow relate to each other and form a 
network of influencing factors. While the findings from the Delphi study only 
allowed indications about the correlation of factors, the in-depth analysis of the 
case study made the existing correlations more apparent. Overall, the network 
can be divided into three parts or sub-networks: the first degree of interrelation 
is of a political and legal nature, it forms the basis for open access competition 
by providing the underlying legitimation of its existence. The second degree of 
interrelation is the market-sided conditions for open access competition, it forms 
the economic basis to survive profitably in the market. The third degree of 
interrelation can be considered as optimisation measures which are not a pre-
condition for the existence of open access competition, but add to the 
profitability and success of the RUs. The following diagram gives an overview of 
the correlation of factors, thereby focusing on the most prominent ones. The 
factors marked in red act as nodes in the network since many factors are 
correlated to them. The factors marked in light grey find themselves on the 
outer edge of the network with less important correlations.  





Illustration 21: Overview of correlations between influencing factors (author’s own diagram) 
This diagram allows a good overview of the nodes in the system which are of 
high relevance for the development of the other influencing factors, proving the 
theoretical basis outlined in chapter 2. The existence of law in the books and 
the implementation of law into action form the basis for open access 
competition in the first place. The two factors influence several other factors 
directly and strongly, e.g. unbundling, intermodal competition, homologation, 
technical harmonisation, willingness to subsidise, and cherry-picking. Some of 
these are rated as strong influencing factors in the Delphi study and reveal a 
massive influence in the case study, too. They can therefore be described as 
the motor or catalyst of open access competition. The Italian case shows this 
impressively: when the law in the books was properly implemented and gaps in 
the regulations were closed, other factors like unbundling, access to train paths, 
and the performance of the incumbent were improved, thereby triggering the 
successful market entry of NTV, when Arenaways failed a few years earlier. 
Unbundling, which is directly influenced by law in the books and law in action, 
functions as a node itself by directly affecting cross-financing, access to train 
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paths and facilities and the performance of the incumbent. The incumbent’s 
performance, which is again influenced by unbundling, also influences several 
other factors, including market-related conditions. The German case proves 
how difficult it can be for a competitor to enter the market, where a fair but 
strong incumbent dominates.  
The second sub-network are market-sided conditions, a node form market 
potential and market size: the factor is directly connected to access to 
distribution systems, access to financing, customers’ willingness to pay, low 
profitability and access to train paths/facilities, the incumbents’ performance and 
other factors. Some of these factors are also rated as strong in the Delphi study. 
The findings from the case study also show that once the legal/political 
preconditions exist, the market decides upon the success of an RU: Locomore 
went bankrupt due to insufficient financial resources, customers’ low willingness 
to pay and not enough passengers due to an inefficient distribution system. 
After the takeover by LEO and FlixMobility, those factors were influenced 
positively and market potential could be skimmed more efficiently. The Czech 
example, with two competitors in the market, also shows that once a big enough 
market and number of regular passengers exist, competitors can co-exist. The 
example of WESTbahn in Austria and MTR Express in Sweden also proves 
that. The political precondition that cherry-picking is allowed plays a big role. 
The three smaller nodes, customers’ willingness to pay, low profitability and 
access to financing also have a strong interrelation with market potential and 
market size. Experience from Germany shows that intermodal competition can 
influence willingness to pay directly, resulting in low profitability of RUs. 
Arenaways and the early Locomore reveal that access to financing and 
insufficient financial resources in the start-up situation are strongly influenced by 




the incumbents’ performance, entrepreneurship and the availability of rolling 
stock and its prices, which in turn influences profitability.  
The third degree of optimisation measures reveals no additional nodes in the 
system, but adds to the above-named nodes, as shown in the case study. In the 
two analysed cases as in the other countries under investigation, innovations, 
customer loyalty, the attitude of press and population as well as cooperation 
and adaptation to customer expectation are supporting factors that trigger 
others and work for the optimisation of a running system. For example, the 
experience from FlixMobility, Locomore and HKX in Germany indicates how 
beneficial partnerships outside the railway industry can be and that some 
potential might not yet be exhausted.  
The hypothesis of a network of interrelated factors influencing open access 
competition can therefore be confirmed. All factors cannot be analysed in a 
stand-alone perspective and decisions made by politicians, incumbents and 
open access providers need to incorporate the other influencing factors that 
relate to the factor under investigation. The diagram developed can provide a 
good guideline for that.  
The diagram also provides an explanation for the question of why the most 
liberalised countries, e.g. Germany, show so little competition. The first sub-
network, the pre-conditions from the political and legal basics, mostly exist, 
such as separation of IM and RU, strong authorities that monitor this, no 
subsidies for the incumbent, with the possibility of further cherry-picking. 
However, some factors have a direct and negative influence on the second sub-
network, the market-related conditions: access to train paths generally exists, 
but due to the dense network of the incumbent and regional and cargo RUs on 
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the lines, it is more difficult to find free attractive slots that provide enough 
market potential than in Italian high-speed rail, for example. The incumbent’s 
strong market position also influences competitors’ market potential and market 
size, despite a large market for mobility in Germany. The incumbent’s strong 
position makes access to financing for competitors more difficult, which again 
affects the accessibility of rolling stock. The example shows that it is not only 
the individual influencing factors which make competition difficult in countries, 
but the dependency on one another and the series of effects.  
7.4.    Discussion of shift of influencing factors  
Over the last decade, some shifts of influencing factors took place all over 
Europe. Again, the shifts vary between countries and reveal different directions 
and strength. The indications given in the Delphi study could be confirmed in 
practice. Below, the most apparent and interesting shifts of factors are 
discussed:  
The access to distribution systems has changed over recent years, but the shift 
took place on different levels, as described in section 7.2.: digitalisation has 
changed distribution in the entire transportation industry. Mobile and online 
ticketing make RUs more independent from stationary distribution points and 
reduce complexity and costs. Therefore a basic ticket distribution can be 
guaranteed with limited financial resources, by offering a website, apps and a 
call centre as seen by all open access competitors currently in the market. This 
can be considered as a great, positive shift towards competition. Nevertheless, 
the incumbents' network effects, prominence and wide recognition in the 
population and the preference of some customers to buy the tickets in 
stationary offices or on ticket machines influence the open access RUs’ success 




to a great degree, as Locomore and HKX prove. In some cases the market 
potential cannot be skimmed efficiently and conventional distribution systems 
still play a role. NTV, LEO, MTR and RegioJet solved this problem by building 
their own distribution structure with new technology, ticket machines and sales 
offices, which led to additional fixed and variable costs. WESTbahn sells tickets 
in “Trafiken” (kiosks) all over Austria. Locomore accessed the wide distribution 
system of FlixMobility after the takeover. DB/ÖBB managed to enter TI’s 
distribution system. Overall, it can be said that access to a distribution system 
became easier in recent years, the ground was prepared by digitalisation. 
However, to access the entire market potential, powerful distribution partners or 
a high investment in stationary distribution infrastructure are necessary. 
However, their importance has decreased and is likely to decline with advancing 
digitalisation.  
With the liberalisation of coach transportation in some European countries, the 
influence of intermodal competitors on long-distance rail has shifted greatly. The 
German case in particular proves this: within a short period of time, numerous 
new coach competitors entered the market and offered services on a variety of 
new lines, offering tickets at a low price. This also attracted rail customers and 
had a direct influence on the price level and the incumbent’s and open access 
competitors’ profitability. A similar development can be found in Austria and to 
some extent in Sweden. In the Italian case, the influence of coach providers on 
competition has not increased as strongly as in other countries. Another aspect 
of intermodal competitors, which appeared in recent years, is the possibility of 
profitable partnerships: RegioJet in the Czech Republic used to be a mere 
subsidiary of the coach company Student Agency and LEO cooperates with 
FlixMobility in Germany to run Locomore. Intermodal competition not only 
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moved to a greater extent to open access competition, but also became a 
potential partner for competitors. The future will show how RUs use this 
potential to move more passengers to public transport, which would be 
beneficial for the whole system.  
Another shift can be observed regarding the homologation process which has 
improved over the last decade, as can be seen in the Italian and German cases. 
In the past, it used to be a big bottleneck, deterring investors and RUs alike. 
Today, handling in the institutions has become more professional and fairer, 
and also takes less time. Therefore its negative influence on competition has 
decreased. When considering the other countries under investigation, it is 
shown that the recent homologation of rolling stock has not been a problem: 
WESTbahn in Austria recently homologated new Stadler KISS trains without 
any delays and complications, examples from Sweden support this thesis. 
Homologation is still a precondition to offer safe and well-functioning rail 
transport, but it cannot be considered a major entry barrier nowadays.  
Implemented law in action also shows a shift over the last decade, especially in 
some countries. While Germany and Sweden were considered as advanced 
countries regarding liberalisation by the LIB-Index in 2011, the Czech Republic, 
Austria and Italy lagged behind. This, however, has changed in recent years. 
The implementation of law in the book into action has made the handling of 
competition in those countries more professional. The early competitors, e.g. 
Arenaways, DB/ÖBB, InterConnex and RegioJet, were forced to deal with 
discrimination of the IMs and the incumbents. Due to the implementation of 
independent and strong authorities, the rights of open access RUs are 
enforced, protecting them from major cases of discrimination in most fields. 




Some further steps need to be taken, but the work of recent years is paying off, 
making open access competition more likely in Europe.  
Low profitability has been an influencing factor for the industry for decades. The 
obligation to provide public transport for the population combined with the high 
costs were one reason why railways were state-owned for a long time. With 
improvements in technology and within the organisational structure, profitability 
has increased. Still, the case remains critical, as the insolvencies of Arenaways 
and Locomore and the bad economic situation of most other open access RUs 
show. This factor became more negative in the last few years, due to the 
market entry of low-cost coach services, the increase of operating costs, 
especially infrastructure costs, and rolling stock costs. The intensity of 
competition and the reduction triggered in ticket prices influence the 
incumbents’ and competitors’ profitability. The positive consequence is that 
incumbents need to change and become more efficient to be competitive in the 
future. Still, it remains a danger for open access competitors and needs to be 
closely monitored by politicians, since it has the potential to steal the basis of 
open access competition's existence.  
Overall, it can be said that some major steps towards a liberalised market have 
been taken in the recent years and entry barriers have been reduced. However, 
some open issues exist which need to be addressed in the next few years to 
promote open access competition. The negative trends, e.g. low profitability, 
need to be closely investigated and countermeasures need to be developed on 
a transport system level.  
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8.  Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This chapter draws conclusions from the thesis. Firstly, the core findings are 
stated. Then, recommendations for politicians and companies are given while 
referencing the core findings. Finally, some suggestions for further research are 
made, also taking questions into consideration which have not been answered 
in this thesis.  
8.1.  Core findings  
Competition in the European long-distance passenger rail is an interesting 
phenomenon to investigate: feared by incumbents, longed for by unsatisfied 
customers, treated with ambivalence by politicians, and followed with interest by 
press and researchers. This thesis aimed to give a detailed picture of open 
access competition in the market and its journey over the last years: it identified 
34 factors influencing competition, their mutual correlations in form of a tight 
network and their partial shift over time. To answer the research questions, a 
PESTLE-analysis was used to provide structure and guidelines, a Delphi study 
was applied to construct the theoretical framework and a final case study filled 
the framework with practical examples.  
What becomes clear is that the introduction of open access competition into the 
long-distance passenger rail industry proved to be extremely difficult. Up to 
now, open access competition has not been able to assert itself: in Germany, 
Austria and in Sweden, no significant market share could be achieved by 
competitors and in most member states, open access competition does not 
exist yet. In the Czech Republic and in Italy, moderate market shares could be 
attained, but only on individual lines and not on the entire network. But what 
made the introduction of open access competition so difficult? The first reason 




is that the introduction of the legal environment took a long time: law in the 
books needed to be introduced into action and the necessary institutions and 
authorities needed to be established. The insolvency of Arenaways in Italy is a 
good example of what happens in case this is not yet given. The entry into a 
market, which is not yet regulated and monitored properly, proved to be very 
risky and often unsuccessful. This clearly prevented potential competitors from 
entering the market. Another reason is the difficult economic situation of the first 
RUs. HKX and InterConnex as well as Locomore in Germany did not break 
even and had to leave the market. It can be stated that open access 
competitors need to have a long breath to be successful, as the cases of 
RegioJet in Czech Republic and NTV in Italy show. This, combined with high 
investments and economic risks, might further prevent companies from market 
entry. Further, this thesis shows that a number of influencing factors need to be 
present in order to achieve the right competitive environment, as section 7.3. 
shows. If this is not given, market entry is not possible as the cases of MSM and 
derschnellzug.de in Germany show. Still, the companies operating in the market 
show that the introduction of open access competition has been successful to 
some degree: it took a long time and a series of setbacks but the Delphi study 
and the case study show that a development took place over time and 
successful open access competition is possible. 
However, competitive markets could only be introduced into some areas of the 
industry: open access providers operate especially on profitable ODs, which 
connect big cities or metropolitan areas. This is the case in Italy, Czech 
Republic and Germany. Particularly if the train connection is faster or as fast as 
intermodal competitors, open access is successful. Then, also market shares 
from other transport modes can be acquired. This leads to a big market 
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potential, which could attract further open access competitors in the future. 
Especially the Czech example shows that in a country, where the incumbent 
operator provides low quality, open access providers offering good quality and 
innovative services, have a better chance to succeed and to be profitable in the 
long run. What this thesis also shows is that competition on secondary routes 
and in more regional areas could not yet be introduced successfully. Some 
examples exist, like InterConnex, but generally the existence of PSO, the higher 
degree of intermodal competitors (especially car and coach services) and the 
smaller market volume prevent the existence of open access competition on 
those lines.  
Still, the current examples of open access competition show that the long 
journey was worth the efforts, and that the introduction of open access 
competition is beneficial on many levels: a demand for open access providers 
exists. The examples from Sweden, Czech Republic and Italy show that 
competition led to more choice for customers, higher quality of long-distance 
passenger rail in general and reduced prices. Further, the new competitive 
situation also forces the incumbents to provide better quality, as the example of 
TI shows. As a consequence, the modal share of rail increased on the ODs with 
head-to-head competition, which has a positive influence on the environment. 
This is a core element for the EU’s strategy to reduce future transport 
emissions. Further, competition leads to a higher efficiency in the market since 
incumbent operators as well as competitors need to reduce costs in order to 
provide competitive prices. While the positive aspects outweigh the negative 
ones, some drawbacks of open access competition exist: on the one hand, the 
complexity of the system is increased. An overcrowding of infrastructure of 
profitable ODs can lead to congestions, if the existing infrastructure is not built 




for a high frequency of trains. The example on the line Prague-Ostrava shows 
this. Also, the train paths allocation is more complex than without open access 
competition. On the other hand, the overall profitability of the rail industry is 
expected to decrease due to open access competition. This might lead to the 
reduction of all unprofitable ODs, especially in the regional areas. In the worst 
case, it could lead to the exit of further open access providers, as in the case of 
InterConnex.   
Having in mind that open access competition has an overall positive effect on 
the railway industry, what are the underlying drivers that affect competition and 
that help to establish a competitive market? This thesis identifies and discusses 
34 influencing factors from political/legal, economic, social, technical and other 
backgrounds, as shown in section 7.2. When present, they mainly influence 
open access competition positively. The Delphi study as well as the case study 
show that two underlying factors exist, that affect all other factors and therefore 
determine the success of open access competitors in a country: firstly, an 
appropriate legal framework needs to be set up, with strong and independent 
institutions set in place. Secondly, a beneficial market environment needs to 
exist, with high market potential and accessible financing. For the countries 
analysed in this thesis, the political/legal framework has been improved over the 
last twenty years and a good starting position is given. Therefore, the market 
side becomes more important: if an open access provider is ready to provide 
good quality at a reasonable price, the development of open access competition 
can be sped up in the future. However, the experts in the Delphi study do not 
expect a drastic increase in the next decade.  
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Coming to an end, this leaves one important question to be answered: how can 
open access competition best be introduced? As described above, the basic 
condition for successful open access competition is the sound implementation 
of law in the books into action. In doing so, no gaps should be left for 
interpretation that allow the incumbent to discriminate against competitors. All 
institutions which guarantee this need to be set in place as soon as possible. 
Also, the right market needs to be addressed to establish successful open 
access competition. Especially ODs with high market potential and with 
relatively fast infrastructure are best suited to enter a market. It is important that 
the IMs are prepared to make those attractive slots available and that not only 
the incumbent can offer fast connection at the right time. A successful path 
allocation system needs to be set up. The level of RACs needs to be 
considered as well: some ODs in Europe, e.g. some highspeed connections, 
can scarcely be run profitably. With the opening of the overall European market 
for open access competition, especially those lines could be attractive for 
competitors. Therefore, a reduction of RACs might be necessary to establish 
successful competition. Further, a level playing field between intermodal 
competitors is necessary for successful competition. If transport emissions are 
to be reduced, especially on those lines where car and coaches have similar 
travel times, a similar cost structure must exist in order to shift passengers from 
car and coaches to rail.   
The research on open access competition proved to be very interesting, 
throughout the whole process of this thesis. A holistic picture of open access 
competition in the EU could be drawn, which can benefit the development of 
competition in the next years. Especially the EU-wide market opening in 2020 




will be a crucial date for the future of open access competition, which will be 
observed closely by politicians, companies, customers and researchers alike.   
8.2.    Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this thesis, the following recommendations can be 
made, divided into different levels: European politics, national politics, open 
access providers, and incumbents.  
Politics at the European level. Both the Delphi study and the case study reveal 
that open access competition proves beneficial, if set up correctly. Therefore the 
EU’s expectations can be fulfilled by promoting open access competition. 
During work on this thesis, the EC decided to make domestic open access 
competition mandatory, which is a step in the right direction. A recommendation 
is that the EU must continue to monitor the liberalisation process closely and 
further observe violations of law as well as taking enforcement actions when 
appropriate. The Italian case shows that the simple implementation of EU law in 
the books is not a solution which promotes open access competition. It is 
therefore necessary that existing law in the books and future law in the books 
need to be holistically implemented as part of a network of influencing factors, 
without leaving leeway for interpretation. The progress made regarding 
homologation shows that the EU has taken the right steps and needs to 
continue with the idea of a one-stop shop in the future to further reduce the 
negative influence from this factor. Technical harmonisation between the 
countries must also be observed closely and a higher process speed might be 
necessary to reduce the negative influence and provide the basis for additional 
international open access competition.  
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Politics at the national level. Despite the EU’s decision to make domestic open 
access mandatory by 2020, liberalisation can also be promoted at the national 
level more quickly. It is recommended that the EU countries examine the 
situation and proceed to allow open access competition partly or entirely. This 
speeding up bears risks as well and needs to be considered closely, also taking 
other transport modes into consideration. If this step is taken, it is of great 
importance to establish and guarantee the independence and necessary 
strength of the respective authority, since this proved to be the core issue in the 
Italian and German cases. The case study also reveals and the Delphi study 
indicates that PSO needs to be reconsidered as well. In Germany, no PSO in 
long-distance passenger rail exists, in Italy the high frequency of PSO-services 
on some lines leaves little room for profitable open access competition. It is 
therefore recommended to closely examine the necessity to pay subsidies on 
highly frequented secondary lines, to open new possibilities for open access 
providers. Furthermore, the Italian case proves the influence of amended costs 
for infrastructure: the reduced track access fees in Italy on the high-speed lines 
led to a stabilisation of NTV’s economic situation, it was beneficial for the 
incumbent TI and due to the increase in train-km not harmful for the IM. Also, 
national governments tend to lose track of cross-financing, especially of PSO-
money to guarantee equal conditions for incumbents and competitors.  
Open access competitors. The outcome of the thesis shows that the optimal 
absorption of market potential is the key to successful open access competition, 
once the legal framework exists. This requires different steps from providers: 
before market entry, an analysis of the currently existing market potential and 
an estimate of possible future customers need to be performed. The overall 
increase in rail customers in the Italian high-speed network indicates this. This 




forms the basis for economic success. It further shows the necessity of a 
successful distribution strategy: the increase of customers for Locomore after 
the integration into FlixMobility’s distribution system is impressive. This once 
again indicates that a strong distribution partner or a well-functioning distribution 
system is a precondition to realise the existing market potential. A further finding 
is that product differentiation strategies that addressed especially the higher-
priced segments, by offering premium quality, did not work out for most open 
access competitors. The setting up of low-price strategy on the other side 
worked out well for some open access providers, like RegioJet, FlixMobility, and 
WESTbahn. This strategy is therefore recommended, since it attracts more 
customers not only from the incumbent, but also from other modes of 
transportation. Overall, it is recommended that the open access providers have 
a close look at the existing network of factors influencing their individual case: 
this can help to show additional risks or chances that are not obvious at first 
glance.  
Incumbents. The findings of the study reveal that the existence of open access 
competition does not have to be a disadvantage for incumbents, if they can 
provide a comparable service. Within a few years’ time, TI managed to improve 
the quality of its services and its efficiency to a great degree, resulting in an 
increase of customers in the high-speed sector despite fierce competition. Thus 
when competitors, especially large competitors, plan to enter the market of the 
incumbent, the company needs to reconsider its positioning, internal structure 
and strategy to adapt to customer expectation. This makes the migration of 
customers to the competitor less likely. An increase of efficiency also prepares 
the incumbent for a potential price war after market entry. A further 
recommendation for incumbents is the consideration of partnerships with open 
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access providers or intermodal competitors like coach providers, with the goal 
of achieving a shift of customers to rail, and to keep those customers within the 
system. This can also serve as a competitive advantage over positive 
intramodal competitors.  
8.3.    Suggestions for further research 
The research goals of this thesis were fulfilled completely and the topic of open 
access competition was reviewed comprehensively. The following section will 
give some brief suggestions for further research, drawing on the findings of this 
thesis.  
The scope of the case study is limited to Germany and Italy, additional case 
studies of existing competition in the Czech Republic, Austria and Sweden are 
recommended. This would lead to a broader set of qualitative data and the 
identified influencing factors could further be challenged from additional country 
perspectives. The analysis could further be extended to a specific investigation 
of international long-distance passenger services, to challenge the influencing 
factors by having two or more European countries under consideration. While 
the influencing factors identified by the Delphi study form a framework, the case 
study reveals developments until the middle of 2018. To identify future 
developments, it is recommended to conduct a similar study in a few years’ 
time, especially regarding the opening of the market for open access 
competition in all member states in 2020, and a shift of factors and new factors 
occurring. With the further development of competition and the generation of 
new, quantitative data, the outcome of this thesis should once again be 
challenged, taking this quantitative data into consideration. Moreover, it would 
be helpful for understanding the global passenger rail industry if the identified 




influencing factors could also apply to other countries. Therefore a new Delphi 
study with an extended panel is recommended. This thesis shows that the 
development of customers’ willingness to pay has a major influence on open 
access competition, and also on the profitability of incumbents. It would be 
helpful for the passenger rail industry to investigate these influencing factors 
more closely, especially taking the intermodal competitors such as coach 
providers and airlines into consideration. With PSO closing markets in which 
open access competition could be beneficial for customers and regions, the 
system of PSO needs to be reconsidered once again, answering the question if 
PSO on profitable lines is a strong means to prevent open access competition 
and what needs to be done to achieve a viable balance. This thesis gives an 
indication regarding the linkages of influencing factors and proposes a 
precondition chain. It would be helpful to do further research in this field to gain 
more knowledge on that part. If done properly, this could serve as a “check-list” 
for the politics, companies, and researchers to classify the degree of 
liberalisation and likeliness of successful open access competition. Finally, this 
thesis once again shows how interlinked the long-distance passenger rail 
market is with other transportation modes, especially the coach industry. It 
would be of great interest to analyse long-distance coaches on a European 
level to show past developments and give an outlook for future developments. 
This would also benefit the passenger rail industry since important 
considerations can be drawn from this concerning future strategic positioning. 
Also, both the Italian and German cases indicate that a combination of coaches 
and rail can be beneficial for rail operators, coach operators and the customers. 
It would be interesting to develop an approach towards an ideal combination of 
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Appendix 2: 1st Delphi questionnaire 
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Appendix 3: 2nd Delphi questionnaire 
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Appendix 4: 3rd Delphi questionnaire 
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Appendix 9: Approved interview data collection forms (Participant A to F) 
Data Collection Form A 
Θ1 Data collection = interview 
Time of collection = 10.02.2017 
Characterisation of participant:  
• more than 20 years of working experience in the 
passenger rail industry, mainly in Germany 
• CEO and board positions at different railway 
companies (competitors and incumbent) as well 
as political associations 
ϑ1 
Cluster Influencing factor Participant A 
P/L 
Law in books  
• Laws are the basis for theoretical existence of 
competition  
• Can function as a threat of possible competition 
for incumbent 
Law in action  
• In action, law is working mostly to discipline the 
incumbent since DB Fv has such big influence 
and market power and a quasi-monopoly 
• Monopoly Commission is the only active 
promoter for more open access competition from 
the legal side  
Access to facilities and data  
• Access for competitors is generally considered 
satisfying till good and is no major issues exist 
Access to and availability of 
attractive train paths 
• Access for competitors is generally considered 
satisfying till good with no major issues 
• In the past, “path framework contracts” were a 
means to secure paths for competitors (HKX and 
InterConnex) for several years – as long as the 
competitor understood the system and knew 
when and how to apply 
Attitude of government and 
politicians towards 
competition  
• Open access has a limited number of advocates 
in German government and the political 
landscape 
• The currently provided network or system might 
be too big to engage politicians to change it 
• The difference in regional passenger rail is that 
politicians are actively involved since they feel 
responsible for the regional traffic strategy – and 
also subsidies are paid  
Unbundling 
• In an ideal world, DB Fv and DB Netz would be 
separated 
• If unbundling is successful, this is strongly 
dependent on the law in action 
• The current holding structure of DB AG results in 
no big discrimination of competitors 
• However, the “signal” of an integrated holding – 
no matter how good the Chinese walls work – is 
a market entry barrier or an insecurity for e.g. 
investors 
State of and investment in 
infrastructure 
• A network in good conditions is the basis for 
competition 
• German network has an investment backlog and 
in the next years, major construction works will 
take place to solve the problems  
• This harms all operators, including competitors  
o For InterConnex, line closures due to 
construction work lead to reduction in sales 
• The too old signalling/security facilities lead to 
high maintenance costs and therefore increase 
the price for infrastructure   
Willingness or ability to 
subsidise operations  
• Higher investments/subsidies in infrastructure 
would benefit the entire industry, competitors 
included  
Consumer policy 
• Not relevant, the same conditions apply to 
everyone 
E 
Market potential and market 
size 
• A very important point: often the obvious 
potential lead to the idea and finally market entry 




o InterConnex: DB withdraw from InterRegio-
Network and InterConnex filled the gap 
since they saw a market potential  
o HKX: DB Fv did not serve the line between 
Hamburg and Cologne sufficiently and no 
proper air-competition existed, therefore 
market potential was seen in  
• The aspect becomes trickier now, since the bus 
competition is more dynamic than the rail 
competition and connects more destinations 
directly   
Costs for infrastructure  
• In Germany, infrastructure costs increase the 
prices to non-profitability in the long-distance 
passenger market 
• This leads to a market entry of competitors 
mainly on niche markets where prices for 
infrastructure are lower 
o HKX did not use high speed rail paths 
between Frankfurt and Cologne 
o InterConnex also used secondary lines 
• “This factor might not be the “killer” of the 
competition but it harms the passenger rail 
sectors in general”   
Access to distribution 
systems  
• Inclusion in passenger information and in the 
listing of connections is very important  
o InterConnex filed a suit against DB in order 
to be listed in their systems – they won  
• Even when the listing is given now for every 
competitor, access to distribution is still 
important – the “buy now”-button makes a 
difference for customers  
o HKX changed from a long-distance 
provider to a regional provider in order to 
be sold over DB’s distribution channels – 
however it did not work out due to 
problems with reservation, an investment 
was necessary which HKX did not want to 
take  
• This is also dependent on the OD, since an OD 
with more interchanges is more unlikely to attract 
customers when different tickets are required – 
point-to-point tickets depend less on the 
incumbents’ distribution system  
• In the starting years of long-distance bus 
competition, the price comparison platforms 
directed especially price-sensitive customers to 
HKX’ booking page, since HKX was listed there 
• Still, a shift can be observed: online and mobile 
sales become more important and make it easier 
to sell tickets. In the beginning, mostly young 
people used it – now a wider share of population 
gets used to it 
Presence of intermodal 
competitors  
• It was introduced by the politicians partly to 
discipline DB Fv on long-distance passenger 
transport 
• Bus transport has a high influence on open 
access competition 
o InterConnex: bus competition was the fatal 
blow for InterConnex, it came really fast 
with many connections and to very cheap 
prices, they finally had to terminate the 
market 
o HKX: bus has an effect on HKX’ 
profitability, however it is indirect. Since DB 
Fv adapted their prices to compete with 
bus providers, HKX suffers from the low 
price-level of DB Fv 
• The existence of bus competition led, together 
with the low-cost-airlines, to a decreasing price 
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of mobility which forces long-distance rail 
provider to offer cheap price in order to be 
competitive   
Existence of network effects 
for incumbents 
• Long-distance passenger rail in Germany is 
considered as a fixed, interlinked system: the 
more inter-changes a passenger needs to make 
to get to their destination, the more likely 
network effects are 
o HKX has more point-to-point travellers will 
lesser inter-changes  
• A difference between generations can be 
observed, younger people “design” their trips 
with apps and different ticket providers, enabled 
by technology. More and more people adapt, too  
• This is also depending on price sensibility: 
business travellers and higher priced segments 
are more likely to stay in the network than leisure 
and low-price segments  
Generally low profitability of 
the industry 
• It is difficult to earn money with open-access 
competition 
o InterConnex: the transport did not earn 
much money but is contributed positively to 
the brand image 
• “The generally low profitability of the industry 
often led to bloody noses when talking to 
possible investors – they might like the idea of 
open access competition at first but when they 
do research, they back out”  
• A high fixed costs structure exists in the industry, 
especially due to high infrastructure fees  
• High exit costs: bought rolling stock is often too 
specialised and cannot be used elsewhere and 
consequently cannot being sold easily 
Access to financing  
• Experience shows that investors are interested 
in doing open access in Germany because it is 
allowed by law and scare. However, when they 
make further investigation, they deny financing 
• This is due to: low profitability, potential danger 
of discrimination by incumbent in a vertically 
integrated holding structure, high market power 
of DB Fv, often irreversible costs of rolling stock, 
long-term-character of the investment  
Cooperation/coopetition 
within the industry 
• The existing structure of international 
cooperations between incumbents makes it 
nearly impossible for open access competitor to 
provide international services: the network is too 
dense when two incumbents already cooperate 
Cross-financing  • Not an issue in Germany 
Cooperation with other 
transport modes 
• Cooperation with other modes, e.g. buses, would 
only make sense if an individual network could 
be created. This is not the case in Germany and 
failed, e.g. for HKX.  
Possibility for cherry-picking 
in the market  
• In general, it can be beneficial for incumbents 
but it is always dependent on what the “cherry” is 
– this can be seen from different points of view, 
e.g. Gera in case of InterConnex  
• Highly dependent on market structure and 
market size 
S 
Existence of (strong) unions • Not an issue in Germany  
Customer loyalty 
• Competitors observe a high customer loyalty in 
general 
• They collect “fans” quickly and form online 
communities, like in case of HKX and 
InterConnex 
• Customer of competitors seem to have a higher 
tolerance for problems and delays  
• “Customer loyalty to competitors is often 
triggered only by the existence of the new 




providers which symbolise an alternative to the 
incumbents” 
Sharing economy  
• This is a revolution for transportation, and further 
enabled by the internet and apps  
• Currently mainly used by younger generation  
Adjustment to customer 
expectation 
• One would believe that this has a high effect 
o HKX offered special organic food and 
drinks 
o InterConnex offered child-care for children 
that travelled alone on weekends 
• However, no big effect: the battle is won on the 
price-side 
Customers’ willingness to pay 
• Currently, a relatively low willingness to pay for 
mobility, this has decreased in the last years 
• Add-ons (like e.g. Business Tickets in HKX) are 
difficult to sell 
• Competitors use the low willingness to pay as an 
advantage over incumbents:  
o This worked well for HKX and InterConnex 
during the time when DB Fv was 
considered as expensive – today this is not 
working anymore 
o DB Fv sold “Sparpreise” up to 3 days 
before the start of journey. Consequently, 
the last 3 days before departure, customers 
changed from DB Fv to HKX since it was 
cheaper. Since DB Fv now sells 
“Sparpreise” until the start of journey as a 
consequence to the cheap bus prices, it 
becomes more difficult for HKX 
Entrepreneurship 
• “You have to be crazy in order to offer open 
access competition” 
• It is very important for an open access 
competitor in Germany to have a persistent and 
driven entrepreneur as CEO, since it is a stony 
path 
• Since the industry is complex, an understanding 
for rail is necessary (e.g. paths framework 
agreements)  
Attitude of press and 
population toward 
competition 
• For competitors this is extremely important and 
mostly very positive: due to the novelty and 
mostly non-existence of competition, customers 
like to chose 
• Positive attitude of press and population leads to 
higher customer loyalty 
o DB has a highly negative image in Stuttgart 
since the project “Stuttgart 21” - this is 
expected to bring more customers to 
Locomore. Their market potential increases 
due to the positive attitude of people 
towards the competitor 
T Access to rolling stock 
• Access to rolling stock is still extremely tricky in 
Germany  
• First hand rolling stock mostly is too expensive 
and only few investors would finance it – very 
little leasing companies exist 
• Second hand rolling stock is also difficult to buy 
due to the technical specification and missing 
technical harmonisation in the EU 
• Most competitors use second hand rolling stock 
o InterConnex even used rolling stock from 
regional transport and the customers were 
very satisfied 
o HKX also partly used regional transport 
rolling stock since they had no reserve in 
the beginning  
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o The older coaches HKX used lead to a 
lower reliability and a higher degree of 
maintenance 
• Requirements on type and number of rolling 
stock can change during process of 
ordering/refurbishment 
o HKX bought old ÖBB-coaches which were 
refurbished and homologated and now are 
not being used since the situation changed  
• “Rolling stock generally is an 
“Investorenschreck”” 
• A chance could occur if first competitors leave 
the market and try to sell rolling stock, this could 
lead to market entry in other countries and on 
other lines 
Lack of technical 
harmonisation within the EU 
• This is an important point, mostly due to rolling 
stock access 
• Up to now, no clear improvements can be seen 
up to now 
Existence of innovation 
• Technical innovation rarely plays a role 
• Market innovation can be a chance for 
competitors, e.g. InterConnex‘ idea to offer “child 
care” on the line between Berlin and Leipzig  
Homologation process 
• After a “homologation crisis” a few years ago, 
the situation has improved significantly  
o During this time, HKX also tried to 
homologate ÖBB-coaches and had trouble 
doing so 
• The “homologation crisis” however had long-
term consequences and still frightens investors 
Railway safety systems • No effect on the German market 
Availability of necessary 
personnel 
• No significant problems which cannot be solved 
• Possible future problems with the availability of 
train drivers 
Other 
Incumbent’s performance  
• Generally, no significant discrimination by DB Fv 
• No price war between DB Fv and competitor can 
be observed 
• However, the decrease of DB Fv prices since the 
introduction of long-distance bus services 
harmed HKX 
• DB Fv’s sometimes bad image leads to a switch 
of customers to competitors  
Additional findings • “In general, the economic factors are the most 
relevant for a competitor – all other problems 
can be solved by fighting” 
• “HKX is like a mouse between two elephants: 
DB Fv and FlixBus”   
ϑ2 
Findings  • Access to financing – secured access to paths – 
law in the books and discrimination potential by 
vertical integration – high costs for rolling stock 
• Law in the books – law in action – incumbent’s 
performance – politicians’ attitude towards 
competition 
• Low profitability – intermodal competition – high 
costs for infrastructure  
ϑ3 
Findings • Clear shift in intermodal competition since 
opening of the long-distance bus market  
• Customers’ willingness to pay also decrease 
over the years 
• Homologation process improved  
• The appearance and disappearance of “bus-
price-competition-pages” which improved 
distribution of tickets 
• Shift with regards to access to distribution 
systems: not as important anymore due to easily 
booking online and via apps 
 





Data Collection Form B 
Θ1 Data collection = interview 
Time of collection = 16.02.2017 
Characterisation of participant:  
• More than 20 years of working experience in the 
railway industry, mostly with focus on Germany  
• Background in research and consulting as well 
as civil service in political institutions 
ϑ1 
Cluster Influencing factor Participant B 
P/L 
Law in books  
• Law forms the underlying basis for competition 
• Legal conditions for open access competition are 
given in Germany since 1994 
• Regulation needs to be developed further in the 
next years but will most likely not change 
drastically 
Law in action  
• Law in the books is lived in Germany  
• The holding-structure of DB makes a monitoring 
of political institutions and authorities necessary 
Access to facilities & data  
• Good access is generally given in Germany 
• In highly frequented stations or hubs bottlenecks 
occur 
o HKX had trouble to get sidings at Frankfurt 
Hbf 
o RDC hat problems with the infrastructure 
and paths on the route to Sylt 
Access to and availability of 
attractive train paths 
• General access to paths is satisfying, however in 
big transport hubs (e.g. Frankfurt/Hamburg) 
allocation of attractive paths can be tricky 
• The German network is a “mixed network”, 
different forms of railway service are provided at 
the same time with different speeds and 
stopping pattern 
• Currently, paths can be blocked one year in 
advance 
• In the past, “path framework contracts” could be 
closed in order to secure paths and achieve 
planning security 
o Competitors, e.g. HKX/Locomore used this 
tool  
• Open access competitors need planning security 
with regards to paths, e.g. to attract investors  
Attitude of government and 
politicians towards 
competition  
• The attitude of politicians towards open access 
competition is ambivalent – no homogeneous 
opinion exists 
o SPD-delegate at “Bundestag” is closely 
connected to the unions whereas the 
unions are mostly dominated by DB Fv 
employees  
• Different interests can also be found between 
“Bund” and “Länder”, since the regional 
governments are mostly interested in their 
subsidised regional transport   
Unbundling 
• “The stricter infrastructure and services in 
unbundled, the less regulation and monitoring of 
the market is needed” 
• Full unbundling would promote open access 
competition in Germany  
• However, it is seen as ambivalent: a weighing off 
between efficiency of the total passenger rail 
market and the wish to introduce more 
competition needs to take place 
State of and investment in 
infrastructure 
• The network forms the basis for competition and 
therefore has a high influence  
• Competition is only possible when enough 
capacity is given  
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o Repeatedly, difficulties in path allocation for 
competitors especially in transport hubs 
occur  
• An upgrading of infrastructure in transport hubs 
could lead to more open access competition and 
would make the entire rail transport more 
attractive 
• The present status quo of the network often 
leads to disruptions and consequently delays  
• However, construction work, if it is organised 
without considering running services of 
incumbent and competitor, can lead to 
commercial losses and a decrease of 
attractiveness  
Willingness or ability to 
subsidise operations  
• Only plays a role in theoretical considerations 
and discussions:  
o “Deutschlandtakt” as a means to offer a 
full-coverage network, also serving regions 
with low demand, whereas the state pays 
subsidies and tenders the lines 
o This would lead to more competition, 
however competition for the market not in 
the market 
• However, currently not pursued aggressively 
and not widely supported by politicians   
Consumer policy 
• Plays no significant role, also because same 
conditions apply for all participants 
E 
Market potential and market 
size 
• Plays a big role since “only where people want 
to travel, competition makes sense” 
o Market entry in most European countries 
show the focus on lines with strong 
demand  
Costs for infrastructure  
• The higher the price for infrastructure, the less 
likely is competition 
• However, infrastructure is only a part of the total 
costs in Germany, round about 20% 
• If costs would be, e.g. halved, no massive wave 
of new competitors would enter the market, 
since the effect would be too weak 
Access to distribution 
systems  
• In the past, access to distribution systems in 
Germany was much more important than today 
– IT and internet enabled other ways of 
distribution  
• Today it is essential that the “brand” of the 
competitor is known 
o HKX had a distribution partnership with DB 
but no significant increase of sales resulted 
from that 
• Access to DB Fv’s distribution system in 
Germany is an advantage, but it has to be 
considered at which costs 
Presence of intermodal 
competitors  
• Intermodal competition influences the price level 
of mobility in the industry 
• However intermodal bus and air competition in 
Germany does not kill intra modal competition: 
car transportation is the main intermodal 
competitor  
o InterConnex claims to be a victim of 
intermodal competition with long-distance 
busses, however their services were even 
unprofitable before the liberalisation 
Existence of network effects 
for incumbents 
• DB Fv’s network effects hinders competition, it is 
a strong entry barrier  
o e.g. the “Bahncard” as a customer loyalty 
tool: customers “buy” a network with 
Bahncard 100 or Bahncard 50 – why 
should they change to a competitor’s 
network?  




• Network effects also theoretically enable DB Fv 
to fight price wars against competitors 
Generally low profitability of 
the industry 
• Railway industry cannot compete with other 
industries regarding profitability  
• “You do not run trains for high returns”  
o HKX and Locomore have “railway 
enthusiasts” as managers/investors, 
therefore we can speak of another type of 
competition, which has an “idealistic” goal 
besides high profits 
• More profitability in the industry would result in 
easier access to financing and more competition  
Access to financing  
• Plays a big role for market entry 
o Various companies who planned to access 
the market failed due to missing financing, 
they were asked by the investors to provide 
securities 
• High ex ante investment sums are needed which 
makes it even harder to get financing  
Cooperation/coopetition 
within the industry 
• Cooperation within the rail industry can make a 
difference: 
o  E.g. regional pre- and onwards carriage 
o Loyalty caused by cooperation between DB 
Fv and other European incumbents, e.g. 
SNCF can prevent entry from the other 
incumbent  
Cross-financing  
• Regional transport provider get subsidies in 
order to cover the expenses – they provide open 
access at marginal cost level with existing rolling 
stock (e.g. HEX) 
Cooperation with other 
transport modes 
• Can be an advantage but is often associated 
with a lot of work and has no significant effect on 
competition 
Possibility for cherry-picking 
in the market  
• Necessary to get competition going in the 
beginning 
• Currently no real cherry-picking is practiced in 
the German market:  
o InterConnex ran on secondary lines  
o HKX and Locomore run on “cherry lines” 
but provide too little daily connections  
S 
Existence of (strong) unions 
• Political influence of unions is relatively high in 
Germany (e.g. SPD in Bundestag)  
• However, if new rail companies are found, 
unions normally have little influence  
Customer loyalty • Customer loyalty at DB Fv is relatively low 
Sharing economy  
• Currently no big influence on open access 
competition, however this can change in the next 
years 
• UBER for example has more influence on 
regional transportation 
Adjustment to customer  
expectation 
• Customers’ expectations in Germany are very 
heterogeneous 
• “The passenger rail provider that can bundle the 
most customer expectations will be most 
successful”  
o DB Fv satisfies a great variety of customer 
expectations 
o HKX partly failed due to a focus on a too 
narrow field of customers, namely the price 
sensitive leisure customers 
Customers’ willingness to pay 
• Plays a big role for competition  
• In order to be successful in Germany, a wide 
variety of different willingness to pay needs to be 
covered 
• Willingness to pay is also influence by 
intermodal competition 
• However the Germans’ willingness to pay does 
not and will not change significantly in the next 
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years since it is also influence by economic 
circumstance   
Entrepreneurship 
• “Open access competition is mostly done by 
idealists with passion for railways”  
• Competitors often bring own money into the 
company (e.g. HKX & Locomore, also Westbahn 
& NTV)  
Attitude of press and 
population toward 
competition 
• The attitude of press and population towards 
competition is generally positive  
• Only individual interest groups are/were 
suspicious  
• However, this has little influence on competition  
T 
Access to rolling stock 
• In Germany, no market for second hand rolling 
stock and leasing of rolling stock exists 
• It is easier to buy and rent locos than coaches 
o HKX and Locomore had trouble to obtain 
coaches 
Lack of technical 
harmonisation within the EU 
• The missing harmonisation is an entry barrier for 
incumbent competitors  
• It has a weaker influence on domestic German 
competition  
Existence of innovation 
• Innovations can have positive and negative 
influence: 
o The internet and the related technical 
changes had a very positive influence on 
competition since it e.g. allows easier ticket 
distribution  
o ETCS can mean additional effort and costs 
for competitors  
Homologation process 
• Not the process of homologation is hindering 
competition but the effort which is associated 
with homologation  
o HKX bought coaches abroad which used to 
run in Germany but those could not be 
homologated without alterations 
Railway safety systems 
• Hinders no competition since equal conditions 
apply to all railway undertakings 
• For smaller competitors:  
o Technical features which might need to be 
updated are most costly 
o Safety management systems can also 
provide challenges 
Availability of necessary 
personnel 
• Companies in Germany complain about the non-
availability of train personnel 
• However, all companies found needed staff, incl. 
HKX and Locomore 
• The number of employed train drivers has 
increased in the last years in Germany 
Other 
Incumbent’s performance  
• DB Fv has a strong market position in Germany 
and even in Europe and adapts well to changes 
o Updated their pricing system according to 
market changes 
o Covers a wide portfolio of customers which 
is a clear competitive advantage 
• However, DB Fv sometimes has a negative 
image among customers which leads to a low 
customer loyalty  
Additional findings • Existing competitors provide competition on 
another level: slower paths, less frequency of 
connections, older rolling stock  
• Political and legal influence factors form 
competition and influence it most (e.g. 
organisation of the market, investment in 
infrastructure) 
ϑ2 
Findings  • Availability of paths – rolling stock – financing – 
possibility for cherry-picking – profitability → all 
leads to the conception of a business model  




• Incumbents performance (strong market 
position) – cooperation with other state 
incumbents 
• Low profitability – infrastructure costs  
ϑ3 
Findings • Market environment has changed only slightly – 
no leaps can be observed 
o DB Fv slightly improved in image and 
adapted to market conditions, undermining 
their position as strong market player 
o Intermodal competition changed due to the 
opening of the bus market, however no 
significant shift can be observed due to the 
still remaining strong position of cars 
o Access to distribution systems became 




Data Collection Form C 
Θ1 Data collection = interview 
Time of collection = 28.02.2017 
Characterisation of participant:  
• over 15 years of working experience in the mobility 
and railway industry 
• working experience in politics and for competitors 
• senior management positions 
ϑ1 
Cluster Influencing factor Participant C 
P/L 
Law in books  
• Right from the beginning, German law in the 
books symbolises a “hybrid-liberalisation” 
• Law and regulation providing long-term planning 
security would be of high importance for 
competitors, but are currently absent  
Law in action  
• German law in the books is not implemented and 
lived in a proactive way towards competition 
• On one occasion, in the third path framework 
agreement period, the cancellation fee for paths 
had been reduced drastically which was beneficial 
for competitors 
• Recent change in paradigm: process of paths 
framework agreement has been abolished by EU 
and are therefore not any longer possible in 
Germany – unclear how the process will work in 
the future  
Access to facilities & data  
• This influence factor is “not decisive for the 
outcome of war, but costs a lot of strength”  
• Access is basically seen as possible, but it is a 
“handling” issue: it costs a lot of work and 
persistence   
• Some facilities suffer from bad management, 
however this affects all players  
o DB Station and Services needed to hang out 
Locomore’s information on the stations and 
at the info points and this was often incorrect 
o The display of the train order is not working 
correctly in some stations, like Hanau 
o Locomore has difficulties with shunting and 
the quality of cleaning in Stuttgart  
Access to and availability of 
attractive train paths 
• General access to paths is given, however it is 
rather complex and decisiveness in negotiations 
is necessary 
o Locomore and HKX understand the system 
and have a high degree of filigree 
experience  
• The German network is highly utilised and a de 
facto shortage of paths exists  
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o The newcomer on the German network is 
always structurally disadvantaged, since 
attractive paths are already blocked by 
running competitors 
o In order to break this up, an asymmetric 
regulation is necessary, e.g. through 
“Vorratstrassen” or “Angebotstrassen” like in 
freight rail – this is currently not wanted by 
DB Netz   
o Locomore tried to get paths for HKX via 
“urgent proceedings” at BNetzA, however it 
was denied since it is not clearly defined in 
the existing law 
• Paths framework agreements as an instrument 
was not usable for competitors  
o Before HKX started, they planned to apply 
for path framework agreements and in 1.5 
years’ time they would have had started or 
pay a high cancellation penalty – which was 
very risky 
o Further could the needed long-term security 
not be given by paths framework 
agreements, since it only runs for 5 years 
which is too short for most investors. This is 
different in Italy and Austria and enabled 
competition with new rolling stock financed 
by investors in these countries.     
• It is currently unclear how the new system without 
paths framework agreements will work – up to 
now no clear shaping is known  
Attitude of government and 
politicians towards 
competition  
• Open access competition is seen as a “transport 
ministry specific topic” and has no wide lobby 
• In order to promote competition, a “big bang” with 
regards to regulation is needed – currently, this 
cannot be expected and no lobby for such a 
change exists 
Unbundling 
• Full unbundling would be possible for competition, 
but it is not enough: a real liberalisation would 
need a breaking up of DB Fv into several parts 
that compete against each other – which is not 
wanted by the current government and politicians  
State of and investment in 
infrastructure 
• Irrelevant for competition  
Willingness or ability to 
subsidise operations  
• It plays a role in interregional transport: a clearly 
organised framework would lead to new 
possibilities for competition in regions without 
cherry-picking potential, subsidised by 
regionalisation funds  
Consumer policy 
• It plays a role, but is not significant – it is a 
“handling topic” which costs capacity but has to 
be done 
• Consumer policy is unfair with regards to 
intermodal competition 
E 
Market potential and 
market size 
• The higher the market potential of a destination, 
the lower the risk for market entry 
• Competition starts where the highest market 
potential is, then timetable have to be examined 
and finally the rotation planning has to be done 
• When the incumbent is already running a high 
frequency of trains on a route with high market 
potential, the risk of expulsion is not as big as 
when the competitor enters a route which is not 
served by the incumbent and the incumbent 
decides to re-enter this route again.   
Costs for infrastructure  
• The high costs for infrastructure play a big 
negative role for open access competition  
Access to distribution 
systems  
• Alternative distribution channels can be 
established relatively easy due to technological 
possibilities and the internet  




• A refused access to distribution systems has a 
negative effect on competitors  
o At least 20-25% more tickets could be sold if 
Locomore would be included in DB’s 
distribution system  
o Due to high costs, the setting up of 
individual ticket shops in stations is too 
expensive for a limited number of trains  
• The opening up of the distribution system is 
currently not planned in Germany, however it is 
expected that EU will force an opening quite soon 
and competitors will continue to campaign for it  
Presence of intermodal 
competitors  
• It has an influence on open access rail 
competition, especially due to the decreased 
prices for long-distance passenger transportation  
o Market entry of busses changed situation for 
open access competitor  
o Market entry of low-cost-airlines, like 
Ryanair on the route Frankfurt-Berlin, makes 
profitable operations more difficult   
• This is also enabled due to the unfairness of 
infrastructure costs, e.g. compared to busses 
Existence of network 
effects for incumbents 
• This is no “knock-out-criteria” for competition, 
however the incumbent’s network motivates 
customers to stay within the system  
Generally low profitability of 
the industry 
• The industry is not known to be very profitable  
• However, it is always dependant on how the 
business case is conceptualised 
• When setting up open access competition in 
Germany, companies are not motivated by 
profitability but also need a great degree of 
idealism 
Access to financing  
• Financing for open access competition and 
especially rolling stock is very hard to obtain in 
Germany 
• Very few institutional financiers exist, most of 
them are “spoiled” by regional transport: long-
term contracts are given which provide more 
security with steady payment of subsidies 
• Finding financing is a tricky task for competitors: 
o For HKX, Henry Posner was found, who had 
specific ideas how to do competition and 
provide services 
o For Locomore, crowdfunding was 
established and SRI invested in rolling stock  
o In case of WESTbahn and NTV, the French 
incumbent was participated with as many 
company shares as necessary to provide 
security for investors and banks 
Cooperation/coopetition 
within the industry 
• Cooperation can be a means to optimise the 
business 
Cross-financing  
• Due to the missing regulatory framework which 
implies full liberalisation, it is still non-transparent 
how the infrastructure funds are used within DB 
AG - a possible coverage of ICE 4 financing by 
infrastructure funds cannot be fully excluded 
Cooperation with other 
transport modes 
• This influence factor does not save any business 
plan, but helps to optimise the business  
Possibility for cherry-
picking in the market  
• Open access competition would not be possible in 
the market if no cherry-picking exists 
• It is always a question where cherry-picking 
begins – also with regards to the scale of the offer 
• Cherry-picking mostly implies a problem of 
capacity since the destinations for cherry-picking 
are often characterised by high frequency of 
connections 
S 
Existence of (strong) 
unions 
• Neutral  




• A costumer’s loyalty in Germany is not given, if 
the price of another competitor is cheaper  
Sharing economy  
• Sharing economy has an influence on 
competition, mainly because it supports the trend 
to increase the usage of public transportation, 
which also benefits open access competitors  
Adjustment to customer  
expectation 
• It is important to be successful 
• Traveling in Germany is too standardised – little 
possibility is given to travel individualised or 
personalised  
Customers’ willingness to 
pay 
• German customers are very price sensitive 
• Price sensitivity kills customer loyalty: if another 
provider offers a cheaper price, a high degree of 
customers will switch 
Entrepreneurship 
• As a competitor, in order to be successful in the 
long-distance passenger rail, you have to have a 
clear vision and be extremely steed to it 
• To get what you need, when entering the market 
and when staying in the market, it is important to 
be very persistent  
Attitude of press and 
population toward 
competition 
• The positive attitude of press benefits the 
competitors 
o Marketing budget can be saved due to the 
good presence in press and media  
• Press and population is highly interested in 
competitors in the German market, this is also 
due to the general monopoly in the long-distance 
passenger rail transport  
T 
Access to rolling stock 
• This is the main influence factor on open access 
competition 
• Access to rolling stock is closely related to 
financing, since ex ante investment in rolling stock 
is high and the amortisation period is very long 
o Locomore considered the buying of new 
rolling stock from Siemens but the finding of 
investment was too difficult  
• It is very hard to find hand rolling stock for rent in 
Germany and Europe: no leasing companies like 
in freight rail and little offer of good second hand 
rolling stock exist  
• When Hartmut Mehdorn was CEO at DB AG, a 
very restrictive rolling stock strategy was in place, 
this led to a lack of suitable rolling stock in 
Germany: 
o A high degree of outgoing but still operable 
coaches were scrapped  
o Another part of the rolling stock was sold to 
destinations far away 
o The rolling stock which was sold in central 
Europe was highly restricted and its usage 
was closely controlled 
• The access to locomotives is not considered as a 
problem, the locomotive-market in Germany was 
liberalised 15 years ago when Siemens decided 
to offer flexible and short-term leasing 
o Since big parts of the freight wagons were 
financed with private capital and therefore 
easily accessible, the liberalisation of the 
locomotive market triggered the 
liberalisation of freight rail  
Lack of technical 
harmonisation within the 
EU 
• Irrelevant: if you want to run a concept with 
locomotives and coaches, technical 
harmonisation does not play an immense role 
• Locomotives are relatively easy accessible in 
Germany and coaches are to some degree 
already standardised within Europe  




Existence of innovation 
• It plays no essential role in the market entry 
process, it is possible to enter the market with old, 
conventional rolling stock 
• However, it is an influence on commercial 
success: if you are not innovative with your 
product/offer, it is harder to achieve commercial 
success 
Homologation process 
• It plays a derivative role 
• The process and interaction with the authorities is 
tricky and complex, but solutions can be found 
o In case of HKX’s second hand rolling stock, 
a solution could be found and homologation 
was granted  
Railway safety systems 
• Irrelevant, since the same conditions apply for all 
market players 
Availability of necessary 
personnel 
• Generally, no problem: necessary personnel is 
available 
• However, due to the status of full employment in 
Germany, it is generally harder to get personnel 
than it was a few years ago 
Other 
Incumbent’s performance  
• The incumbent in Germany is too big to compete 
with  
• The size of the incumbent discourages 
competitors and investors – regardless of actual 
discrimination  
• As long as all competitors of DB Fv in the market 
are “alibi-competitors”, little will be done against 
them 
o The case of bus competitors shows that as 
soon as competition endangers DB Fv, they 
react to competitive threats  
Additional findings • The finding of rolling stock is the main influence 
factors, combined with the finding of paths and 
financing  
• Legal and economic influence factors play the 
most important role, being closely intertwined  
ϑ2 
Findings  • Law in the books (and its interpretation) – law in 
action – access to attractive paths (with long-term 
security) – financing  
• Financing – rolling stock   
ϑ3 
Findings • Access to distribution systems: technology and 
internet made it easier to establish alternative 
distribution channels 
• Intermodal competition: liberalisation of the long-
distance bus market led to a decrease of 
monopolistic returns and also to a decrease of 




Data Collection Form D 
Θ2 Data collection = interview 
Time of collection = 03.09.2017 
Characterisation of participant:  
• More than 15 years of working experience in the 
rail industry, with a focus on the Italian and 
German market  
• Participant D holds/held high management 
positions and has experience with both 
competitors and incumbents  
ϑ1 
Cluster Influencing factor Participant D 
P/L Law in books  
• Up to 2009, Italy worked on the implementation of 
EU law, this was the initiation of competition in the 
country 
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• Law in the books, however, still provided 
competitive advantages for the incumbent over a 
long period 
• The legal situation was not very clear and 
uncertainties occurred in the beginning 
Law in action  
• Law in action is broadly diversified: statements and 
decisions are not always clear and explicit 
• In the beginning, one office in the Transport 
Ministry was the whole authority. Decisions were 
made consensual and less competition oriented  
• Law in action came a long way since the early 
days, an improvement becomes apparent  
Access to facilities & data  
• This factor has an influence on competition and 
the access to facilities today is better than in the 
early days of competition 
o The usage of storage facilities was unclear 
for a long time for NTV and DB/ÖBB 
o Facilities like energy, cleaning, etc. were 
optimised after the start of operations by 
DB/ÖBB and changed during the years  
o Access to major stations (e.g. in Rome or 
Milan) were denied by RFI to NTV and 
DB/ÖBB 
Access to and availability of 
attractive train paths 
• Especially in the early times, access to attractive 
train paths was scarcely given  
o When DB/ÖBB applied for paths prior to their 
market entry in 2009. RFI denied the 
attractive train paths since TI wanted to use 
them. They were offered slower train paths 
that did not fit with connecting trains of TI. TI, 
however, never used them and DB/ÖBB had 
to run behind a “ghost train”  
o Originally, DB/ÖBB wanted to run until Milan, 
but the paths were unattractive and slow and 
the train station in Milan was outside of the 
city  
o A official order has bee issued to DB/ÖBB 
not to serve intermediate stops on the Italian 
territory, due to expected cannibalisation of 
subsidised lines – in the end the order has 
never been executed.  
Attitude of government and 
politicians towards 
competition  
• In the beginning, the attitude was rather 
protectionist: Italy implemented EU law at a 
minimum standard  
• When NTV started, there was a lot of scepticism 
and no support from government 
• However, due to the change in government and 
the changed economic situation in Italy, the 
conditions have changed and government and 
politicians are more open towards competition now 
Unbundling 
• Unbundling had an influence, especially in the 
early times: for RFI, the situation was new and no 
clear separation to TI existed  
o e.g. in terms to paths, no clear guidelines for 
priorisation existed, so TI was often priorised  
• Today, a stronger separation exists and Chinese 
Walls are intact which work efficiently  
State of and investment in 
infrastructure 
• This factor has a high influence on open access 
competition in Italy 
• A lot was invested in the Italian infrastructure and 
an investment programme was set up before the 
market entry of competition 
• The fast and attractive infrastructure between the 
main metropolises (Rome-Milan) allows 
competition and provides access to a big market 
• Due to dedicated high-speed lines, the traffic is 
“unmixed” – no slow regional or cargo 
transportation is running on those lines    




Willingness or ability to 
subsidise operations  
• The influence of this factor in Italy is rather low 
• In the early times, the authorities feared a 
cannibalisation of the subsided lines, therefore 
cabotage was forbidden in parts (Arenaways, DB-
ÖBB) 
o DB-ÖBB feared that it would influence their 
traffic but it turned out to be no big influence  
o It also seems to have no influence on NTV 
since they only run high speed transport 
which is also not subsidised in any way  
Consumer policy 
• This factor has low influence – the same 
conditions apply for all market participants  
E 
Market potential and market 
size 
• Market potential has a high positive influence on 
competition in Italy 
• Italy is not polycentric like e.g. Germany, big 
centres with millions of inhabitants exist, which are 
connected with one another via high-speed 
infrastructure (e.g. Milan, Rome)  
o Together with the infrastructure, market 
potential was the core influencing factor that 
brought NTV to a market entry  
o DB-ÖBB were convinced of the touristic 
potential in the north-Italian part and 
therefore also set up the traffic due to this 
reason 
Costs for infrastructure  
• Infrastructure costs is a strong influencing factor in 
Italy 
• It is also a leverage government takes: the prices 
for path km in the high speed network have been 
decreased from 14 EUR in the beginning to 6,50 
EUR now 
• In the past and today, the cost for other 
infrastructure was and is relatively low. However, 
the government plans a high decrease in 2018 
o DB-ÖBB is taking legal actions against RFI 
since they are convinced that this is unfair  
Access to distribution 
systems  
• Access to distribution systems was and still is a 
main factor for the start of operations in Italy 
• 5-6 years ago when digitalisation was not as 
strong as it is today, it was an obligation to have a 
sales office in the stations in order to fill the trains 
with customers  
• Digitalisation changed this up to today, however in 
big hubs, a sales office is still required 
o TI knows about its power in this field 
o TI did not sell DB-ÖBB for some time and it 
was a fight to get back in TIs sales system. 
Only inside TIs distribution system, DB-ÖBB 
could run profitably  
o NTV was not distributed from the beginning 
onwards and had to establish their own sales 
offices 
o NTV offers sales offices in form of ticket 
machines and staff that help customers use 
those ticket machines 
Presence of intermodal 
competitors  
• This factor has low influence on high-speed 
competition: 
o Compared to air competition, NTV has 
advantages since airports are often located 
outside of cities and NTV is fast due to the 
fast infrastructure 
o Compared to buses, NTV is a lot faster 
• In long distance passenger rail it was not relevant 
at market entry of DB-ÖBB. The overall pressure 
is not very high, since bus companies already 
reduced services on some lines 
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Existence of network 
effects for incumbents 
• Competition in Italy is possible without network 
effects, since a number of big cities exist on direct 
lines  
• In long-distance passenger rail, feeding is more 
necessary and possible, DB-ÖBB profit a lot from 
customers that come from or change to TI’s 
network 
• TI and DB-ÖBB work on the harmonisation of their 
timetables in order to guarantee good interchange 
possibilities for the customers 
Generally low profitability of 
the industry 
• Low profitability influences competition in Italy 
o After the market entry, TI and NTV entered a 
price war which led to a drastic decrease of 
ticket prices 
o The banks that are shareholder of NTV want 
to withdraw step by step from the business 
due to the low profitability  
Access to financing  
• It is relatively easy to find investors in Italy, 
however once an investor is found the 
bureaucratic barriers are relatively high  
o It was rather easy for NTV to access 
financing since the main shareholders have 
been financially sound 
o For DB-ÖBB is was also relatively easy to 
access financing since the holding 
companies provided financing   
Cooperation/coopetition 
within the industry 
• This influencing factor plays a big role in Italy 
• The generally low profitability forces competitors 
and incumbent to cooperate 
o DB-ÖBB, for example, have a formal 
cooperation agreement with TI, which is 
important for DB-ÖBB’s success 
Cross-financing  • Very low influence 
Cooperation with other 
transport modes 
• Low influence on competition 
Possibility for cherry-picking 
in the market  
• Cherry-picking is a big influence factor due to the 
metropolitan areas 
• In the past, competition on cherry lines was 
prevented, e.g. by non-availability of infrastructure 
where TI provided subsidised transport  
o When NTV applied for paths, access to 
strategically important stations was denied 
S 
Existence of (strong) unions 
• Unions have an influence on competition since 
they are a cost driver 
o Unions frequently demand that two 
locomotive drivers are needed on one 
locomotive as it is common in freight 
services. This threat would make operations 
significantly more expensive for DB-ÖBB to 
run the trains  
Customer loyalty 
• The influence of customer loyalty on competition is 
relatively low in Italy 
• Customers are not very loyal in Italy, they consider 
which offer is more attractive and convenient for 
them 
o NTV and TI both have customer loyalty 
programmes 
Sharing economy  
• The influence on competition is low 
• Carpooling companies like BlaBlaCar are no real 
competitor to long-distance and especially high-
speed rail 
Adjustment to customer 
expectation 
• This factor plays a role in Italian competition:  
o In the last 8 years since NTV announced to 
enter the market, TI adapted to customer 
wishes: it bought new rolling stock for the 
high speed sector, it adapted the offer 
between Rome and Milan, etc.  




o NTV regularly adapts the network and the 
ODs to customers wishes 
o DB-ÖBB also modified its lines to customers 
wishes and offers end-to-end tickets together 
with TI 
Customers’ willingness to 
pay 
• Willingness to pay has an influence on 
competition, especially since the economic crisis 
from 2010 onwards 
• A detailed yield-management is a pre-condition for 
success in Italian long-distance passenger 
transport 
• The low willingness to pay caused the price war 
between NTV and TI, the connection Rome-Milan 
was sold for 9 EUR at some times 
Entrepreneurship 
• This has a high influence on competition in Italy 
and is a precondition for market entry: Arenaways 
and NTV had and have strong entrepreneurs, 
which started the company 
• When the market entry is successful, 
perseverance is also necessary in order to survive 
in the market 
Attitude of press and 
population toward 
competition 
• Population and press generally promoted 
competition in Italy 
• Population wishes for diversification and for an 
improvement in quality 
o In studies, DB-ÖBB regularly obtain good 
results with regards to service and comfort 
T 
Access to rolling stock 
• This is not an Italian topic, it is a European 
problem 
• Access to rolling stock in Italy is possible, however 
very dependent on the capital strength of the 
company  
o In the case of DB-ÖBB, ÖBB had a surplus 
of coaches which could run on the Italian 
network  
Lack of technical 
harmonisation within the 
EU 
• Technical harmonisation has high influence on 
competition in Italy  
o DB-ÖBB’s locomotive had no homologation 
for Italy for a long time. Now, the 
homologation is existent however only up to 
200 km/h 
• Italy has its own type of ETCS for the high-speed 
lines 
• Entering the Italian market costs a lot of time and 
resources due to the barriers of lacking technical 
harmonisation 
Existence of innovation 
• Innovation makes a difference in Italy, it is, 
however, no major influence factor on competition 
o NTV set up a new distribution system: it does 
not offer sales centres but ticketing machines 
centres where staff helps the customers to 
buy tickets at the machines  
o NTV also provides an entertainment and wifi 
on board of the trains in a very early stage  
Homologation process 
• The homologation process has a high influence on 
the time and resources of competitors  
• In the early times of competition, a lot of 
uncertainties existed and the process was not very 
clear – this has improved 
• Requests and decisions felt random without clear 
guidelines  
o Next to DB-ÖBB, also NTV had problems 
with the homologation process  
Railway safety systems 
• Even if the conditions are equal for all operators, it 
is a complex influence factor 
• A special Italian version of ETCS exists named 
SCMT 
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• Train driver can only run in Italy when they are 
employed by an Italian rail operator  
Availability of necessary 
personnel 
• The availability of necessary personnel is given in 
Italy and has no influence on open access 
competition  
• The necessary training for personnel in operations 
is difficult, also since high barriers for the change 
between companies exists 
Other 
Incumbent’s performance  
• For TI, two strategies could be observed which 
changed after some time:  
• At first, TI tried to prevent competition where 
possible (e.g. paths, stations) and to create 
barriers for possible competitors 
• Due to competitive pressure, TI then initiated a 
comprehensive internal change which resulted in a 
massive increase in quality (e.g. new sales 
system, new rolling stock, new customers 
orientation)  
Additional findings  
ϑ2 
Findings  • Unbundling: the relationship between RFI and TI 
changed a lot over the last years. RFI’s decisions 
were taken randomly and individually in the past 
and are more structured and independent from TI 
now 
• Distribution system: customers are used to digital 
sales channels and machines and no longer 
require personal sales offices 
• Law in action: the regulatory agencies are now 
established and independent and used to be non-
existent in the beginning → however there is work 
to do   
ϑ3 
Findings • Access to financing is closely connect to 
availability of rolling stock  
• The customers’ low willingness to pay is related to 
the low profitability in the industry 




Data Collection Form E 
Θ2 Data collection = interview 
Time of collection = 19.09.2017 
Characterisation of participant:  
• More than 10 years of working experience in the 
transportation industry, with a focus on the 
Italian market  
• Participant E has experience in consulting and 
research  
ϑ1 
Cluster Influencing factor Participant E 
P/L 
Law in books  
• The Italian law in the books is relatively old. If it 
would have been implemented after 2012 it 
would look different  
• Open access is possible for more than 10 
years, the legal framework was introduced in 
2003 
• A new regulation was introduced which obliged 
rail companies to be in a situation, where they 
can tow their own trains in case they get stuck 
on the infrastructure and block other trains. This 
was considered anticompetitive and modified.  
Law in action  
• The separation between infrastructure and 
operations, which is set in the law, exists, not 
from an ownership perspective but two mayor 
companies are set up under one public holding 
(FSI): Trenitalia (hereinafter “TI”) is running 
trains and RFI is in charge of the infrastructure 




• It took a long time to implement law into action, 
and also for companies to enter the market  
o For Arenaways, it was too soon to enter the 
market, the basics for competition were not 
fully implemented at that time 
• However, there are many gaps within the legal 
framework, this makes it harder for competition 
since procedures were and are sometimes not 
clear  
o TI actively used especially at the beginning 
the existing gabs in order to delay 
competition  
o Capacity management is not regulated: 
when enough capacity exists, competition 
is easily possible. However, when capacity 
is exhausted, competition is in danger → 
there is a future risk 
o TI tried to block Italo in the first years with 
the “gaps” in the law. For example, it said 
that Rimini station was not suitable for the 
trains and NTV could not stop 
Access to facilities & data  
• General access to stations is provided with 
some gaps in the regulation. Therefore, access 
to stations cannot fully be controlled 
o In the first years, NTV was only permitted 
to use some secondary stations. This, 
however, has changed over the years 
• TI has its own maintenance and this is not 
accessible by NTV, it also has its own 
maintenance facilities  
• The stations in Italy are managed by RFI 
• Commercial spaces is by Centostazioni 
(formerly partially privatised and recently 
rebought by FSI 100%) and Grandistazioni 
(privatised). The two companies are in charge 
of mid-large and large stations in Italy. The rest 
is not commercially exploited (or it is by RFI) 
Access to and availability of 
attractive train paths 
• It is rather complicated in Italy to get train paths, 
this can be difficult and a risk for new 
companies  
• The process is based on agreements with RFI, 
RFI accommodates paths with each company 
according to a catalogue 
• Access to attractive train paths has not been a 
real problem in the past, since enough capacity 
is existing. This could change in the future when 
not enough capacity is given 
Attitude of government and 
politicians towards 
competition  
• The attitude of government and politicians is 
generally diversified and not “one” universal 
attitude exits 
• In the beginning, politicians were not aware of 
the positive and negative consequences which 
their decisions on competition had  
• The government has a general interest to 
favour TI, they are protective since it is 
governmental owned  
• With regards to competition, Italian companies, 
e.g. NTV, are more protected than other 
competitors from other countries, e.g. DB/ÖBB 
Unbundling 
• Some years ago, the government wanted to 
sell/privatise TI, however unbundling resulted to 
be a problem: the mix of asset ownership and 
the access to credits were tricky, therefore the 
holding structure and the state ownership 
remained  
• Currently, full unbundling is not a topic which is 
actively discussed 
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• The government, however, thinks about the 
privatisation of operation (only train operator) on 
the profitable high-speed network   
State of and investment in 
infrastructure 
• In the 90th, the government decided to invest a 
great sum into the high-speed network  
• The high-speed network and the resulting 
increase in capacity is one of the preconditions 
for competition in Italy 
• The main competitor, NTV, is offering no niche 
product since the capacity to start with a big 
scale approach existed 
Willingness or ability to 
subsidise operations  
• 104 long-distance daily trains are subsidised in 
Italy, TI has a contract which ran for 15 years 
and the payment volume was 200 Mio. EUR 
• This contract has recently been renewed and TI 
gets 350 Mio EUR per year, for 10 years for 
about the same amount of trains 
• Especially long running IC trains and night 
trains with low fares, many stops and slow 
travel times need subsidies. Often, they run in 
between regional transport. Therefore, they 
cannot be run on a commercial level and are 
not TI’s core business 
• Those subsidised trains make niche services for 
competitors impossible since it is not profitable 
to compete with TI’s subsidised trains as well as 
the also subsidised regional trains  
Consumer policy • Not relevant  
E 
Market potential and market 
size 
• Market potential in Italy has a strong influence 
on open access competition  
o NTV chose one of the richest markets to 
enter, which is also a main line of the 
Italian network  
o After running some trains on less profitable 
lines, NTV abandoned those services due 
to cost optimisation  
Costs for infrastructure  
• Infrastructure costs have an influence on open 
access competition  
o When the costs for high-speed paths was 
decreased from 15 EUR to an average of 
8.50 EUR, the business case of NTV was 
improved and the so gained economic 
stability helped NTV 
• The access fees to conventional lines are also 
rather cheap with about 3 EUR per path/km  
Access to distribution 
systems  
• The access to distribution system has an 
influence on open access competition, 
especially due to the resulting costs when a 
new distribution system needs to be set up 
• TI has no obligation to share its sales system 
with competitors 
o NTV created a parallel sales system, 
including search engines, ticketing 
machines, web page, commercial 
agreements with other operators (tourist 
operators, GDSs),  etc. 
• The costs for establishing a parallel distribution 
system are bearable for big competitors, like 
NTV, but not possible for small ones 
o This also was a problem for Arenaways  
Presence of intermodal 
competitors  
• The presence of intermodal competitors clearly 
influences the long-distance passenger rail. 
However, it always depends on the routes 
o E.g. on the route Milan-Bari, air is the 
better choice compared to rail, on the route 
Milan-Rome, air connections were almost 
cancelled since rail is the better choice  




• The quality of the transport provider’s product 
as well as the travel time make the difference 
for the customers 
• On the Italian market, all modes are present, 
including low cost airlines like Easyjet, coaches, 
carsharing  
• Long-distance coaches are more and more 
present in Italy, yet, they have not a high 
influence right now but their influence might 
increase 
• Coaches might have a small price effect on the 
rail lines where prices are high, like Milan-
Padua. This would lower entry-prices for low 
willingness-to-pay users 
Existence of network effects 
for incumbents 
• TI definitely has network effects 
• NTV never put much power into integrating into 
a rail network 
o NTV never integrated into SNCFs TGV 
network, despite SNCF being a 
shareholder in the business, this would 
have been beneficial  
o NTV initiated self-run coaches as “feeder” 
and tries to set up an own network and in 
order to gain network effects 
Generally low profitability of 
the industry 
• This factor should normally be of high influence 
but might not be of such  
o NTV ignored the high economic risk when it 
entered the market and were very 
optimistic. It clearly overestimated the 
willingness-to-pay (→ the obtainable 
yields). However, with time NTV adapted 
its strategy and business plans  
• In general, profitability in Italy is not as low as 
one would expect and competition can be 
successful  
Access to financing  
• When companies and/or entrepreneurs have 
good business connections to banks or 
investors, access to financing is easy  
o The president of NTV held very good 
connections to investors and also banks, 
they provided the necessary money  
Cooperation/coopetition 
within the industry 
• TI holds cooperation with different rail 
companies, e.g. SNCF, DB, SBB, ÖBB 
• Italo holds no rail cooperation, also not with 
SNCF. This however could have had a positive 
effect 
Cross-financing  
• Cross-financing has formally no influence on 
open access competition 
• Generally, no money from infrastructure and 
regional transport can be transferred to TI 
• However, TI gets indirect cross-financing since 
it receives 350 Mio. EUR of subsidies for the 
slower long-distance network. Also access to 
credit could be easier doe to its dimension (too 
big to fail). 
Cooperation with other 
transport modes 
• Cooperation with other modes are used in Italy, 
e.g. in form of feeders 
o Operators have contracts with local coach 
companies which bring people from the 
rural areas to the metropolitan areas where 
they switch to trains  
o NTV has further partnerships with hotels, 
sea ferries and some urban transport 
networks 
o FSI owns Busitalia and Busitalia Fast (bus 
& coach companies) 
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Possibility for cherry-picking 
in the market  
• TI complains that NTV does cherry-picking on 
the high-speed network, however this could not 
been shown and proven yet 
• It can be said that open access competition in 
Italy could not have been realised at such a 
large scale when a running on the main “cherry 
lines” would not have been allowed 
S 
Existence of (strong) unions 
• TI has a ”national” contract with the Italian 
unions. Since until NTV Ferrovie dello Stato 
was the only national rail company, the 
“national” contract is actually “FSI”’s contract, if 
a newcomer defines a new contract with unions 
as NTV did. 
• NTV negotiated its own contract with the Italian 
unions 
• It is necessary to integrate the unions and do 
contracts with them in order to do competition in 
Italy at such scale 
Customer loyalty 
• Italian customers are not particularly loyal and 
therefore this factor has no big influence on 
competition  
• It can be said that the Italian customers had no 
“love” for TI and therefore it was relatively easy 
for NTV to attract TI’s customers 
Sharing economy  
• BlaBlaCar is operating in the Italian market and 
competition exists, however it has now big 
influence on open access competition in Italy 
due to small modal share 
Adjustment to customer 
expectation 
• An adjustment to customers’ wishes is an 
important factor in Italy  
o NTV started with the hypothesis, that it 
would have a huge comfort and quality 
advantage over TI, however TI adapted 
very quickly to customers’ wishes 
o As a consequence, NTV could not realise 
the yield that they originally planned to gain 
Customers’ willingness to pay 
• The willingness to pay in Italy has not changed 
a great deal with the start of open access 
competition  
• The Italians’ willingness to pay is not particularly 
low, especially on the high-speed lines a lot of 
business travellers use the trains which have a 
high willingness to pay 
• Still, NTV offered lower prices than TI to attract 
customers  
• Some offers of both TI and NTV are very low 
• Price variability across classes & flexibility rules 
is very high 
Entrepreneurship 
• This factor plays an important role for open 
access competition 
o In case of NTV, some entrepreneurs liked 
the ideal to run trains on the Italian network 
and they also had the right contacts to 
investors, so they set up a business and 
started operations 
Attitude of press and 
population toward 
competition 
• Press and population have no particular favour 
or ill-favour for one company or the other 
• The population did not “love” TI, also people do 
not have a negative image of NTV which is 
good for the company  
T Access to rolling stock 
• Access to rolling stock is a general problem in 
the industry all over Europe 
• The exception of Italy is that you have a big 
amount of money available to invest in new 
rolling stock  
o NTV had the money and bought 25 new 
trainsets + 12 new trainsets 




o Arenaways bought 2 second-hand train 
sets from Czech Republic 
Lack of technical 
harmonisation within the EU 
• This factor is not crucial for open access 
competition as most of traffic is domestic, 
however is has an influence on the cost 
structure  
o NTV had the money to buy new rolling 
stock that fully fit into the Italian network  
Existence of innovation 
• Existence of innovation is currently no major 
influencing factor and will not be in the future  
Homologation process 
• Homologation in Italy is a long and complicated 
process which costs a lot of money 
o The examples of NTV show that it is 
possible, when you have the necessary 
resources and time 
Railway safety systems • This factor has no influence on competition  
Availability of necessary 
personnel 
• Availability of personnel plays a role for 
competition 
• A high upfront investment is required since 
people need to be trained and payed for months 
before the start of operations  
• It is not a major problem to recruit necessary 
personnel, it is the training that is the critical 
path 
Other 
Incumbent’s performance  
• TI had a strategy to delay competition by using 
the existing gabs in regulation 
• In the beginning of competition, discrimination 
of TI against competitors was frequent, however 
over time it had become less and less 
• The reputation of TI is now generally good. The 
quality of high-speed trains changed a lot since 
TI initiated the change of strategy  
Additional findings •  
ϑ2 
Findings  • The incumbent’s performance changed a great 
deal, since TI improved rolling stock, 
punctuality, pricing system, etc. after the 
competitor announced to enter the market  
• Intermodal competition grew stronger, since 
after the liberalisation more coaches entered 
the market 
• Access charges changed, especially in on high-
speed lines they decreased  
• Investment in infrastructure changed (however 
it is not continuous) 
ϑ3 
Findings • The access to rolling stock is highly dependent 
on the access to financing  
• The availability of necessary personnel is also 
dependent on the access to financing  
• The availability of attractive train paths is 
dependent on the profitability of the industry  
• The customers’ willingness to pay is dependent 
on the market potential  
• Adjustment to customers’ experiences is 
dependent on the profitability of the industry  
 
 
Data Collection Form F 
Θ2 Data collection = interview 
Time of collection = 29.09.2017 
Characterisation of participant:  
• Many years of working experience in the rail 
industry, with a focus on Italy  
• Participant F is working in the field of research and 
consulting  
Cluster Influencing factor Participant F 





Law in books  
• Especially the independency and strength of 
authorities and institutions play an important role. 
Therefore, this influence factor has a high 
importance for open access competition 
o The case of Arenaways shows that when 
authorities and institutions are not made 
strong enough, they cannot protect 
competition   
Law in action  
• Infrastructure fees in Italy are generally set base 
on regulation  
o Intense lobbying by NTV lead to a decrease 
of infrastructure fees  
Access to facilities & data  
• This influence factor is of high importance and 
had delayed start of operations in the past:  
o On the line Milano – Rimini – Ancona, NTV 
could not stop on Rimini Station, since the 
station was not fit for the train. RFI refused to 
adapt the station. NTV wanted to adapt the 
platform by themselves, but was not allowed.  
o As a consequence, the start was delayed 
and due to commercial reasons was only run 
for a limited time by NTV 
Access to and availability of 
attractive train paths 
• Access to attractive paths is of significant 
importance:  
o The main stations Milan and Rome were 
already “full” and no path capacity for NTV’s 
trains was given. Therefore, access to those 
important stations was denied in the 
beginning 
o Now, the situation changed and NTV has 
access 
Attitude of government and 
politicians towards 
competition  
• The visibility of NTV’s top executives is very high 
and they have a good network in the politics – 
NTV could make a lot of “noise” 
o NTV used this influence in order to decrease 
the fee for high-speed lines 
o For Arenaways, this was not possible since 
the political connection was not there and it 
could not make much “noise” 
Unbundling 
• Unbundling has been a problem in the past, 
especially the case between RFI/Trenitalia and 
Arenaways proofs this 
State of and investment in 
infrastructure 
• Participant F is uncertain about this factor:  
o On the high-speed sector the updated 
infrastructure has the positive effect of 
additional capacity which incumbent as well 
as competitors can use  
o For Arenaways it was of no real influence, 
however a generally low capacity exists in 
the normal regional and intercity network  
o The question is, if NTV would have entered 
the market without the existing high-speed 
network 
Willingness or ability to 
subsidise operations  
• This influence factor has relatively high influence:  
o Arenaways was competing with TI’s 
subsidised lines and did not succeed 
o DB ÖBB also see that it is tricky to compete 
with TI  
o SNCF provides a line between Milan and 
France and does not have cabotage in order 
to not compete with national lines 
Consumer policy 
• Consumer policy did play a role in the past:  
o Between Torino and Milan, commuter trains 
are very full and commuters often have no 
seats  
o The association of commuters complained 
about this 
o TI started to ask commuters to book seats  




o Interesting is, that Italo does not offer the 
type of connections which are attractive for 
commuters – it seems to avoid big masses of 
commuters 
E 
Market potential and market 
size 
• “Either you go for a rich OD or you don’t consider 
entering the market” 
• An adequate market size is the precondition for 
open access competition  
• NTV does not offer international connections 
since they are convinced that the market is too 
small  
Costs for infrastructure  
• This factor influences open access competition, 
and it mostly is an entry barrier 
• However, it always depends on the line: on some 
lines – mostly high-speed lines - the costs are 
very high, on other lines they are rather low and 
fair  
Access to distribution 
systems  
• TI has ticketing machines at prominent points in 
station -  they are very visible. NTV wanted to 
have machines in the same places but it was not 
possible in the beginning. Now, the situation 
changed an ticketing machines are in place at key 
points 
• No ticketing platform exists, which allows all 
operators to sell tickets to increase Network 
effects 
Presence of intermodal 
competitors  
• In most cases, it is the other way around and 
open access competition influences intermodal 
competitors: airlines abandon lines and rail take 
over air customers  
• The core advantage is that rail starts its lines 
directly in city centres, this beats air because 
airports are often located outside of cities 
• Coaches are no competition to high-speed rail but 
can be for long-distance passenger rail  
Existence of network effects 
for incumbents 
• This factor influences open access competition in 
Italy, it is a means to fill the trains at its optimum 
• In Florence, NTV offered an integrated ticket with 
local public transport: with an NTV rail ticket one 
hour of bus travel in Florence was included 
• NTV and TI both set up their own bus network in 
order to generate additional network effects  
• TI’s timetable is matched to its regional 
connections, when using NTV, customers often 
have to wait in order to be connected to the 
regional network – this is a disadvantage 
Generally low profitability of 
the industry 
• This influence factor is an entry barrier for open 
access competitors, especially in combination 
with path access fees  
Access to financing   
Cooperation/coopetition 
within the industry 
• The example of DB Fv/ÖBB Pv shows that this 
factor has an influence: when DB/ÖBB set up the 
trains and were not cooperating with TI, the trains 
were hidden from the public. After the cooperation 
started, however, TI began advertising the 
DB/ÖBB trains on board of its trains 
Cross-financing  
• Since separate accounts exist within FSI and a 
strong, independent institution is set up, this 
factor has no influence on open access 
competition   
Cooperation with other 
transport modes 
• This influences open access competition, the 
coach network that TI and NTV established show 
that 
• NTV and also TI offers a courier-service to carry 
luggage which can be bought with the NTV ticket   
Possibility for cherry-picking 
in the market  
• Cherry-picking is not only dependant on the line, 
it is also dependant on the choice of paths and 
the time slots:  
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o Arenaways ran on cherry lines, however its 
time slots were not ideal and not many 
customers changed from TI  
o NTV on the other hand has a very similar 
offer to TI, they run only minutes apart  
S 
Existence of (strong) unions 
• The factor generally has no significant influence 
on open access competition 
• Railway unions are generally strong  
• However, not all of NTV’s staff has railway tariff 
contracts: the “stewards” belong to another tariff 
group  
Customer loyalty 
• Customer loyalty has no effect on open access 
competition  
Sharing economy  
• Carsharing exists in all of Italy’s big cities 
• Despite NTV offering carsharing on top to their 
high-speed trains, no significant influence on 
open access competition can be found   
Adjustment to customer 
expectation 
• Adaption to customers’ wishes is necessary:  
o NTV wanted to operate luxury trains, 
however they adapted to satisfy a wider 
market  
o TI also adapted and does finetuning: in the 
beginning, they offered a premium class with 
meeting rooms on Frecciarossa trains. Since 
they seem to be used rarely, the customers 
from the other classes also can access the 
meeting rooms 
Customers’ willingness to 
pay 
• It is important to find the right pricing strategy for 
customers 
• It proved not to be profitable, if only luxury high-
speed rail is provided, no money can be made 
• There is a wide segment of price-sensitive 
customers, therefore TI and also NTV changed 
their strategy and offer cheaper tickets to fill the 
trains  
Entrepreneurship 
• Especially the political network and the possibility 
to make “noise” in case of irregularities is a 
benefit which NTV had and which helped the to 
improve profitability and stay in the business 
Attitude of press and 
population toward 
competition 
• This factor has no real influence on the Italian 
market 
• Press and population in Italy are generally neutral 
• The customer group of commuters however 
played a special role, they wanted to enforce that 
commuters could use all trains  
T 
Access to rolling stock 
• Access to rolling stock is a barrier to entry for new 
open access operators  
• Arenaways leased its rolling stock from abroad 
Lack of technical 
harmonisation within the EU 
• This influence factor has an influence, since it 
makes the acquisition of rolling stock even more 
difficult  
Existence of innovation 
• Innovations have generally low influence on open 
access competition 
• One innovation that would have a higher 
influence would be the setting up of a sales 
system which is independent of any sales 
infrastructure 
Homologation process 
• Homologation has a negative influence on open 
access competition, it makes it more difficult to 
buy rolling stock, especially second-hand rolling 
stock  
Railway safety systems 
• SNCF runs services between Milan and France, 
however the TGV cannot use the high-speed line 
since it has no approval for the railway safety 
system  
Availability of necessary 
personnel 
• In freight transport, the recruiting of train drivers is 
critical: in the first years, the freight competitors 
acquired personnel from TI. In the following 




years, the association of freight open access 
operators complained that TI acquired trained 
train drivers from them 
• In Italy, companies exist that train train drivers 
and provides schools for training  
Other 
Incumbent’s performance  
• TI made it really hard for competitors in a fair 
way:  
o TI got the better feeling for the market and 
therefore better adapted to customers wants 
o TI improved its image a great deal. There is a 
differentiation between regional and high-
speed, but now TI is known to provide good 
quality high-speed rail  
Additional findings • Marketing plays an important role: NTV made an 
impression by using clever marketing strategies:  
o NTV let people chose the name for the trains 
o Before the start of operations, NTV filled 
billboards with advertisement  
o NTV regularly posts advertisement in papers  
o Also TI started posting advertisement 
recently, making Frecciarossa a real brand  
ϑ2 
Findings  • Law in action and law in the books 
• Access to facilities 
• Access to attractive train paths  
ϑ3 
Findings • Rolling stock availability – homologation process 
– lacking technical harmonisation  
• Infrastructure fees – market size – low profitability 
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Appendix 10: DB Fv’s ICE and IC/EC route map 2018 
 
Sources:  
DB (2018e). ICE-Netz 2018. [online] Available at: https://www.bahn.de/p/view/mdb/bahnintern/fahrplan_ 
und_buchung/reiseauskunftsmedien/fahrplanmedien-download/mdb_263334_ice_liniennetz_v2_2018.pdf 
[Updated 12/2017, accessed 12/5/2018]. 
DB (2018f). EC/IC-Netz 2018. [online] Available at: https://www.bahn.de/p/view/mdb/bahnintern/fahrplan 
_und_buchung/reiseauskunftsmedien/fahrplanmedien-download/mdb_263335_icec_liniennetz_2018.pdf 


















Appendix 11: Locomore’s and HKX’s route map and FlixTrain’s route map 2018 
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Appendix 12: Derschnellzug.de’s planned route map  
 
Source:  




















Appendix 13: NTV’s route map 2018 
 
Source: Italo Spa (2018). Il nostro network. [online] Available at: https://italospa.italotreno.it/network/il-
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